June 2019

The economic element of the Trump administration’s “Deal of the Century,” which was unveiled at the “Peace to Prosperity” workshop in Manama on June 25-26, did not convince Chinese commentators even before Donald Trump’s adviser and son-in-law Jared Kushner went to Bahrain. “Since the ‘Deal of the Century’ clearly deviates from the ‘two-state solution’ recognized by the international community, the European Union, Russia, and China are highly skeptical,” wrote Niu Xinchun, the head of the Middle East department of the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR). [1] While the American plan is destined to fail, says Niu, it will still have important implications for the Palestinians. Niu, indeed, fears that Trump’s plan as well as previous decisions have definitively broken the delicate equilibrium that other American administrations strived to preserve between Israel and the Palestinians; the “Deal” also destroyed any political capital that the United States had left among the Palestinians. According to him, it will be impossible for future Presidents to reverse this situation in any meaningful way. At the same time, Israel, too, does not seem buying the “Deal”, and might simply not comply with it. In that case, writes Gu Zhenglong, a senior commentator affiliated with the China Foundation for International and Strategic Studies and the Xinhua Centre For World Affairs Studies, tensions will further worsen, thereby leading to significant regional instability. [2]

In the case of Iran, too, American policies are under attack. According to Qin Tian of Shanghai International Studies University (SISU), it is clear that Iran is successfully fighting back and called American bluff in the face of a potential strike. [3] According to the Grandview Institution’s Tian Shichen, it is only a matter of time before the United States will attack Iran. [4] Former Chinese Ambassador to Iran Hua Liming, instead, argued that the situation depends on whether Secretary of State Pompeo, National Security Adviser Bolton, and other foreign actors that would gain from a war will succeed in hijacking American foreign policy despite President Trump’s apparent unwillingness to wage war against Iran. [5]

Ambassador Hua made such a comment during a long interview with the Observer, and also put forward his opinions on both Japan’s tentative role as mediator and the Chinese purchase of oil from Iran, which are worth taking into consideration in the light of two other articles published by Chinese media. As for Japan, Hua described it as a humiliation for both Japan and the United States. According to him, Shizo Abe, the first Japanese Prime Minister to visit Iran in 40 years, volunteered to help the Americans but not only did his mission fail but, by coincidence, two tankers with “Japan-related” cargo were attacked in Strait of Hormuz during Abe’s stay in Iran. Wang Jin, an expert at Northeastern University, too, argued that Abe was destined to fail in his attempt to be a “middleman” between Iran and the United States: Japan does not have the ability to influence any of the parties involved. [6] Such event might well be the end of Japan’s aspiration to play a stronger role in the region, something that was deemed possible by Cheng Yun, an Associate Professor at Nanjing University, who wrote an analysis of Japan’s diplomacy in the Middle East for Xinhua’s Globe. [7]

As for Iran, Hua ambiguously declared that “although CNPC and Sinopec stopped importing Iranian oil, it does not mean Chinese companies cannot buy it. I believe that oil trade between Iran and China will not stop.” These words seem to summarize well the evolution of the Sino-Iranian energy relations. As pointed out by the Global Times in November 2018, 7% of oil imports to China used to come from Iran in the pre-sanctions period and it is impossible to re-gear Chinese refineries to adapt quickly to a no-Iranian oil scenario. Hence, it is likely that China simply cannot avoid buying Iranian oil even after having increased imports from Saudi Arabia and having pursued a diversification strategy that, according to a Global Times article published in June 2019, decreased China’s reliance on Middle Eastern oil to 34,9%. [8] Media reported that Iranian cargoes successfully unloaded crude in Tianjin. Chinese-owned ships, too, have been spotted making port calls in Iran. At the same time, it is important to note that no similar activity has been reported for India and South Korea, two other former major importers of Iranian oil. It is possible that, as hypothesized by Samir Madani, China will try to make the most out of this situation by turning the impossibility of avoiding Iranian oil into a diplomatic tool to undermine the American goal of bringing Iran’s oil exports to zero. This could happen by stopping switching off the Automatic Identification System of its tankers, thereby removing the fig leaf that was used to hide the continuation of China’s imports of Iranian oil.

Egypt for the second month in a row is the subject of articles and analyses published by Chinese media. In May, we reported that Chinese analysts look at that country as a potential resurgent heavy weight in regional politics, although its economic and domestic political situation are not positive. In June, Zhao Jun, a scholar with SISU, confirmed this assessment in two articles. [9] On the one hand, Egypt is investing in its strengthening its military by purchasing new hardware and cooperating with countries like France in order to reestablish its position in the region and maximize its strategic autonomy in a moment where many countries look at Cairo as an important partner in the Libyan theater. On the other hand, the Egyptian regime remains fragile, as proven by the adoption of a state of emergency after then sudden death of Mohamed Morsi, which was probably caused by mistreatment in prison. In any case, Zhao Jun does not see this event as seriously undermining Egypt’s stability in a significant way.

Fragility is a theme that reemerged in the commentaries about Turkey. Unsurprisingly, the defeat of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s Justice and Development Party in the second round of mayoral elections of Istanbul was seen by SISU’s Niu Song as a confirming the analysis published by other Chinese scholars immediately after the results of the first round of election were made public: Erdoğan is in a difficult position, especially after his opponents received many more votes than during the first round. [10] Moreover, the defeat discredited Turkey’s democratic system while also creating tensions between central and local governments. Somehow, these words echo those of Tang Zhichao, an expert with the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, who in February 2017 argued that Turkey is becoming “more Middle Eastern” as its institutions that used to inspire to the Western model of governance have been undermined by Erdogan’s way of doing politics. [11] This fact, writes the Director of the Director of Institute of Arms Control and Security Studies of CICIR Guo Xiaobing, is also evident in Turkey’s acquisition of the Russian S-400 air defense system, instead of the American equivalent. [12] Interestingly, Guo also argued that that issue also showed how political and diplomatic issues are undermining the efforts of Chinese armament manufacturers despite the quality of their products. Yet, there is no consensus on how much the purchase of the S-400 as well as Turkey’s general turn to Russia will affect the relations between Turkey and the United States. The Director of the Turkish Studies Center at Shanghai University, Guo Changgang, indeed believes that the two countries need each other and Turkey will probably make some concessions to the United States to compensate for the acquisition of the S-400. [13]