Although not many articles referring to China's role in the region were published in May, the discourse on the Mediterranean took a markedly critical turn in May.
The most critical articles were published by the Israeli media. The strongest attack against Beijing came from Susie Dym's article for Arutz Sheva. Dym called on Beijing to stick to the principle of non-interference mentioned in the 2015 Arab Policy Paper and to stop sending officials to Gaza.The nature of the criticism is not new. Indeed, Israeli scholars and commentators have previously criticized China's attempts to act as a mediator in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (see the Bulletins from January and February 2018). However, what makes Dym’s article different from the others is that the Israeli government is also under attack for being too soft and remissive with China in order to develop economic relations with the Asian giant.
The question of how to balance economic relations with China on the one hand, and political/strategic relations with the US on the other, was once again brought up. TheMarker published an article calling for the government to rethink its approach to cyber and technology cooperation with countries, like China, that are known to be involved in industrial espionage and have tense relations with Israel's most important ally: the US. Meanwhile, the Palestinian newspaper Donia Al-Watan reported that a Fatah delegation arrived in Beijing on May 15 and met with Wang Chen, member of the Chinese Communist Party's Politburo and Vice Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress.
The Moroccan media outlet Maghress was also critical towards what has been perceived as China's unfriendly actions in the Western Sahara. In response to China's abstention in the vote for the extension of the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO), the journalist declared, "China has taken a stand against the [Moroccan] national cause." Although Russia and Ethiopia also abstained, the article singled out China and describes the donation of DZD 10 million to Sahrawi Red Crescent to support Sahrawis refugees in Tindouf camps in Algeria as further proof of China's anti-Moroccan intentions.
Even so, the Algerian media outlet TSA published an article arguing that "the 'excellence' of the relations between China and Algeria is only a political reality."According to official statistics from the Algerian customs, China is Algeria’s first supplier since 2013, and roughly 18% of the goods and services imported by Algeria came from China between 2016 and 2017. An official from the Algerian Chamber of Commerce stated that, "China exports a lot in Algeria, however, it does not buy our products. China is far from being the first investor in Algeria despite the presence of many Chinese enterprises here." According to the journalist, Algerian authorities have accepted this unbalanced relationship because China usually refrains from taking sides on Algerian domestic issues. He also pointed out that most of the funding used by Chinese companies in Algeria comes from the Algerian government itself. There are growing expectations in Algeria for an increase in Chinese investment, following a cooperation agreement signed by the two governments in 2016. The first projects where Chinese investment will be used will pertain to the construction of the new port in El Hamdania and the development of a marble cave, among others. The article concludes that while these projects surely signal positive relations, Algeria must develop a clear, strategic to approach China, a wealthier trade power and investor with much more experience.
Currently, Egypt is receiving much attention from Chinese investors. The Bank of China and the Export-Import Bank will provide a USD 200 million long-term loan to Telecom Egypt in partnership with Huawei to build and modernize Egypt's telecommunication infrastructures. Ahmed El Beheiry, Chief Executive and Managing Director of Egypt Telecom, noted that it will take some time to implement this plan, and that Huawei will play an important role in the project.
• Suzy Dim, Hatzad habaa: Sin הצעד הבא: סין [Next step: China], Israel National News, 14 May 2018, https://www.inn.co.il/Articles/Article.aspx/17567.
• Eli Greenbaum, Hatzlachat hacyber hisraeli alola lihiyut besacana [הצלחת הסייבר הישראלי עלולה להיות בסכנה], TheMarker, 29 May 2018, https://www.themarker.com/opinion/1.6120225.
• Vafd fath yasil pekin va yaltaqi wang chen ozv alaktab alsyasi lilojna almarkaziya lilhizb alshiyoui alsini , وفد فتح يصل بكين ويلتقي وانغ تشن عضو المكتب السياسي للجنة المركزية للحزب الشيوعي الصيني , [Fatah delegation arrives in Beijing and meets Wang Chen, a member of the], Donya Al-Watan, 15 May, 2018, https://www.alwatanvoice.com/arabic/news/2018/05/15/1144862.html.
• Alsin tadaam lpolisario b10 million dinar jazaeri الصين تدعم البوليساريو ب10 مليون دينار جزائري [China supports Polisario with DZD 10 million], Maghress, 11 May, 2018, https://www.maghress.com/alhoudoude/42384.
• Hassan Haddouche, La Chine en Algérie le commerce en attendant les investisseurs [China in Algeria : waiting for investors. In the meantime trades], TSA-Algerie, 9 May 2018, https://www.tsa-algerie.com/la-chine-en-algerie-le-commerce-en-attendant-les-investisseurs/.
• Almisriat lilaitisalat wa"hwawa" yuaqiean aitifaqiat tamwil binuk siniat b200 mlywn dular المصرية للاتصالات و"هواوى" يوقعان اتفاقية تمويل بنوك صينية ب200 مليون دولار [Egypt Telecom and Huawei Sign a USD 200 financing agreement], Youm7, 30 May 2018, https://www.youm7.com/story/2018/5/30/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B5%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%84%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AA%D8%B5%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%88-%D9%87%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%88%D9%89-%D9%8A%D9%88%D9%82%D8%B9%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%A7%D8%AA%D9%81%D8%A7%D9%82%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D9%85%D9%88%D9%8A%D9%84-%D8%A8%D9%86%D9%88%D9%83-%D8%B5%D9%8A%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A8200/3813943.