Beijing on the Kosovo Question: Russia’s Understudy or a Possible Partner for Europe?

We are back with another exploration of China’s position on the frozen and often overlooked conflicts across the wider Mediterranean region, this time focusing on Kosovo. This analysis will also be included in our upcoming report on current issues in Sino-Serbian relations (you can check out our previous report on Israeli media narratives on China here).

As with our previous piece on the Cyprus Problem, the analysis presented here does not necessarily reflect the personal views of the authors. We also recognize that many locations are known by different names in various languages. For the sake of consistency and clarity, we have opted to use commonly recognized English exonyms and spellings (e.g., Kosovo instead of Kosova, Pristina instead of Prishtina).

‍

On February 9, 2025, the partially recognized state of Kosovo held general elections. The ruling party, Vetëvendosje! (Self-Determination Movement), led by Prime Minister Albin Kurti, secured approximately 40.87% of the vote. Although Kurti and his pro-Kosovar Albanian populist party claimed victory, this result fell short of an absolute majority, necessitating the formation of a coalition government, a process which is encountering serious difficulties.

In recent years, the Kurti government has intensified its efforts to exert greater control over Serb-majority areas in North Kosovo. Pristina’s assertive policies have not only heightened tensions with Serbia, which continues to officially regard Kosovo as a breakaway province, but have also drawn criticism from the European Union and the United States. Kosovo now faces not only even greater international isolation and a substantial shortfall in economic support, but also the serious security implications of a potential U.S. military withdrawal from the region.

Despite contending with a mass protest movement against his government, Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić has not lost sight of advancing Serbia’s position on the Kosovo issue. To this end, Serbia has increasingly turned to China. With Beijing reaffirming its support for Belgrade in the North Kosovo crisis, local analysts have begun to assess the potential role China might play in a conflict it has thus far regarded as a far-off European problem.

Against this backdrop, in this edition of the ChinaMed Observer, we explore local perceptions and analyses of China’s stance on the Kosovo question and offer our considerations on whether Beijing could intervene. In particular, we assess the potential for China-EU cooperation in conflict mediation in the Western Balkans amid the fraying Transatlantic partnership.

China’s Historic Position on Kosovo

In the early 1990s, the dissolution of Yugoslavia into its constituent republics led to a series of bloody ethnic conflicts. During the initial phase of what became known as the Yugoslav Wars, including the conflicts in Croatia (1991–1995) and Bosnia (1992–1995), China largely kept a neutral stance, adhering to its foreign policy strategy of “keeping a low profile” (韬光养晦) while generally supporting United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions aimed at managing the crisis.^[1]

By 1998, full-scale war had erupted in Kosovo, then an autonomous province within Serbia, which, along with Montenegro, constituted what remained of Yugoslavia. The conflict arose from escalating political repression and ethnic discrimination against the province’s ethnic Albanian population. Specifically, after the failure of peaceful resistance to address Kosovo’s future in preceding peace negotiations, the Kosovo Liberation Army launched armed attacks aimed at ending Serbian rule. In response, Yugoslav forces and Serb paramilitary groups initiated a campaign of ethnic cleansing targeting Kosovar Albanians.^[2]

The escalating bloodshed, alongside the memory of the international community’s failure to prevent the violence in Bosnia, prompted NATO to launch large-scale aerial bombardment of Yugoslav military infrastructure in March 1999. Justified as a “humanitarian intervention,” the campaign remains highly controversial, both for its many civilian casualties and for being conducted without UNSC authorization.

Among the casualties were three Chinese journalists, who were killed on May 7, 1999, when the U.S. bombed the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade. The attack provoked an immediate and vehement rebuke from Beijing, as well as mass protests across China against the U.S. and NATO. Although Washington issued formal apologies and maintained that the bombing was a mistake, many within China believe it to have been a deliberate act of aggression.

The bombing not only intensified China’s opposition to NATO operations against Yugoslavia but also reinforced concerns about Western interventionism. NATO involvement in Kosovo, which led to the province’s de facto independence, was perceived by Chinese policymakers and analysts as establishing a dangerous precedent that could legitimize Western interference in China’s internal affairs, particularly concerning Tibet, Xinjiang and Taiwan.

As such, when Kosovo unilaterally declared independence from Serbia in February 2008, Beijing sided with Belgrade. China thus became one of the nearly eighty countries that does not recognize the Republic of Kosovo as a sovereign nation, alongside Russia, India, Brazil and even some EU member states with their own secessionist concerns like Spain.

Although China officially supports Serbia’s position on Kosovo in the UN, it has historically maintained a rather hands-off approach, viewing the matter as a European issue best handled through EU-led mediation as well as expressing a willingness to accept any resolution that is agreeable to all parties. This stance contrasts with Russia’s more active support for Serbia’s claim, as Moscow has lobbied other states to withhold or withdraw recognition of Kosovo.

Beijing’s response to Pristina’s declaration of independence was welcomed by Belgrade, especially given China’s status as a permanent member of the UNSC. Already in 2009, under President Boris Tadić, Serbia committed to a “four pillar” foreign policy, aiming for good relations with the U.S., the EU, Russia, and, notably, a still-rising China. This positive outlook continued under subsequent administrations and was reciprocated by an increasingly globally oriented China, likely contributing to the relatively developed and growing Sino-Serbian economic partnership.

Conversely, China’s close ties with Serbia and its refusal to recognize Kosovo’s statehood has led to much of Kosovar society and media to dislike the People’s Republic. This, alongside how alignment with the U.S. and EU is viewed as essential to Kosovo’s recognition, security and development, has led Pristina to maintain a rather critical stance toward Beijing.

For instance, Albin Kurti has on multiple occasions described China as an “enemy” and promised to reject Chinese engagement at any cost. As Prime Minister, he even refused to accept gifted Chinese vaccines during the height of the COVID-19 pandemic, arguing that Kosovo should not accept aid from countries that do not recognize its independence.

As noted by the team behind the European Council on Foreign Relations’ “Mapping China's Rise in the Western Balkans” project, this political context has contributed to China’s nonexistent economic presence in Kosovo, the only country in the Western Balkans not to have signed up to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). However, this does not mean economic ties between the two are entirely absent. Bilateral trade has been growing and Chinese firms have made a few, unsuccessful bids for Kosovar infrastructure projects. Nevertheless, the entrenched presence of Western companies since post-war reconstruction, combined with the country’s limited strategic relevance, lack of significant natural resources and diplomatic concerns, has led China not to actively prioritize a strong economic presence in Kosovo.

Recent Developments: The Ukraine War and a “Common Destiny” for Kosovo and Taiwan?

The full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 turned Serbia’s historically close partnership with Russia into a liability. With its EU accession prospects and financial assistance on the line, Belgrade yielded to Western pressure by (partially) distancing itself from Moscow. This reversal has complicated President Vučić’s long-standing strategy of hedging amid escalating international competition, as his government has sought to extract political and economic concessions from the EU, while simultaneously preserving space for Serbia’s assertive foreign policy and increasingly authoritarian domestic agenda.

In this context, analysts have interpreted Belgrade’s outreach to China as an effort to secure a non-Western great power partner capable of filling Russia’s shoes. A clear example is in military procurement as Serbia, while terminating many of its Russian contracts, has begun purchasing Chinese weaponry, most notably, the CH-92 and CH-95 armed drones, as well as the K-3 air defense system.

The Ukraine War also strengthened China’s strategic interest in Serbia. As Beijing’s relations with the EU soured due to its “neutral” stance on Russia’s aggression, Serbia emerged as one of China’s few remaining reliable partners in Europe; both economically as a gateway for Chinese firms seeking access to the EU market, and politically, as Belgrade has expressed open support for China’s alternative vision of the international order.

Vučić was one of the very few European leaders to attend the Third Belt and Road Forum in Beijing in October 2023. In contrast to Western calls for “de-risking,” the Serbian President voiced his support for the BRI and inked a free trade agreement with China. The so-called “ironclad friendship” between the two countries was further reinforced in May 2024 when Chinese President Xi Jinping visited Belgrade. During the visit, numerous memoranda were signed, including one committing Serbia to building a “community of common destiny” with China, making Serbia the first European country to do so.

Xi’s state visit to Serbia attracted substantial international media attention, particularly as it coincided with the 25^th anniversary of the NATO bombing of the Chinese embassy. However, as underscored in a previous ChinaMed Observer, Serbian analysts placed far less emphasis on this anniversary. Instead, domestic discourse centered on economic cooperation with China, its implications for Serbia’s EU accession process, and how Belgrade is leveraging its ties with Beijing to strengthen its negotiating position with the West, particularly on the Kosovo question. Notably, both Xi and Vučić publicly reaffirmed China’s support for Serbia regarding Kosovo, with the Serbian President drawing a direct parallel between Kosovo’s status for Serbia and Taiwan’s status for the People’s Republic.

Although Kosovo has always been a pertinent issue in Serbian politics, Vučić’s robust efforts to court Chinese support are likely due to the ongoing crisis in North Kosovo. Since Kurti assumed office in Kosovo in 2021, his government has sought to consolidate control over the four Serb-majority northern municipalities. Serbia provides various public services to residents in these towns, a practice that Pristina views as a challenge to its sovereignty, given Belgrade’s steadfast rejection of Kosovo’s statehood.

After tensions first erupted over Serbia-issued license plates in North Kosovo, Pristina began implementing a series of measures in the summer of 2022 ostensibly aimed at integrating the region more firmly under its authority. This heavy-handed campaign—which included deploying special police forces, banning goods and medicines from Serbia, and halting the construction of Serbian-funded housing—led to the mass resignation of Serbs from Kosovar institutions. Serbs then boycotted the April 2023 local elections, resulting in ethnic Albanians being elected as mayors in North Kosovo. In response to barricades, Kosovo authorities seized control of the municipal buildings by force to allow these mayors to take office. This move was condemned by both the U.S. and EU, as it provoked violent protests, prompting NATO’s resident peacekeeping force to intervene.

In September, the crisis deepened when a deadly clash broke out between Kosovo police and Serb paramilitaries in the northern village of Banjska. Pristina blamed Belgrade’s interference for the incident, viewing it as justification to continue dismantling parallel Serb institutions. With the debacle weakening local resistance, the Kurti government pressed ahead, banning use of the Serbian dinar, closing Serbian banks and post offices, and attempting to bar the main political party representing Kosovo’s Serbs from running in the 2025 elections. These actions further diminished prospects for an internationally advocated agreement guaranteeing autonomy for North Kosovo, as well as broader normalization between Belgrade and Pristina.

Although domestic political considerations played a significant role given the 2025 Kosovar parliamentary elections and the Vučić government’s ongoing legitimacy crisis, the international dimension was also crucial. Against the backdrop of the Ukraine War, Pristina has attempted to frame its actions as part of a wider struggle against “Russian-sponsored hybrid warfare,” aiming to secure Western support as Kosovo pushes for EU and NATO membership. Meanwhile, Belgrade has sought to position itself as a “responsible” actor, appealing to NATO, the EU and the UN for support against Kurti’s purportedly destabilizing actions. Nevertheless, despite serious concerns over Pristina’s policies in North Kosovo, Vučić’s controversies surrounding alleged electoral fraud, repression of civil society, and a crackdown on mass protests have undermined Western willingness to back Belgrade.

Against this background, Serbian commentators have discussed Serbia’s outreach to the Global South, particularly its bid to join BRICS, as a strategy to rally non-Western support for blocking Kosovo’s participation in the UN and other international organizations.^[3] Among these partners, China clearly stands out as the central focus of Serbian diplomatic efforts, as was prominently displayed during Xi Jinping’s visit to Belgrade, but also more recently.

On January 21, 2025, on the sidelines of the World Economic Forum in Davos, Aleksandar Vučić addressed reporters about his meetings with EU Special Representative for the Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue Miroslav Lajčák and Chinese Vice Premier Ding Xuexiang (丁薛祥) regarding Kosovo. He discussed the two engagements consecutively, contrasting the positions of the EU and China. Vučić remarked:

“I am concerned about the European policy on this issue […] the policy of surrender to Kurti and their announcements that despite all active provocations, they will allow them into the Council of Europe and other organizations […] We also talked about political issues with China […] The Chinese have unequivocally declared their support for preserving the territorial integrity of Serbia, including Kosovo.”^[4]

President Vučić has not been the sole member of the Serbian government soliciting and celebrating Chinese support on Kosovo.^[5] Since Xi Jinping’s state visit, a succession of high-ranking Serbian officials has traveled to China, each raising the Kosovo question with their Chinese counterparts.

For example, in September 2024, Serbian Deputy Prime Minister and Interior Minister Ivica Dačić visited China, where he met State Counselor and Minister of Public Security Wang Xiaohong (王小洪). During their discussions, Dačić informed Wang of “the terror against Serbs in Kosovo and Metohija and the disregard for all international agreements.”^[6] He also expressed gratitude to China for its support in “preserving the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Republic of Serbia,” particularly emphasizing China’s “consistent and unequivocal position on the issue of non-recognition of the so-called Kosovo.”^[7] Dačić's office later underscored the importance of China’s backing in the UN, expressing confidence that Serbia “will certainly have their support.”^[8]

Similarly, Prime Minister Miloš Vučević (who recently resigned due to the ongoing protests), “expressed gratitude to Chinese friends for their principled stance towards the issue of Kosovo and Metohija” during his November 2024 meeting with Premier Li Qiang (李强) in Shanghai. Foreign Minister Marko Đurić also voiced similar appreciation for China’s position on Kosovo during his meetings with his Chinese counterpart Wang Yi (王毅) in Beijing, in an interview with Xinhua, and at a reception at the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade celebrating Chinese New Year.

These expressions of gratitude are in response to Beijing’s continued statements of support on the North Kosovo crisis. For instance, on September 16, 2024, the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson stated that “China respects Serbia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, and believes that the security and lawful rights and interests of ethnic Serbs in the Kosovo region should be upheld.” Although these statements are rather boilerplate (as evidenced by them being repeated almost word for word on January 17, 2025) they have received extensive and celebratory coverage in Serbian media.^[9]

A more assertive comment came from China's Permanent Representative to the UN, Fu Cong (傅聪), during a Security Council meeting on October 30, 2024. In his statement, Fu Cong not only reiterated Chinese support for “reaching a mutually acceptable political solution through dialogue and consultation” in a process that must respect “the sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of Serbia,” but also explicitly blamed the crisis on Pristina. In a strongly worded statement, Fu Cong declared:

“Tensions in northern Kosovo have escalated with a high incidence of violent security incidents. The responsibility lies with the Kosovo authorities.”

The Chinese Ambassador criticized the Kosovo authorities’ heavy-handed policies, the lack of Serb representation in North Kosovo’s institutions, and Pristina’s continued refusal to implement the long-promised autonomy plan for Serb-majority municipalities. Although Fu Cong reiterated China’s willingness to “work with all parties concerned to [...] promote an early political settlement of the Kosovo issue,” it is evident that Beijing has no intention of expanding its role on Kosovo beyond its traditional hands-off diplomatic posture, with Fu placing the onus of mediation on the EU:

“We hope that the new EU leadership will maintain its neutrality on the Kosovo issue and use its good offices in a fair and impartial manner. We expect all parties, with EU mediation, to continue to engage in discussions on the political solution to the Kosovo issue.”

This position is consistent with China’s long-standing policy of deferring to Brussels with regard to mediation between Kosovo and Serbia, which has been previously iterated by Fu Cong, as well as Chinese Ambassador to Serbia Li Ming (李明) in an interview with Politika.^[10] While one could conclude that China's reluctance to contribute actively to Serbia-Kosovo dialogue may show that Belgrade’s diplomatic outreach has been unsuccessful, it is unlikely that Serbian authorities either expected or desired greater Chinese involvement.

Nonetheless, Kosovar authorities have reacted strongly to Beijing’s close ties with Serbia. For instance, Prime Minister Kurti expressed strong disapproval of Serbia’s acquisition of Chinese weaponry, stating in a social media post:

“This makes Serbia the first and only operator of Chinese weapons in Europe, openly displaying violent aggression towards Kosovo"

Similarly, during a Council on Foreign Relations interview in September 2024, Kosovo’s President Vjosa Osmani-Sadriu expressed deep distrust of China in response to a question about Kosovo’s alignment with the U.S.:

“We believe that [China’s BRI] is a malign influence. We believe that [it] has not led the other countries in our region towards more prosperity. Actually, it got them mostly in trouble. [...] We don’t cooperate with China. We haven’t allowed China to use any of its instruments to influence whether policymaking or even opinion making in Kosovo. Of course, they try. They do try.”

Sentiment critical of China is not limited to Kosovar government officials but is also echoed by the opposition. Democratic Party of Kosovo MP Enver Hoxhaj, for example, when criticizing Kurti and Osmani for not aligning more closely with the U.S., argued that: “Kosovo does not only have Serbia as an enemy, but also Russia and China.”^[11]

While such statements likely reflect the widespread distrust of China in Kosovo, they do not necessarily signal genuine concern over Beijing’s direct involvement in negotiations. Rather, given that these remarks are often made during meetings with EU and U.S. officials, as well as in engagements with Western media and think tanks, this rhetoric may serve to court Western support by emphasizing Kosovo’s alignment with Western security concerns, in a mirror of Serbia’s own use of the “China card.”

It is against this backdrop that experts from Serbia, Kosovo and the rest of the region have begun analyzing the growing diplomatic outreach between Kosovo and Taiwan.^[12] While Taipei was the first Asian government to recognize Kosovo’s declaration of independence, Pristina has yet to reciprocate, as doing so would have inevitably provoked Beijing and very probably complicated Kosovar efforts to join the UN.

However, as noted by James Baron for Foreign Policy, under Kurti, UN membership has become less of a priority for Pristina, with a stronger focus instead on joining the EU and NATO. As a result, driven by their shared status as partially recognized U.S.-aligned liberal democracies facing irredentist neighbors, Kosovo-Taiwan exchanges have notably increased. In March 2023, the first parliamentary delegation from Kosovo visited Taiwan, led by former Prime Minister Avdullah Hoti, who met with then-President Tsai Ing-wen, provoking a rebuke from the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade. Hoti led another delegation in April 2024, and more recently, in February 2025, Kosovo Minister of Defense, Ejup Maqedonci, visited Taipei—the first visit by a sitting Kosovo official.

Local Perspectives on China’s Position

Despite Beijing’s lack of concrete actions, the pro-government Serbian press has continued to report favorably on China’s rhetorical support for Serbia’s stance on Kosovo.^[13] Conversely, Kosovar commentators and civil society organizations have grown more critical of China’s influence in the Balkans.^[14] Meanwhile, experts on both sides generally have nuanced perspectives on the substance of China-Serbia relations, though significant debate persists.

As we previously analyzed in the context of Xi Jinping’s visit to Belgrade, many experts from Serbia and the region interpret Belgrade’s courting of Beijing as a response to Moscow’s diminishing capacity to serve as leverage in negotiations with the West, particularly in light of the war in Ukraine. This view continues to be predominant and was expressed by Vuk Vuksanović, a Senior Researcher at the Belgrade Centre for Security Policy (BCSP), a Serbian pro-EU think tank. In an interview with Kosovo Online, he explained why Serbia may find Chinese support preferable to that of Russia:

“[There is] a desire among leaders in Belgrade for China to be a more outspoken protector of Belgrade because Belgrade doesn't like a trend they see, which is Moscow using the Kosovo precedent to justify territorial annexation in Ukraine and other locations in the post-Soviet space. This puts Belgrade in a very awkward position, as can be seen from the statements of Serbian officials but also from Serbia's voting in the UN”.^[15]

On the other hand, Beijing supports Serbia’s stance due to its own territorial disputes, though it has so far preferred to “fly under the radar,” having historically allowed Russia to take the lead on the issue. For Vuksanović, it remains uncertain if this approach will evolve as China has become increasingly active, having mediated between Iran and Saudi Arabia. The Serbian analyst argues that, for now, Beijing still views Kosovo as a distant dispute that is primarily a European problem.

Other analysts agree that China is a more reliable partner on Kosovo with respect to Russia as Beijing “is not pressuring Serbia to choose a side, nor is it trying to stop its integration into Euro-Atlantic structures.”^[16] Moreover, China has a much more consistent outlook than Russia on the “Kosovo precedent.” In an interview for FoNet’s ​”Kosinus” series, journalist Nemanja Todorović Štiplija, the editor-in-chief of the portal European Western Balkans, noted how while China has an unchanging position on the issue of Kosovo’s UN membership, Russia’s stance depends on “its personal interests towards what is happening in Ukraine, Georgia or in any case in which Moscow can use the Kosovo precedent.”^[17]

Similar confidence in China over Russia was also expressed by political scientist Aleksandar Djokic in an interview for independent magazine Radar. However, Djokic also warned that interstate relations are not just confined to diplomacy:

“A separate question is how China would treat Kosovo in practice, especially in economic terms, and whether it would regard it as an independent state without formally opening an embassy there.”^[18]

However, regarding diplomatic relations, the consensus among Serbian analysts is that China has no intention of ever recognizing Kosovo independently outside a solution agreed upon by Belgrade and will actively veto Pristina’s accession to the UN until such an agreement is reached. While some government-aligned experts attribute Beijing’s stance to the “traditional friendship” and growing economic and political partnership between China and Serbia, most Serbian commentators take a more pragmatic view, arguing that China’s position is primarily driven by concerns over its own territorial integrity.^[19] Some Serbian sources even report that Chinese officials have stated they will never recognize Kosovar statehood, even if Serbia itself were to do so, due to the precedent it would set for China’s own territorial disputes.^[20]

Among these disputes, Taiwan is the most prominent for Serbian analysts, who often point to it as the reason why they are confident that Serbia will continue to enjoy unwavering Chinese support.^[21] This connection is even noted by Kosovo Serbs, like Miodrag Marinković the director of the Center for Affirmative Social Actions, an NGO promoting Serb rights, interests and opportunities in Kosovo.^[22] In this context, the growing diplomatic engagement between Kosovo and Taiwan has sparked debate among both Serbian and Kosovar analysts, specifically on whether the historical, political and security circumstances of these two territories are comparable.^[23]

For Serbian historian Stefan Radojković, Pristina’s attempt to strengthen ties with Taipei represents, from its view, a reasonable strategic move. As he explained to Kosovo Online:

"Kosovo constantly tries to return to the center of Washington’s attention by associating itself with current, highly significant global security challenges such as Ukraine or the conflict in the Middle East between Hamas and Israel. In that context, Pristina’s diplomacy will attempt to align itself with Taiwan because they understand that all or most of Washington’s focus will be directed toward the Pacific."^[24]

However, Radojković rejects direct comparisons between Kosovo and Taiwan for two key reasons. First, while Taiwan does not present itself as an “antithesis to the Chinese people, Chinese civilization, or the People’s Republic of China,” he argues that “[Kosovar] Albanians attempt to deny any Serbian presence in Kosovo and Metohija, as well as the existence of the Republic of Serbia.” Second, he highlights the stark economic contrast between the two, noting that Taiwan is a technologically advanced and economically vibrant entity, whereas Kosovo is not. Nonetheless, he acknowledges that both represent “separatist attempts” facing significantly larger and more powerful internationally recognized states.^[25]

This final point is echoed by Pristina-based security expert Nuredin Ibishi, who conceded that “historically, they have no similarities at all, but the security risks are indeed alike for both.” However, he is quick to highlight a crucial distinction, emphasizing that while “Taiwan is recognized by 17 states, Kosovo is recognized by 117, including the world’s most powerful countries.”^[26]

In contrast, Nikola Lunić, Executive Director of the Council for Strategic Policies, a Serbian think tank specializing in international affairs, rejects the notion that Kosovo and Taiwan face the same security challenges, arguing that their circumstances are fundamentally different. Speaking to Kosovo Online, he stated:

“Taiwan is facing a robust global power that has overtaken Russia in global influence, while Serbia merely possesses some Chinese weaponry that serves a purely defensive purpose.”^[27]

Building on this point, Lunić also addressed Defense Minister Maqedonci’s visit to Taiwan, dismissing it as part of Pristina’s “donor diplomacy.” He argued that Kosovo’s current diplomatic strategy revolves around “searching for donations,” with its outreach now extending beyond Western countries to include Taiwan as well.^[28]

It must also be noted that it was not just Serbians who criticized Maqedonci’s trip to Taiwan, but also Kosovars, with former ambassador Muhamet Brajshori arguing that:

“For almost two decades, Kosovo's foreign policy has strongly adhered to the One China Policy. The Defense Minister's visit to Taiwan is the most reckless & strategically damaging move in the history of Kosovo's foreign policy. It is an adventure with diplomatic consequences.”^[29]

Brajshori is not the only Kosovar diplomat to advocate for maintaining open the chance to build diplomatic ties with China. A similar stance was articulated by former ambassador Mimoza Ahmetaj in an article published by Radio Free Europe looking into the Representative Office of China in Pristina. The same article also features a contrasting perspective from Ramadan Ilazi, Head of Research of the Kosovo Center for Security Studies, an independent policy research center based in Pristina. While Ilazi acknowledges that Kosovo should remain open to engaging with China, particularly in light of its veto power in the UNSC, he emphasizes that any such engagement “should be done in full coordination with the USA.”^[30]

On this note, the Kosovo Center for Security Studies published an analysis by Research Fellow Besar Gërgi on China-Serbia relations and their impact on the dialogue with Kosovo, arguing that China has effectively filled the vacuum left by Russia to the detriment of regional security in the Western Balkans. After outlining the history and current state of Belgrade’s ties with Beijing—highlighting their political, economic, and military benefits for Serbia—Gërgi contends that a potential Chinese invasion of Taiwan would have serious consequences also for Kosovo:

“Experts agree that in lieu of a convincing deterrence by Kosovar army [sic.], Serbian security forces would try to reassert control over the territory. Therefore, a global threat requiring the bulk of the attention & resources of NATO forces, such as a hypothetical Chinese attack on Taiwan, has the potential of military escalations in as far a place as the Western Balkans.”^[31]

Gërgi concludes by asserting that “As long as there is China in the Western Balkans, there shall be no progress in the dialogue between Kosova and Serbia.” Among his recommendations to the Kosovar government is a reconsideration of “its self-imposed ban on relations with Taiwan, since China has not upheld its promise to remain distanced from Kosovo’s issues.” Moreover, he suggests that with the Trump administration mainly focused on the threat posed by Beijing, Pristina “should present the risks of Beijing’s interference in the region to Washington, D.C. more actively and comprehensively.”^[32]

However, given how the second Trump administration has so far engaged with Europe and the Western Balkans, implementing such a recommendation may come as a serious challenge for any incoming Kosovar government.

Could China Get More Involved?

The cautious optimism among both Serbians and Kosovars regarding Donald Trump’s return to the White House is increasingly in doubt, as his foreign policy throws international politics into more and more disarray. Although the Western Balkans are not a priority for the Trump administration, whose diplomatic focus is largely on Ukraine and Gaza, developments in Washington are nonetheless fueling uncertainty across the region.

Richard Grenell, who previously served as the U.S. Special Envoy for Serbia and Kosovo peace negotiations from 2019 to 2021, has once again been nominated by Trump, this time as his “Special Presidential Envoy for Special Missions.” A vocal critic of Albin Kurti, Grenell has already begun intervening in regional affairs, making statements against Kurti ahead of the Kosovar elections. Given the U.S. and Grenell’s alleged role in the fall of Kurti’s first government in 2020, speculation is mounting over whether Washington is undermining the coalition negotiation process in Pristina, potentially to cobble together an anti-Kurti coalition.

This political instability is compounded by the uncertainty surrounding U.S. security commitments to the region and by recent deep cuts to foreign aid, which have hit Kosovo especially hard. Meanwhile, Serbia has found itself targeted by Trump’s new trade policies, facing 37% tariffs, the highest rate in the Balkans (Kosovo has gotten off relatively lightly with the base tariff of 10%).

Nevertheless, many observers suggest that Trump may tilt in favor of Belgrade over Pristina. This likely has not been lost on Aleksandar Vučić, who appears to have seized the moment to advance a nationalist agenda, illustrated in the “All-Serbian Assembly” declaration. The ripple effects of this unrest are also being felt in Bosnia and Herzegovina, where secessionist efforts led by Bosnian Serb leader Milorad Dodik have pushed the country deeper into crisis.

As Agon Maliqi noted in a piece for the Atlantic Council, escalating U.S.-EU tensions risk transforming the Western Balkans into a theater of Transatlantic competition rather than cooperation. The Trump administration’s approach to conflict mediation, marked by a disregard for European security concerns in the case of Ukraine, and a lack of commitment to achieving a humane and sustainable resolution in the case of Gaza, suggests that securing a mutually acceptable peace agreement in the Western Balkans may no longer be a priority for Washington. The revealed overt disdain within Trump’s inner circle toward Europe is likely reinforcing this perception in Brussels.

With the possibility of a U.S.-enabled Russian victory in Ukraine potentially allowing Moscow to reassert its influence in the Balkans and open a second front of instability against Europe, the EU may be forced to seek unlikely partners, such as China. Although Chinese influence in the Western Balkans is a source of apprehension within Europe, particularly due to Beijing’s current alignment with Moscow, China may be perceived as a more stable and pragmatic partner than Washington in the context of Kosovo, given its continued support for EU mediation, its broader interest in regional stability, and its acceptance of Serbia’s European integration process. Moreover, Beijing may be one of the few actors possibly able to cooperate with the EU in applying pressure on Belgrade to accept a negotiated settlement.

While such a rapprochement currently seems impossible, mutual frustration over U.S. protectionism is already rapidly accelerating interest in Sino-European cooperation. Belgrade, for its part, may be amenable to Chinese involvement; as we have seen, many Serbian officials and analysts now view China as preferable to Russia on Kosovo. In contrast, Kosovo is skeptical of both the EU and China, but given the Trump administration’s erratic stance, Washington may no longer represent a reliable alternative with regard to ensuring Kosovar sovereignty.

A more relevant question is whether China would be willing to intensify its engagement in what it traditionally views as a predominantly European issue. While most local analysts are skeptical, there is broad agreement that China’s approach is driven by concerns over its own territorial integrity, especially regarding Taiwan. This sensitivity has already led some Kosovar diplomats to publicly caution Pristina against deepening ties with Taipei. Should Kosovo move closer to Taiwan, an idea advocated by certain Kosovar analysts, Beijing could likely retaliate by expanding its diplomatic involvement. A relevant precedent can be found in China’s increasingly assertive stance in favor of Somalia following Taiwan’s renewed engagement with Somaliland, another disputed breakaway territory.

Nonetheless, attempting to forecast future developments in the Western Balkans is speculative at best. The region continues to grapple with unresolved political crises in both Serbia and Kosovo, while the trajectory of EU relations with both the U.S. and China remains uncertain. In such a volatile context, it is unclear which external power the EU might ultimately partner with in the attempt to ensure stability in the region.

‍

Anja DUVNJAK is a Research Fellow at the ChinaMed Project. She is a graduate of the University of Turin-Zhejiang University Dual Degree in International Relations and China Studies. Her research focuses on the relations between China and the Western Balkans.

Leonardo BRUNI is the Project Officer and a Research Fellow at the ChinaMed Project. He is also a Research Fellow at the University of Turin and a graduate of the Sciences Po-Peking University Dual Master’s Degree in International Relations. His research interests include China-EU relations and Chinese foreign policy in the wider Mediterranean region.