Anticipating a New Nuclear Deal: Chinese and Iranian Experts Analyze the Iran-China-Russia Meeting in Beijing

On March 14, just one day after China, Iran and Russia concluded the Security Belt-2025 joint naval exercise near the Iranian port of Chabahar, high-ranking representatives from the three countries convened in Beijing. Hosted by Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, the meeting centered on “the latest state of play with regard to the nuclear issue and sanctions lifting.” The timing of this meeting was far from casual; as on March 12, U.S. President Donald Trump sent a letter to Iran's Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei proposing direct negotiations on a new nuclear deal—a proposal that the Iranian leadership has rejected in favor of continuing indirect talks.

This development is particularly significant given the looming expiration of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)—commonly known as the Iran nuclear deal—in October of this year. The JCPOA is an agreement signed in 2015 by Iran, China, Russia, France, Germany, the UK, the U.S. and the EU to ease sanctions on Tehran in exchange for restrictions on its nuclear program. This agreement effectively collapsed in 2018 after the U.S. under the first Trump administration withdrew from the deal and implemented its “maximum pressure” sanction campaign.

Against this backdrop, this edition of the ChinaMed Observer analyzes recent statements made by Chinese and Iranian officials, alongside perspectives from both Chinese and Iranian commentators.

While Chinese officials advocated for the U.S. to be more open to dialogue, Chinese experts instead generally concurred that, at present, the most viable course of action for Tehran is enhanced cooperation with China and Russia. Iranian officials, unsurprisingly, also emphasized prioritizing cooperation with these two countries; however, some suggested that such cooperation should not preclude engagement with the U.S. or Europe. Iranian commentators, meanwhile, appear more divided, with some even arguing that direct negotiations with Washington are preferable to relying solely on Moscow and Beijing.

Chinese and Iranian Official Positions

Nearly a decade after the signing of the JCPOA, Iran’s nuclear program has once again become a central issue in international discussions. During the high-level meeting held in Beijing, Wang Yi presented a five-point proposal emphasizing nuclear non-proliferation and the peaceful use of nuclear energy. He also stressed the need to reach a new consensus, urging the U.S. to demonstrate sincerity and openness to dialogue, supporting step-by-step direct negotiations, and opposing a “hasty intervention by the United Nations Security Council.”

At a press conference following the meeting, Vice Foreign Minister Ma Zhaoxu reaffirmed China’s commitment to eliminating the “root causes” of the current situation, stressing the importance of UNSC Resolution 2231 (2015), which endorsed the JCPOA, and calling all parties concerned to refrain from any action that could escalate tensions.^[1] Similarly, Fu Cong, China’s Permanent Representative to the UN, stated that “we can seize the limited time we have before the termination date in October this year, in order to have […] a new deal so that the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action […] can be maintained.” He also argued that “putting maximum pressure on a certain country is not going to achieve the goal.”^[2]

Iranian officials broadly echoed these perspectives, reflecting a rather unified stance on the issue. For instance, Deputy Foreign Minister for Legal and International Affairs Kazem Gharibabadi expressed satisfaction with the meeting’s outcomes while criticizing the U.S. and European countries for a lack of commitment. Discussing the joint statement, he stressed that China and Russia agree on the need to remove the “illegal” sanctions on Iran. Gharibabadi also added that both countries agree with Tehran that future negotiations shall continue to focus on Iran’s nuclear program. The three parties also concurred on the importance of respecting the JCPOA’s established timeline and avoiding the activation of the “snapback mechanism,” which would automatically reimpose international sanctions on Iran without allowing permanent UN Security Council members to exercise their veto.^[3]

Abolfazl Zohrevand, a member of the National Security and Foreign Policy Commission of the Iranian Parliament, expressed an even stronger stance, arguing that Iran should abandon efforts to negotiate with the U.S. He accused Washington and European countries of acting contradictory: on one hand, calling for negotiations, while on the other, imposing sanctions to destabilize Iran’s economy. He went so far to label Trump a “bullying dictator” who seeks to impose his will on Iran rather than engage in genuine dialogue. According to Zohrevand, Trump’s offer for direct dialogue is a trap designed to trigger the snapback mechanism.^[4]

Consequently, Zohrevand advocated for Iran to deepen its partnership with China, Russia, the BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, while also expanding trade with Asian countries. Citing Iran’s non-oil trade, which stands at USD 60 billion, compared to its limited USD 200 million trade volume with Europe, he argued that this disparity underscores the futility of further economic engagement with the West and the need to prioritize partnerships in Asia (according to recent reporting by Iran International, however, Iran’s trade with East Asian countries—excluding China—is also in decline).^[5]

Lastly, Ebrahim Azizi, the Chairman of the National Security and Foreign Policy Commission of the Iranian Parliament, also stressed the need to prioritize cooperation with China and Russia over engagement with the West. He believes that Moscow and Beijing could support Tehran in future negotiations with Europe. Indeed, he claimed that it is high time that Europe aligned itself with China, Russia and Iran, arguing that Europe cannot remain so dependent on the U.S. In any case, like other Iranian officials, he warned that “if the Europeans engage in a game that does not give any benefits to Iran, Iran will close the path of cooperation with them.”^[6]

The Chinese Expert Debate

Many Chinese experts and observers are pessimistic about the prospects of resolving the Iranian nuclear issue, blaming the U.S for the current impasse. Liu Zhongmin, director of the Middle East Studies Institute at Shanghai International Studies University (SISU), argued that the JCPOA itself “lies in ruins following the U.S. withdrawal.”^[7] He contended that Washington “has made some very unrealistic demands, completely driven by its own interests, […] which has led to the destruction of the original consensus, foundation and mechanisms.”^[8] According to Liu, the real challenge now is not only to develop new solutions but also prevent unilateral U.S. actions from undermining any emerging agreements.

Beyond diplomatic setbacks, Liu also linked U.S. policies to the declining quality of life in Iran, arguing that these pressures have driven Tehran to accelerate uranium enrichment, thereby increasing the risk of nuclear proliferation.^[9] However, Qiu Queshu, a Chinese commentator based in Tehran, offered an alternative perspective for Iran’s economic difficulties, stating that:

“The reason for the collapse of the local currency is also the poor management within the government. Even in the face of sanctions, Iran's oil can be sold and the money can be recovered. However, under the influence of long-term Western sanctions, Iran's economy has created a deformed system, and a huge gray industry has been spawned to evade sanctions.”^[10]

According to Qiu, the lack of adequate supervision has meant that revenues from oil exports, rather than being used to improve public welfare, have instead been captured by privileged interest groups. He further argued that Iran’s monetary policies have contributed to economic stagnation, noting that banks have raised interest rates to curb inflation, making it difficult for businesses to expand, hindering economic development.^[11]

Qiu also drew a historical parallel between Iran’s current situation and China’s economic challenges in 1994, as he explained, “what Iran needs most now may be the abolition of the ‘dual-track’ pricing system, […] to break this cycle.” Based on this assessment, Qiu concluded that Iran’s structural economic problems cannot be resolved simply by lifting sanctions or improving relations with the U.S., because “if U.S. sanctions are suddenly lifted, it will trigger conflicts.”^[12] This critical opinion is far from unique in today’s Chinese debate on Iran, which is becoming increasingly skeptical about the country’s future.

However, other Chinese experts have a somewhat more optimistic stance, emphasizing China’s potential role in facilitating U.S.-Iran dialogue. Sun Degang, director of the Center for Middle Eastern Studies at Fudan University, outlined two possible approaches toward the Iran nuclear issue: one relying on maximum international pressure—an approach that has already failed and would likely accelerate uranium enrichment—and another involving strengthened multilateral diplomacy. He asserted that China could play a key role in advancing the latter strategy.^[13]

Similarly, Wu Bingbing, Director of the Center for Middle Eastern Studies at Peking University, noted that “choosing Beijing as the venue for the talks shows Iran's endorsement of China as a crucial party to the Iranian nuclear issue.”^[14] Liu Zhongmin also suggested that the trilateral meeting in Beijing could serve as a new platform, particularly given the deep-seated mistrust between Iran and the U.S., which has rendered other diplomatic channels ineffective.^[15]

Fan Hongda, professor at the Middle East Studies Institute at SISU, made a similar point. He observed that last year’s negotiations between Iran and European countries progressed slowly and, according to him, “Iran believes that the UK, France and Germany lack sufficient autonomy in international affairs and are easily influenced by the U.S.” Therefore, Iran chose to engage with Russia and China, as Tehran has developed a relatively stable relationship with these countries in recent years.^[16]

Qiu Queshu also highlighted how China and Russia represent the natural choice for Iran. He argued that “with the ‘Axis of Resistance’ hit hard, Iran has lost the ‘gun’ it once aimed at Israel's head and needs to restore its deterrence.” Ambiguity, he noted, remains Tehran’s main instrument for gaining leverage.^[17]

Qiu elaborated:

“Although Iran officially stated that it does not intend to develop nuclear weapons, its strategy follows the logic of maintaining strategic ambiguity, that is, retaining the ability to manufacture nuclear weapons but choosing not to do so, keeping the bow drawn but not yet releasing the arrow, using this threat to then negotiate with the West and gain benefits such as the lifting of sanctions.”^[18]

Qiu added that even if Iran possessed the ability to develop nuclear weapons, Supreme Leader Khamenei has consistently reiterated that he will not choose this path. In this context, Qiu suggested that “this may also be the [real] purpose of the U.S. and Israel: if Iran really ends up developing nuclear weapons under their maximum pressure, it will lose the opportunity to use [this ambiguity] as a bargaining chip during future negotiations.” The commentator thus believes that Iran is engaging with China and Russia to obtain greater security guarantees while preserving its strategic ambiguity.^[19]

Regarding U.S. policy toward Iran, many Chinese analysts, including Niu Song, researcher at SISU’s Middle East Studies Institute, argued that Iran remains a central concern in U.S. foreign policy under Trump.^[20] While this view is shared by most Chinese experts, there is disagreement on what type of approach Washington will adopt.

For Qiu Queshu, the U.S. is unlikely to reimplement the “maximum pressure” policy of the past.^[21] Meanwhile, Fan Hongda argued that: “the Trump administration has adopted a 'soft and hard' strategy: on the one hand, it has shown a tough stance, suggesting that if Iran does not actively cooperate, it may face a heavy blow; on the other hand, it has extended an 'olive branch' and proposed to restart negotiations to resolve the issue.”^[22]

Nonetheless, other scholars take a more pessimistic view of U.S. policy. For example, Zhang Yuan, also a professor at SISU’s Middle East Studies Institute, harshly criticized Trump’s approach, arguing that it is a key driver of instability in the region:

“Currently, U.S. policies, both domestically and internationally, are shaped by Trump's personal interests, and he prefers to impose his will on others. In such circumstances, it is inevitable that U.S. policies will become increasingly volatile and unpredictable.”^[23]

Furthermore, Zhang also claimed that Trump’s strategy is not only destabilizing to the region but also detrimental to the U.S.’ global image: “his authoritarian management style in the early stages of his second term has demonstrated that Trump’s personal preferences are in fact taking precedence over those of the U.S. The Trump administration’s coercive diplomacy is seriously and rapidly eroding America’s standing as a hegemonic power.”^[24]

The Iranian Expert Debate

The Iranian expert debate reflects a divergence of opinions on whether Tehran should reject or pursue direct dialogue with Washington.

Some members of Iran’s more conservative elite strongly oppose re-engaging with the U.S. For instance, Fereydoun Abbasi, a nuclear scientist, former head of the Atomic Agency Organization of Iran as well as a politician close to “hardliner” Saeed Jalili—Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian’s main opponent in the last elections—argued that Iran should learn from its previous mistakes and avoid further negotiations with the U.S. For Abbasi, historical precedent demonstrates Washington’s tendency to break commitments, disregard UN resolutions, and interfere in other countries’ domestic affairs. He further claimed that Iran is now recognized as a global power with an active role in shaping international affairs, despite longstanding U.S. efforts since the Islamic Revolution to undermine its success.^[25]

Against this background, Abbasi celebrated Iran’s growing alignment with China and Russia as a clear alternative to the U.S. In his analysis, he criticized previous Iranian administrations, accusing them of being “anti-Eastern.” Specifically, he condemned the Rouhani administration for prioritizing the JCPOA while neglecting China and Russia. As such, Abbasi argued that the Islamic Republic needs greater cohesion and a strong, well-defined domestic and international agenda—one that remains consistent regardless of public opinion or shifts in government—to ensure long-term consistency in foreign policy.^[26]

Heshmatollah Falahatpisheh, a foreign policy analyst and former chairman of the Iranian Parliament's National Security and Foreign Policy Commission, offered a markedly different perspective. In an interview with the online newspaper Fararu, he voiced concern over Iran’s foreign policy trajectory, arguing that the country has been on the wrong path for years by over-relying on China and Russia. According to Falahatpisheh, these countries have, at times, actively acted against Iran’s interests and have ultimately emerged as the only beneficiaries of the JCPOA’s failure. He elaborated:

“Russia, which avoided isolation over Ukraine while Iran faced sanctions and accusations, and China secured massive oil discounts from Iran.”^[27]

Moreover, he highlighted that during the first Trump administration, both China and Russia reduced their economic engagement with Iran, halting the implementation of previously agreed upon projects (as noted in a past ChinaMed report, such grievances are not new among Iranians). Therefore, Falahatpisheh advocated for Iran to directly engage with the U.S., without any intermediaries. Washington, he believes, would be open to such an approach, arguing that “Trump repeatedly expressed frustration that the JCPOA was signed under U.S. pressure but that its economic benefits went to other countries.”^[28]

Falahatpisheh further affirmed that the eagerness shown by Russia and China during the recent meeting reflects their interest in maintaining their seat at the negotiating table, especially as Trump appears to be seeking more direct engagement with Iran.^[29] As he stated:

“Until Iranian foreign political affairs, especially the nuclear issue, do not acquire independence from the interests of intermediate powers, there will be no resolution. If Iran and the U.S. enter direct dialogue, it would be much more beneficial than allowing Russia and China to continue playing the ‘Iran card’.”^[30]

Falahatpisheh also expressed confidence that the U.S. is unlikely to activate the snapback mechanism, as, according to him, Washington prefers to negotiate, unlike the Europeans, which are nowadays more preoccupied with the war in Ukraine. Furthermore, he suggested that, much like what is happening regarding peace negotiations with Russia where Europe has been sidelined, Trump is prioritizing direct engagement with Iran.^[31]

Conclusion

The range of perspectives among Chinese and Iranian commentators reflects the uncertainty surrounding both the future of the JCPOA and the prospects for Iran–U.S. dialogue. However, there is room for cautious optimism, given Tehran’s response to Trump’s letter expressing a willingness to continue indirect talks, as well as reports that U.S. National Security Advisor Michael Waltz, a known Iran hawk, may be fired over “Signalgate.”

The significance of the U.S.’ role is evident: despite the meeting taking place in Beijing among Chinese, Russian, and Iranian officials, statements, from both policymakers and commentators, focused overwhelmingly on what Washington will do. Across Chinese and Iranian perspectives, there is broad consensus that the uncertainty surrounding the JCPOA’s future is a direct consequence of U.S. actions and that any solution will ultimately depend on what approach Trump will take.

However, diverging perspectives on the strategic value of Sino-Iranian relations challenge the prevailing Western narrative that depicts China and Iran as firmly aligned with Russia and North Korea in an “authoritarian alliance.” While Chinese officials primarily used the occasion to call for Washington’s genuine participation in resolving the Iranian nuclear issue, Chinese experts displayed a greater interest than their government in trilateral cooperation between China, Russia, and Iran as a potential means of mitigating Iran’s isolation. However, this does not imply that Chinese analysts regard Tehran as a strong partner; many continue to highlight what they perceive as Iran’s self-inflicted economic woes.

Meanwhile, within Iran, official statements uniformly advocate for deeper cooperation with China and Russia. However, Iranian commentators express a notable degree of disagreement. While some support strengthening ties with Beijing and Moscow, others argue for prioritizing engagement with the U.S. over China. Similarly to what Razan Shawamreh recently argued in an article on Chinese policy toward Palestine, China’s commitment to Iran appears to be more rhetorical than substantive. According to this view, Beijing is primarily interested in securing a seat at the negotiating table rather than actively pursuing a resolution to the nuclear issue and may even be exploiting Iran’s isolation for its own economic benefit. As such, some analysts contend that direct negotiations with the Trump administration would be a more effective course of action.

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Giorgia FACCHINI is a Research Fellow at the ChinaMed Project. She is also a graduate student in International Relations and Institutions of Asia and Africa at the University of Naples "L’Orientale." Her research interests include China's governance and administrative system, as well as China’s foreign policy and economic strategy.

Veronica TURRINI is a Research Fellow at the ChinaMed Project. She holds a Master’s Degree in Language and Civilisation of Asia and Mediterranean Africa from Ca' Foscari University in Venice. Her research focuses on the media coverage of China in Iran.