September 2018

Where is the Middle East going? Chinese media pundits and commentators spent much of September discussing this issue. Other parts of the Mediterranean region were virtually ignored, even as Western media outlets reported on growing concerns among European officials concerning China’s presence in the Balkans. September was also a month of intense diplomatic activity; various Chinese leaders, including the majority of members within the powerful Politburo Standing Committee, met with ministers and heads of state from Middle Eastern and North African countries. Many of those meetings occurred during, and also immediately before or after, the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation that was held on September 3 and 4. Wang Yi also met with the ministers of foreign affairs from Turkey, Iran, Syria, Russia, and with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Troika at the United Nations’ headquarters in New York.

Given the uncertainties regarding the fate of Syria’s northern province of Idlib, China’s top diplomat sought to meet with representatives of the states most involved in this difficult situation. According to Chinese commentators, it is all in Russia’s hands after Putin and Erdogan agreed on September 17, 2018 to establish a demilitarized zone in Idlib, the last major stronghold of anti-government rebels. Fears had been running high in the region following a devastating offensive by government forces. According to Lan Shunzheng from the Charhar Institute, Russia is already looking at how to definitively consolidate its influence in the region by further trying to divide Turkey and the United States.[1] Lan’s comment is only the latest expression of great approval for Putin’s strategy in Syria and in the region from the Chinese community of international affairs experts.[2] Yet, although Russia currently has the luxury of being able to take time to plan the next move, the problems faced by the Syrian government make the eventual reconquest of Idlib far from certain. Syria is “a victim that every country has preyed upon” and, although military actions taken by other powers might decrease or even stop altogether, the country and the region remain deeply divided and on the verge of war.[3] Chaos, thus, emerges as the only constant element in the region for the foreseeable future. According to the Middle East research group from the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences, even Russia’s dominant position is likely to be undermined in the long run by its own lack of resources to sustain its efforts and to tame the clashing religious, sectarian, and ethnic forces in the region.[4] It is important to note that China is almost never mentioned in these commentaries. The only clear policy decision made by Beijing in the Mediterranean, albeit indirectly related to the situation in Syria, was its reaffirmation of support for Turkey in the face of economic problems that have resulted from Turkey’s worsening of relations with the United States. This message was conveyed by the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Le Yucheng during his visit to Ankara in mid-September.[5]

While scholars from the Middle East research group in Shanghai point to the strengthening of China’s network of partners in the region as an important success for its diplomacy, they also emphasize that the lack of a “soft infrastructure” – language skills and knowledge of the social and religious dynamics in the region – remains the main obstacle to the implementation of the Belt and Road Initiative. It is unclear whether China will dedicate more of its resources to soft-infrastructure in the region. A researcher at the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR) recently noted that the difficult relationship with the United States is absorbing much of  the resources and energies of the Chinese diplomatic machine that otherwise could have been allocated to promoting its relations with other countries and regions like Africa and the Middle East.[6] Thus, it makes sense that Chinese academic institutions are fully engaged in organizing conferences to discuss the events in the region. For example, in early September the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences organized a forum with Japanese, South Korean, and Mongol scholars to exchange perspectives on the situation.[7] Beijing International Studies University, whose Arab Countries Research Center was the first to join the Ministry of Education’s program for the promotion of area studies, invited officials from the Egyptian embassy and Chinese scholars to discuss the evolution of the situation in Egypt and Saudi Arabia.[8]

Business in/with more stable countries remains the main pillar of China’s approach to the region. Thus, several days after the Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs, Zhang Jun, attended the celebrations for the Saudi National Day, the first meeting of the China-Saudi Arabia Business Council and the Promotion Conference of Investment and Trade Opportunities in Saudi Arabia was held in Beijing on September 27.[9] Vice Chairman of the China Council for the Promotion of International Trade, Chen Zhou, and Ambassador of Saudi Arabia to China, Turki Almadi, addressed roughly 300 business council delegates. Both officials called for the development of a more stable business environment and the enhancement of bilateral economic cooperation. Sany Group was elected as the Chair of China-Saudi Arabia Business Council, while China Gezhouba Group Corporation (CGGC), China MCC5 Group Corporation, Ltd, TEDA Investment Holding Co., Ltd, Wuhan Marine Machinery Plant Co., Ltd and TBEA Energy were all elected as the deputy chairs. Similar promotional events were held in Jordan for the 15th China Trade Fair on September 17.[10]

The situation regarding the Port of Haifa in Israel remains contentious. The Shanghai International Port Group, which won a 25-year concession for Haifa's new Bay Terminal in 2015, is expected to take over management of a new private seaport in Haifa in 2021. This will bring a Chinese presence to one of the region's strategic harbors. Indeed, the Haifa naval base hosts American warships with regularity. In 2017, the carrier USS George W. Bush visited Haifa. Thus far in 2018, the amphibious assault ship USS Iwo Jima visited the port in March 2018, and the destroyer USS Donald Cook arrived for a brief visit in June. Previous issues of the ChinaMed bulletin have highlighted the growing discomfort among parts of the Israeli public towards warmer relations with China. For the moment, Chinese commentators, such as CICIR’s Tian Wenlin and Liao Biaozhi, have stated that operations in Haifa are solely business in nature.[11] However, Tian also added, there is nothing strange about Israel deciding to warm up to other countries, such as China, that can wield great influence in both regional and global affairs.

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