A Year and a Half After the Novi Sad Tragedy: Who Drives China-Backed Infrastructure in Serbia?

The ChinaMed Project is undertaking a new research direction dedicated to systematically documenting and analyzing the stakeholders that shape Mediterranean countries’ China policies. In other words, analyzing the institutional and extra-institutional actors that shape a country’s engagement with China, including how they perceive China, and how much influence they wield. Across the Mediterranean, this encompasses a wide range of stakeholders, from foreign ministries and chambers of commerce to armed militias and Chinese diaspora communities.

While data collection is still ongoing (this is a long-term project, and the full dataset is still being prepared for publication on our website¹) we are pleased to offer an early snapshot of our findings through a case study authored by Ivana Rudinac, one of the minds behind this framework. In light of Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić’s recent visit to China, she examines how different actors in Serbia responded to the deadly collapse of the Novi Sad railway station canopy, a tragedy connected to a major China-backed infrastructure project.

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The modernization of the Belgrade–Budapest railway has been presented as one of the most ambitious and strategically important infrastructure projects undertaken in Serbia over the last decade. As with other large-scale China-backed infrastructure projects, it has also been leveraged for political gain. However, the collapse of the canopy of the Novi Sad railway station on November 1, 2024, killing sixteen people, exposed the underlying mechanisms through which such projects are negotiated and implemented, as well as the weakened or bypassed accountability channels.

The incident triggered one of the largest and longest-lasting protest movements that Serbia has seen since the country’s democratic transition in 2000. However, despite the important role of Chinese financing and contractors, the collapse remained primarily a domestic political crisis. A year and a half later, Serbia–China relations remain largely intact, reflecting the approach adopted by the key stakeholders of Serbia’s China policy.

Within days of the collapse, then Serbian Prime Minister Miloš Vučević traveled to Shanghai for the China International Import Expo and signed a memorandum of understanding with the Chinese automotive parts supplier Minth. When meeting with Chinese Premier Li Qiang, Vučević said he did not want to join the “hysteria” against Chinese companies.² The project has gone ahead and in October 2025, Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić inaugurated the Novi Sad–Subotica section of the railway.

Building on the findings of our research project on the local stakeholders shaping Mediterranean countries’ China policy (for more on the methodology see here), this piece reflects on the Novi Sad tragedy through the Belgrade–Budapest railway project. Three groups of stakeholders emerge. At the center is the political core of the ruling coalition, led by President Vučić and Serbian Progressive Party (SNS), which strategically drives and promotes China-backed infrastructure. The broader “winning coalition,” comprising actors within or aligned with the government – ministries, state enterprises, and contractors – facilitates project implementation. On the other hand, the collapse triggered a bottom-up challenger coalition of civic actors, students and investigative journalists, who have been demanding greater transparency and domestic accountability in these deals. The sections below outline the context and background of the project and then examine each of these stakeholder groups in turn.

Context: The Belgrade-Budapest Railway

The renovation of Novi Sad railway station was part of a much larger infrastructure project: the modernization of the Belgrade–Budapest railway, one of Serbia’s flagship transport investments and a central example of its infrastructure cooperation with China. The project was first agreed in Belgrade in 2014 at the summit between China and sixteen Central and Eastern European countries (the “16+1,” as it was known at the time). In November 2015, the governments of China, Hungary, and Serbia signed cooperation documents for the modernization of the Hungarian–Serbian railway line.³

Planned as a 350-kilometre high-speed connection between Budapest and Belgrade, of which 184 kilometers lie in Serbia, the railway has been presented as a strategic project that would reduce the travel time between the two capitals from eight hours to under three, but also make it compliant with European Union standards. There was a clear demand for modernization, as Serbia’s railway infrastructure had long suffered from underinvestment, leaving significant connectivity gaps.

The Serbian section was divided into three main parts. Two of these sections – Belgrade Center–Stara Pazova and Novi Sad–Subotica–State Border/Kelebija – were assigned to a Chinese consortium consisting of China Railway International and China Communications Construction Company (the remaining Stara Pazova–Novi Sad section was implemented by Russian Railways International). The Belgrade–Stara Pazova section was based on a $350.2 million Engineering, Procurement, and Construction (EPC) contract, 85% financed through a $297.6 million China Eximbank Preferential Buyer’s Credit, which entered full operation in March 2022. The Novi Sad–Subotica–Kelebija⁴ section was later contracted through a much larger $1.16 billion EPC agreement with the same Chinese consortium, again 85% financed by China Eximbank, through a $988.4 million Preferential Buyer’s Credit.

As reported by Radio Free Europe, parts of the Belgrade–Budapest railway initially benefitted from EU-funded technical preparation. The EU financed a €300,000 feasibility study for the Stara Pazova–Novi Sad subsection, for which the European Investment Bank was originally expected to provide financing. In 2011, however, Serbia informed the EIB that the loan would instead be sourced from Russia. The EU also provided nearly €4.8 million for technical documentation for the Novi Sad–Subotica–Kelebija section, designed for speeds of 160 km/h. However, Serbia later opted for Chinese financing and contractors after deciding to upgrade the line to 200 km/h, a shift Serbian authorities justified by reference to new technical ambitions and available financing.

The renovation of Novi Sad railway station was part of the wider modernization of the Belgrade–Budapest corridor, and specifically of the China-backed Novi Sad–Subotica–Kelebija section. This matters because the station’s reconstruction was embedded in the same broader model that has shaped several major infrastructure projects in Serbia: large state-to-state agreements, foreign loans, foreign contractors, strategic political visibility, and limited public insight into the contractual and implementation details. Understanding how this model operates, therefore, requires looking at the stakeholders who drive, implement, and contest it.

Who Sets the Direction: The Politics of Infrastructure in Serbia

Infrastructure development has become a central pillar of the Serbia’s ruling coalition, with electoral politics increasingly organized around a political economy of growth, connectivity, and public investments. The Belgrade–Budapest railway was therefore not only a transport project but also a source of political capital for the top of the ruling coalition. In March 2022, during an election campaign, President Vučić and Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán became the first passengers to arrive at the ceremonially inaugurated Novi Sad station, even though construction works had not yet been completed. “If we continue at this pace, Serbia will be connected by a network of the most modern railway lines,” Vučić said at the event.⁵

The station was later closed for further works before being reopened on July 4, 2024, when then Minister of Construction, Transportation and Infrastructure Goran Vesić announced that the final passenger section had been opened, making the station “fully functional.” The event, attended by senior officials including then Novi Sad mayor Milan Đurić and the Vojvodina province president Maja Gojković, was once again framed as evidence of successful infrastructure delivery, with Vesić thanking Chinese partners and domestic companies.⁶

After the station canopy collapsed in November 2024 killing sixteen people, the ruling coalition’s initial response was to contest responsibility. President Vučić claimed publicly that the canopy had not been subject to reconstruction, stating: “Structurally, the canopy was unfortunately not reconstructed. If it had been, the tragedy would never have happened.”⁷ As reported by the pro-EU news and web portal European Western Balkans, pro-government media and some officials, most prominently former Prime Minister Ana Brnabić, advanced an alternative narrative framing the canopy collapse as a possible, or even deliberated, act of sabotage rather than the result of negligence.⁸ Under sustained public pressure, Prime Minister Vučević resigned in January 2025.

Despite sixteen deaths, mass protests, ministerial resignations, and ongoing corruption investigations, in October 2025 President Vučić inaugurated the Novi Sad–Subotica section, completing Serbia’s part of the Hungary–Serbia high-speed railway.⁹ Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Economy Adrijana Mesarović described the railway as a symbol of Serbia’s modernization, regional connectivity, and friendship with Hungary, while thanking “Chinese friends” and crediting Vučić’s leadership for the completion the strategic infrastructure project.¹⁰ The opening demonstrated that the Novi Sad collapse, while triggering the most serious domestic accountability crisis the regime has faced since coming to power, did not fundamentally interrupt Serbia’s China-backed infrastructure agenda. However, the question of how the agenda was implemented, and who was responsible when it failed, is closely linked to the institutional arrangements that shaped the project from the initial stages.

The Implementation Chain: Layers of Accountability

Investigative journalists, experts, and NGOs had warned for years about the governance risks surrounding China-backed infrastructure projects in Serbia. The core concern is that interstate agreements provided a legal basis for major infrastructure projects to be contracted outside Serbia’s domestic public procurement framework. The anti-corruption NGO Transparency Serbia flagged this pattern in 2021,¹¹ citing the Belgrade–Budapest railway as an example of large infrastructure projects financed through international arrangements and contracted outside standard competitive procedures, thereby limiting public scrutiny over contractor selection and pricing.

Serbia’s Ministry of Construction acted as the main signatory, permit issuer, and institutional gatekeeper throughout the project’s implementation. Three successive ministers oversaw different phases of the project, Zorana Mihajlović, Tomislav Momirović, and Goran Vesić, all senior figures within the ruling Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) during their respective tenures. Local Novi Sad outlet 021 reported that the Ministry repeatedly refused to disclose reconstruction documents for the railway station, first citing objections from the Chinese consortium and later the requirements of the state-led investigation.¹² Investigative journalists documented that the contract expanded substantially over time, with a significant gap between early estimates and later stated costs – a gap that, in the absence of a public tender, was not subject to any meaningful market test.¹³

The collapse triggered several parallel legal proceedings, but more than a year later, no final convictions had been reached. The public-safety case against former Minister Vesić and other state officials has been progressing slowly through the courts. Meanwhile, a separate corruption investigation has implicated former Ministers Vesić and Tomislav Momirović in alleged financial irregularities related to the railway reconstruction project.¹⁴ It is unclear whether representatives of the Chinese CRIC-CCCC consortium were ever formally questioned by the Serbian authorities. Much of what is publicly known about how the project was organized was compiled by investigative journalists and the informal Inquiry Commission, both of which operated largely outside of formal state structures. Their findings revealed that the Chinese consortium held primary contractual authority, while responsibility for actual construction was handed over to Serbian subcontractors, who in turn subcontracted further to other companies. Each layer dispersed both execution and risk further from any meaningful oversight. The third group of stakeholders sought to contest precisely this opacity.

Pressure from Below: The Bottom-Up Coalition

The collapse triggered the formation of a coalition of challengers operating largely outside formal institutions and the ruling coalition, comprising experts, journalists, students and citizens. Although in their engagement they often highlighted how the Chinese financing model has facilitated prevailing patterns of governance, their demands were primarily directed at the Serbian government and the ruling coalition rather than at China.

An independent inquiry commission, convened in the aftermath of the incident and operating outside of formal state structures, characterized the collapse as the result of a disorderly project environment, rather than a technical failure. Comprising university professors, civil engineers, legal experts, economists, media experts and retired judges, the commission’s report documented inflated costs, poor sequencing, inadequate supervision, and premature opening, contextualizing the case within broader concerns about institutional dysfunction and political accountability.¹⁵

Investigative media outlets compiled much of the public record, exposing inconsistencies in project documentation, permit status, inspection procedures, pricing, and subcontracting chains, often under visible pressure, including intimidation and political attacks.¹⁶ Transparency Serbia found that documents released under public pressure remained incomplete, with key contractual materials missing.¹⁷ Legal experts reinforced this assessment from a different angle: even where procurement exemptions rested on Serbia’s agreements with China, it was Serbian institutions that adopted, implemented, and defended those exemptions.¹⁸ Annex 2 to the Serbia-China cooperation agreement, which inserted the non-tender clause, was adopted by the SNS-majority Serbian parliament in August 2013.

The student and civic protest movement brought the issue of accountability to the fore. Starting on the evening of the collapse, the movement grew to become one of the largest in modern Serbian history. Students blockaded faculties at dozens of universities for months. The protests, under the slogan of “Corruption kills,” continued for over a year, drawing hundreds of thousands of people to the streets. The protesters’ demands were: all contracts should be published, attacks on protesters should be prosecuted, charges against detained demonstrators should be dropped, and infrastructure across the country should be inspected. The protests transformed the significance of the collapse, elevating it from mere tragedy to a symbol of a governing system where responsibility is displaced. However, they also revealed the limitations of public outrage within a political system capable of absorbing it.

Conclusion

What, then, does this analysis suggest about the future of Chinese-financed infrastructure in Serbia? While the stakeholder analysis indicates continuity, it also shows increasing contestation over the future terms of cooperation.

In the short term, economic cooperation with China is likely to remain intact. The ruling coalition has demonstrated a strong capacity to absorb reputational damage while preserving the underlying financing and contracting model. This model is deeply embedded in the political logic of the current regime: large infrastructure projects provide both visible evidence of government delivery and opportunities for political and economic rents. The arrangement also serves China’s interests. Because responsibility for implementation failures falls primarily on Serbian institutions, Chinese partners remain relatively protected from domestic political pressure. As long as the current coalition remains in power, which, given the ongoing political crisis, is no longer a certainty, the structural incentives sustaining these arrangements will persist and may even intensify. A regime facing growing political pressure has an especially strong need for the legitimating power of large and visible infrastructure projects.

At the same time, the Novi Sad collapse has changed the informational and political environment in which future projects will be negotiated. Civic actors, investigative journalists, and independent experts have accumulated expertise, visibility, and public credibility that were largely absent when the Belgrade–Budapest railway was initially agreed. Future infrastructure agreements are therefore likely to face greater scrutiny, increasing the political costs of the opacity that has characterized the existing model. Pressure for greater transparency is unlikely to originate from the Chinese side, which has little incentive to impose additional accountability requirements on a willing Serbian partner. Instead, such pressure as emerges is likely to come from domestic actors. The central question is whether this pressure will become strong enough to change the terms on which future deals are concluded, or whether it will merely make their political, social, and economic costs more visible.

The most plausible trajectory is therefore not an end to cooperation but growing domestic pressure over its governance.

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Ivana RUDINAC is a Research Fellow at the ChinaMed Project. She holds a Master’s Degree in International Affairs from Central European University, where she is currently pursuing a PhD in Political Science. Her dissertation explores how development finance affects governance and reshapes state-society relations in recipient countries, with a focus on China’s development engagement in the Western Balkans. Her broader research interests include international development, governance, and the policy and politics of aid and investment - particularly the competing modalities between China and DAC donors.