Chinese Experts Look at the Restart of Hostilities in Syria

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Miriam Verzellino

On November 27, after years of relative calm, the Syrian civil war—now in its thirteenth year—took a dramatic new turn. Two simultaneous offensives began last Wednesday: the first, named “Repelling Aggression,” was spearheaded by the Islamist militant group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), while the second, “Dawn of Freedom,” was launched by the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA). These opposition forces swept in from their bases in northwestern Syria, encountering minimal resistance from President Bashar al-Assad’s Syrian Arab Army.

The rebels have so far successfully captured Aleppo, Syria’s second-largest city. At the time of writing, HTS-led forces are advancing along the main road to the Syrian capital of Damascus having seized the city of Hama, where government troops failed to regroup and make a stand. Meanwhile, Russia and Iran have stepped up their support for the Assad regime.

During the regular press conference on December 2, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Lin Jian affirmed that China had already taken precautions to safeguard its citizens. Lin also stated that China supports Syria’s right to defend its national security and stability, adding that China is a friendly country to Syria and is willing to contribute positively to prevent a further deterioration of the situation.[1]

As we have previously noted, China’s role in the Syrian conflict has been limited and cannot be compared to the direct military involvement of Iran and Russia. Even in economic terms, there has never been much appetite in Beijing for financing Syria’s reconstruction, despite Chinese rhetoric to the contrary. Nonetheless, Beijing has clearly favored the survival of the Assad regime, with its representatives at the United Nations playing a supportive role in this regard. This culminated in President Assad’s state visit to China in 2023, during which the two countries announced the establishment of a strategic partnership. At that time, with opposition forces contained in northwestern Syria, Chinese commentators eagerly framed China’s choice to back the Syrian government as a vindicated and strategic choice.

However, with the rebel advance shattering the notion that Bashar al-Assad has secured victory in the civil war, this issue of the ChinaMed Observer explores Chinese commentators and experts’ initial reactions to the unfolding events in Syria. Our analysis reveals an ongoing debate among Chinese observers about whether the Syrian government can hold, but also a broad agreement on the importance of regional dynamics. A clear preference has emerged for viewing the Assad regime’s troubles through the lens of the relative power of regional actors, particularly Iran, Russia and Turkey. Moreover, the resumption of hostilities in Syria is also examined in terms of its regional implications, especially its potential to exacerbate the fragile ceasefire in Lebanon, thereby contributing significantly to broader instability in the Middle East.

The Iran-Russia-Türkiye Triangle

Analysts around the world have offered various explanations for the Assad regime’s failure to halt the rebel offensive, citing factors like sanctions-induced economic struggles, widespread corruption and popular disillusionment. However, Chinese experts, like many of their counterparts elsewhere, have focused more on regional and global dynamics, interpreting the recent developments in Syria as a direct consequence of the shifting balance of power and the changing interests of Iran, Türkiye and Russia.

For example, Zou Zhiqiang, a researcher at the Middle East Research Center of Fudan University, pointed to the weakening of Iran and Hezbollah as being a key factor behind the Syrian government’s fragility. He suggested that Syrian opposition forces likely saw an opportunity to act before the fragile ceasefire between Hezbollah and Israel provided Iran and Iranian-backed forces time to regroup.[2]

Türkiye, Zou argued, is likely to have recognized the same opportunity. As he stated:

“As the main external supporter of the Syrian opposition armed forces, Türkiye believes that now the situation presents an opportunity. It aims to take advantage of this chance to expand its control over the northern area of Syria, as this would provide better conditions for a future attack against Kurdish forces, and leverage in negotiations with the Syrian government.”

Li Zixin, a researcher at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs-affiliated China Institute of International Studies, put forward a similar perspective, suggesting that Israel might provide support to the rebels.[3] He also highlighted the difficult choices facing Iran, given Syria’s crucial role in its regional strategy. In 2016, Iranian support was pivotal in the Syrian government’s recapture of Aleppo. However, this time, a weakened Tehran faces the constant threat of escalating tensions with Israel. Consequently, Li believes that Iran will gradually scale back its presence in Syria, likely seeking to avoid direct involvement in the conflict. He further noted that coordination with Russia will be crucial for Iran’s future efforts in Syria.

On the role of Russia, Li Zhaoxian, the head of the China-Arab Research Institute at Ningxia University, made a similar argument:

“The prolonged Israel-Palestine conflict, which has lasted over a year, has significantly weakened the forces of Hezbollah in Lebanon and Iran’s presence in Syria. Additionally, the over two-year-long Russia-Ukraine conflict has kept Russia preoccupied, creating an exploitable opportunity.”[4]

However, Qin Tian, Deputy Director of the Middle East Institute at the China Institute of Modern International Relations, argued that it would be premature to assume that the three countries—Iran, Türkiye, and Russia—cannot find a compromise.[5] He believes that, from Moscow’s perspective, the primarily goal is to keep the Syrian regime alive, an objective that Ankara does not necessarily oppose. Indeed, Qin Tian pointed out that Russia and Türkiye have already successfully coordinated in the past, suggesting that a new status quo could be established once again.

The Future of the Conflict and its Regional Impact

Looking to the future, Chinese experts do not expect a quick end to this round of fighting. Despite the Syrian government’s weakness and uncertainties on how long the rebels can keep up this offensive, Zou Zhiqiang thinks that Damascus can control the situation for now. He stated that:

“Militarily, the Syrian government will certainly counterattack. In terms of diplomacy, it will intensify coordination with its allies.”

Li Zixin pointed out the urgent need for Syrian government to reverse the current situation as soon as possible.[6] He emphasized that Damascus had previously failed to grasp the evolving situation in the area, taking insufficient action to prevent escalation. For example, the Syrian government abolished the compulsory military service system and reduced the salary of Syrian army personnel. According to Li, “the morale of the Syrian government has been relatively low.” However, he also highlighted that opposition forces do not have air power, a weakness which the Syrian government can exploit to its advantage. Despite this, Li concluded that the conflict is unlikely to end quickly.[7]

According to Qin Tian, it would not be surprising if neither the regime nor the opposition forces manage to eliminate each other in the coming years. Instead, both sides are likely to maintain control over different parts of the country.[8] Qin also predicted that battle for Hama would prove decisive, and with city having fallen to the rebels yesterday, it remains to be seen if Qin’s prediction will hold true and if this could pave the road to Damascus for the opposition.

Regarding impact of the resumption of the hostilities in Syria, Zou Zhiqiang is certain that, although it is difficult to predict the rebel offensive’s exact outcome, current events are clearly “related to the Lebanese and Israeli ceasefire and the changes in the Middle East. This will deteriorate the geopolitical environment in the Middle East and could potentially influence the balance of power in the region.” [9]

Another senior expert at Ningxia University, Niu Xinchun pointed out that:

“Syria has historically been regarded as the crossroads of the Middle East, meaning events in Syria quickly impact neighboring countries and the broader region. Regarding hotspots like the Lebanon-Israel and Israel-Palestine conflicts, the most immediate and significant influence is on Lebanon-Israel relations.”[10]

He further argued that:

“The Syrian crisis has already entangled Israel, Hezbollah and Iran in a complex power struggle, making the Lebanon-Israel ceasefire increasingly fragile and unpredictable. For the broader Middle East, prolonged or escalated conflict in Syria could have far-reaching consequences.”[11]

Conclusion

Chinese experts remain divided on what will be the immediate outcome of Syrian opposition’s offensive. Although some predict that Damascus may hold its ground and potentially even counterattack, others refrain from making predictions. Despite these differences, several common themes emerge in Chinese analyses.

First, there is general agreement that the war is far from over and that a new status quo will take some time to emerge. Second, most view the recent escalation through the lens of regional dynamics, highlighting how the Middle Eastern balance of power appears to be shifting. While Russia and Iran, Assad’s primary backers, face mounting challenges, Türkiye, the leading supporter of the Syrian opposition, appears undeterred in increasing its involvement. Finally, there is broad consensus that these developments could have serious consequences for regional stability, particularly for Lebanon’s fragile ceasefire. Chinese commentators likely recognize that a weakening Assad regime—a key member of the “Axis of Resistance”—could also jeopardize Hezbollah, which relies on Syria as a vital supply route for Iranian support.

Although one could dismiss these perspectives due to Chinese analysts’ mistaken confidence in Assad and their failure to predict his regime’s fragility, it is worth noting that they were not alone in assuming Damascus had won. The Arab Cooperation Council reinstated Syria’s membership, and countries like Saudi Arabia and the UAE restored diplomatic ties. Even in Europe, the Italian government of Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni has advocated for restoring relations with Damascus, as part of its efforts to facilitate migrant repatriation.

The rebels’ recent capture of Hama raises further questions about how Chinese commentators will interpret unfolding developments, as they tended to express more confidence in Damascus’ resilience than much of the international media. Chinese diplomats, meanwhile, have reiterated their support for the Syrian government and its sovereignty, though it remains unclear how Beijing might act concretely in response to the evolving situation. It is interesting to note that none of the Chinese commentators examined seriously discussed China’s potential role in the escalating conflict. This suggests Beijing’s involvement is not considered relevant and that deeper Chinese engagement is seen as extremely unlikely.

Miriam VERZELLINO is Research Fellow at the ChinaMed Project. She holds a Master’s Degree in Language and Cultures of Asia and Africa from University of Naples “L’Orientale” and is currently pursuing a Master’s in Political Science (Chinese Language Program) at the School of Government and Public Affairs at the Communication University of China. Her research interests include scientific and technological cooperation between China and Europe, with a specific focus on Italy, as well as digital governance.

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-Non Commercial-No Derivatives 4.0 International License. To view a copy of this license, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ or send a letter to Creative Commons, PO Box 1866, Mountain View, CA 94042, USA.

[1] Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2024 nián 12 yuè 2 rì wàijiāo bù fāyánrén Lín Jiàn zhǔchí lìxíng jìzhě huì 2024年12月2日外交部发言人林剑主持例行记者会 [On December 2, 2024, Foreign Ministry spokesperson Lin Jian hosted the regular press conference], December 2, 2024, link.

[2] Fu Zihao, Guójì Shíjú: Zhōngdōng Dìqū Chōngtū Duōdiǎn Bàofā, Xùlìyǎ Yòu Chéng Dàguó Bóyì Zhànchǎng? 国际识局:中东地区冲突多点爆发 叙利亚又成大国博弈战场?[International Perspective: Conflicts Erupt Across the Middle East - Is Syria Once Again a Battleground for Major Powers?], China News Network, December 3, 2024, link.

[3] CCTV, Xùlìyà júshì jìnrù guānjiàn qī? Zhōngdōng zàixiàn wēixiǎn fēngbào 20241202 | CCTV Zhōngwén 《Huánqiú Shìxiàn》叙利亚局势进入关键期?中东再现危险风暴 20241202 | CCTV中文《环球视线》[Is the situation in Syria entering a critical phase? The Middle East sees the resurgence of a dangerous storm], December 2, 2024, link.

[4] CCTV News, Zhànhuǒ mànyán zhì zhōngbù Hāmǎ shěng zhèngfǔjūn duōxiàn zuòzhàn yī wén dǔ dǒng xùlìyà jìngnèi gè fāng lìliàng fēnbù 战火蔓延至中部哈马省 政府军多线作战 一文读懂叙利亚境内各方力量分布 [The flames of war spread to central Hama Province, government forces engage in multi-front combat: Understanding the distribution of forces within Syria in one article], December 3, 2024, link.

[5] CCTV, Is the situation in Syria entering a critical phase? The Middle East sees the resurgence of a dangerous storm.

[6] Ibid.

[7] Wang Yatian, Xùlìyà Ālèpǒ zhànshì shēngjí jūnshì duìkàng kǒng xiànrù lājùzhàn 叙利亚阿勒颇战事升级 军事对抗恐陷入拉锯战 [The conflict in Aleppo, Syria, escalates; military confrontation risks turning into a war of attrition], Global Times, December 1, 2024, link

[8] CCTV, “Is the situation in Syria entering a critical phase? The Middle East sees the resurgence of a dangerous storm.”

[9] Fu Zihao, “International Perspective: Conflicts Erupt Across the Middle East - Is Syria Once Again a Battleground for Major Powers?”

[10] CCTV, Xùlìyà zhànhuǒ zàiqǐ duì Zhōngdōng júshì yǐngxiǎng jǐhé? 叙利亚战火再起 对中东局势影响几何?[The flames of war reignite in Syria: What is the impact on the Middle East situation?] December 3, 2024, link.

[11] Ibid.

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Published with the support of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation pursuant to art. 23-bis of Presidential Decree 18/1967. The views expressed in this publication are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation.
Published with the support of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation pursuant to art. 23-bis of Presidential Decree 18/1967. The views expressed in this publication are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation.
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