November 2022

In November, most media outlets in the wider Mediterranean region focused on the three major diplomatic events scheduled for mid-December in Riyadh: the China-Arab States Summit, the China-Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Summit and Xi Jinping’s official state visit to Saudi Arabia. These meetings are expected to bring forth new developments at the regional and international level, especially since they are likely to impact Washington’s interests in the region.

Saudi observers shared enthusiastic expectations for the forthcoming summits. For example, Hani al-Qahtani stated that the summits reflect the depth of Sino-Saudi relations, Riyadh’s outstanding position in the global market, as well as its successful efforts to promote global stability. [1] Al-Qahtani also suggested that they are symptomatic of Washington’s declining international influence, which is being undermined by the repercussions of the war in Ukraine and by domestic instability. The Saudi newspaper Ray al-Yawm went as far as to state that the timing of their announcement, which coincided with Biden’s arrival to Sharm el-Sheik for COP27, was a clear message to the United States that the Kingdom “will not back down from heading East and deepening its strategic relations with China, the future superpower.” [2]

Despite these claims, there was concern over how the US will react to warming relations between China and Saudi Arabia and the GCC as a whole, as a statement by White House Coordinator for the Middle East and North Africa Brett McGurk warned US allies in the region that “deepening relations in certain areas with China would impede their cooperation with their main strategic ally and security partner in Washington.” [3] In response, Saudi writer Huda Raouf, while admitting that China’s interests in the region continue to grow, presented Riyadh’s foreign policy as impartial. [4] He argued the Saudi foreign policy of diversifying the country’s partnership is in response to US’ diminishing involvement in the region. Moreover, stronger relations with Beijing are just one objective, as Riyadh is also improving its ties with other Asian countries, such as India and Japan. Additionally, GCC countries will also undoubtedly continue to rely on Washington for their security concerns. Raouf also acknowledged that this international strategy may likely be hindered by China’s close ties with Iran and tense relations with the US.

Lebanese media also commented on the upcoming summits. Interestingly, Dr. Shaher al-Shaher, writing for media outlet al-Mayadeen, expects, and even hopes, that not only will these meetings bring about new developments in the trade relations between China and Arab countries, but that Beijing will also increase its involvement in regional security issues, which have been deeply impacted by decreasing US engagement. [5] Interestingly, he suggested China to be “the most acceptable partner for all parties” because of its ties with Tehran, as due to Iran’s influence and power, “any security arrangement cannot be imagined without its involvement.” Therefore, China should play a mediator role between Tehran and Riyadh because an improvement in Saudi-Iranian relations would serve both Beijing and the region’s interests and need for stability. It is important to point out that Lebanese public opinion and several exponents of the country’s provisional government have been calling for more meaningful cooperation with China as well. For example, the Minister of Culture stated that it is necessary to improve ties with China in sectors like transportation, infrastructure and health, and that whoever disagrees “operates against the interests of the people.” [6]

Conversely, Iranian commentators are far less enthusiastic about the upcoming summits in Saudi Arabia. On one hand, political figures close to the government, such as former Iranian Ambassador to Russia Seyed Mahmudreza Sajjadi, insisted on the importance of cooperation with China and Russia against the West’s efforts to isolate Iran. [7] On the other hand, there seems to be greater awareness of China’s growing economic engagement with Tehran’s neighbors in sectors in which stronger Chinese investment in Iran would be extremely useful to its economy, such as in the oil and gas sector and infrastructure for maritime logistics. For instance, the reformist Sharq reported on the 27-year agreement for the purchase of LNG between Qatar and China signed in late November. [8] According to the agreement, the LNG exported to China will be supplied from the development of the North Gonbad field, which Qatar shares with Iran, where it is known as South Pars. This could be extremely detrimental for Iran’s gas industry, compounding the problems created by the sanctions and the lack of sufficient capital and technology to sustain production there. Moreover, Jam-e Jam, a newspaper owned by Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting, lamented that the decision to hire Indian companies to develop the strategic port of Chabahar on the Indian Ocean, instead of Chinese ones, will prevent Iran from benefitting from the network of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). [9] The article brings up China’s significant investment in the Pakistani port of Gwadar as an example of what Iran risks missing out on. Similarly, according to the “Global Developments Monitoring Report” published by the Iranian Chamber of Commerce, Türkiye is negotiating with China within the framework of the BRI to replace the West Asia route, that passes through Iran, with the Trans-Caspian route, that instead bypasses Iran for Türkiye, thereby giving Ankara the opportunity to become the transit hub between Asia and Europe. [10]

In fact, Ankara continues to push to strengthen its ties with Beijing within the BRI framework. For example, Türkiye Gazetesi reported the news of an investment plan to include the Çandarlı Port in İzmir in the BRI and build a new transit cargo-oriented container port on the Eastern Mediterranean. [11] However, it should be noted that the Uyghur issue continues to be a contentious topic in the Turkish media debate, as shown by the latest controversy involving the Police Chief of Istanbul’s Sarıyer District that told Uyghurs protesting in front of the Chinese consulate that “We will sweep you all away soon. We will detain you and deport you.” In response to the social media uproar, the Istanbul police later stated that the chief’s words were misunderstood and that the officers were ordered to be careful not to hurt anyone while dispersing the protestors in light of a ban on public demonstrations. [12]

For their part, North African countries continue to strengthen their economic ties with Beijing, as Morocco and China signed another memorandum of understanding to simplify trade procedures for both public and private actors. [13] More significantly, Algeria and China signed their “second five-year plan for comprehensive strategic cooperation” for the years 2022-2026, and, coincidentally, Algiers officially applied to join the BRICS. [14] The five-year plan builds on the comprehensive strategic partnership agreement signed in 2014 with the goal of facilitating economic relations between the two countries. According to economic expert Ahmad Sharifi, the plan also serves Algeria’s goal to diversify its trade partners and maintain balanced relations with the world’s major powers. However, Abderrahmane Toumi, a former member of the Algerian Parliament’s Economic Committee, interestingly stated that Algeria might give priority to its economic relations with China by virtue of the already successfully completed projects between the two countries and in order to ease its accession into the BRICS.

To conclude, we offer some insights into the Italian debate on China. Although Giorgia Meloni, the new right-wing Italian Prime Minister, was quite tepid during her meeting with Xi Jinping at the G20 Summit in Bali, most likely to avoid being isolated from the European Union, [15] her ministers continue to strongly oppose any cooperation with China, especially concerning investment in Italy’s high-tech sector. [16] In this context, we signal “Project Tango,” an investment project to turn the 3Sun Gigafactory in Sicily into the largest European factory for the production of high-performance bifacial photovoltaic modules. [17] According to its manager Eliano Russo, this project is aimed at increasing the productivity of Italian photovoltaic companies, thereby also diminishing dependence on Beijing, which at the moment dominates the industry and market.