On May 30, the 10^th Ministerial Meeting of the China–Arab States Cooperation Forum (CASCF) convened in Beijing, marking the 20^th anniversary of the Forum’s establishment, Representatives from 22 countries attended the conference, which was chaired by Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi and his Mauritanian counterpart Mohamed Salem Ould Merzouk.

Alongside Chinese President Xi Jinping, four Arab heads of state were present: King Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa of Bahrain, President Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi of Egypt, President Kais Saied of Tunisia, and President Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan of the United Arab Emirates.

The statements and positions expressed by China at this conference exemplify the positive narratives Beijing seeks to promote on initiatives like the CASCF, the growth of Sino-Arab ties, and the development of China-led multilateral cooperation with the Global South. As we have seen, Arab media and officials echoed these narratives perspective, from North Africa to the Levant and the Gulf.

Similarly, Chinese experts portrayed Sino-Arab relations as equal partnerships characterized by shared interests and limitless potential. However, unlike their Arab counterparts, they were more willing to view this relationship in the context of the US-China great power competition.

China’s Official Position

Official Chinese statements on the CASCF underscored that Beijing’s engagement with the region has been, and will continue to be, fruitful both politically and economically. Chinese readouts described the conference as an important milestone in building a “China-Arab community with a shared future,” a regional offshoot of Xi Jinping’s grand vision of a “shared future of mankind” (人类命运共同体). Exemplifying this optimistic and celebratory tone, Xi Jinping’s keynote speech at the event had as its main leitmotifs the concepts of “leapfrog development,” “acceleration” and the usual “win-win cooperation.”^[1]

Beijing’s official depiction of the conference conforms and confirms its stated commitment to deepening Sino-Arab ties on both the bilateral and multilateral levels. This is evident in the emphasis placed on the numerous strategic cooperation and partnership agreements signed between China and Arab countries, and most importantly on Beijing’s role brokering the “historic reconciliation” between Saudi Arabia and Iran.^[2] Mao Ning, spokesperson for the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, also highlighted how China is a force for enhancing the “strategic autonomy” of Arab countries:

“China has […] supported Arab countries in strengthening their strategic autonomy and solidarity. The development of China-Arab relations will not only benefit the people of both sides, but also promote peace and development in the Middle East and add stability to a world riven by turmoil. We are willing to continue to work with Arab countries on the path of collective cooperation, build a more three-dimensional cooperation platform, and promote the construction of the China-Arab Cooperation Forum to open a new chapter and embark on a new journey.”^[3]

Additionally, the China-Arab Forum provided Beijing with a good opportunity to reiterate its consistent stance on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In his speech, Xi Jinping once again called for a ceasefire in Gaza and reproposed his peace proposal built upon “Palestinian sovereignty based on the 1967 borders.” He added that for this purpose a “larger, more authoritative, and more effective peace conference” should be convened in the future and ultimately Palestine should enjoy “full membership” in the United Nations. As Xi affirmed:

“The war cannot continue indefinitely, justice cannot be permanently absent, and the 'two-state solution' cannot be arbitrarily shaken.”^[4]

On a similar note, Chinese Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Deng Li emphasized China’s consistent diplomatic presence and preference for mediation:

“The problems in the Middle East should be solved by the Middle Eastern countries and people through consultation. You have noticed that China has been more active in Middle Eastern diplomacy in recent times. In fact, we have never been absent from our efforts to promote peace in the Middle East.”^[5]

These points are not new to the Chinese discourse on Gaza, as our previous analyses of China's immediate reactions to the October 7 attack and its multilateral efforts vis-à-vis the Gaza War have shown. However, this marks the second occasion Xi Jinping has directly addressed this issue in a multilateral setting (the first was during an online summit of BRICS leaders convened at his request last November), highlighting the increasing relevance of the Palestine issue in Chinese diplomacy, at least from a rhetorical perspective.^[6]

In the economic realm, China and Arab countries have clearly stated their interest in deepening relations in innovation, commerce, energy, trade and people-to-people relations. Notably, Xi Jinping indicated his willingness to further integrate Taliban-led Afghanistan into its regional economic network based on the “Eight Joint Actions” and “Five Major Cooperation Patterns,” which would bring substantial innovation-heavy investments into the country in the areas of health, AI, green and low-carbon agriculture.^[7] This is an understandable overlap with the themes of the Third Belt and Road Forum held in Beijing in October 2023, particularly in reference to the digital economy and digital interconnectivity under Beijing’s “Green Silk Road.”^[8]

Additionally, Xi opened the door for Afghanistan joining the Belt and Road Initiative, likely aiming to mitigate potential risks coming from the country. As Xi stated:

“China is willing to work with Afghanistan to support each other, be equal and mutually beneficial, be inclusive and learn from each other, and work closely together to build China-Afghanistan relations into a benchmark for maintaining world peace and stability, a model for high-quality joint construction of the Belt and Road Initiative, a paragon of harmonious coexistence of different civilizations, and a model for exploring the correct path of global governance.”^[9]

In his keynote speech, the Chinese President also advocated for deeper economic and financial institutionalization between China and Arab states. Xi called for expanding special loan programs for industrialization and financial cooperation, expressed Beijing’s openness to Arab countries issuing so-called Panda bonds (RMB-denominated bonds), and encouraged Arab participation in cross-border RMB payment clearance systems.^[10]

In addition to the speeches and communiqués, the event resulted in many bilateral agreements and Memoranda of Understanding. Three major outcome documents were also issued.

Firstly, the Beijing Declaration explored methods to enhance the development of a China-Arab community and strengthen bilateral cooperation. It emphasized shared positions between China and Arab countries on resolving regional crises, combatting terrorism, human rights issues, climate change, and artificial intelligence.

Secondly, the CASCF Execution Plan for 2024-2026 outlined a framework to deepen China-Arab relations and cooperation across various sectors, including the economy, politics, infrastructure and aviation over the next two years.

Thirdly, in the China-Arab States Joint Statement on the Palestinian Issue the signatory parties expressed “deep concerns” over the ongoing war in Gaza, stressed the importance of a cease-fire and the uninterrupted flow of humanitarian aid, while also condemning “Israel’s continued aggression,” “the United States for using its veto to prevent Palestine from becoming a full member of the United Nations,” and the forced displacement of Palestinians.

Finally, it was announced that China will host another China-Arab Summit in 2026.

Chinese Media and Experts on the Forum

Unsurprisingly, Chinese media and commentators celebrated China-Arab relations and the Forum and, to do so, employed all the slogans of the Chinese official narrative. They discussed the “wave of reconciliation” spurred by the Saudi-Iranian diplomatic rapprochement brokered by China, and more recently, Syria’s “grand reunion” with the rest of the Arab world.^[11]

Scholarly responses also emphasized the potential of Sino-Arab relations. For instance, in a celebratory tone, Professor Wang Guangda of Shanghai International Studies University (SISU) remarked:

“The two sides have a lot of experience to summarize in terms of political mutual trust, economic cooperation, and exchanges and mutual learning of civilizations. At the same time, it has further implemented the next stage of China-Arab practical cooperation, which is of great significance in inheriting the past and ushering in the future.”^[12]

Professor Ding Long, also from SISU, and Sun Degang from Fudan University interpreted the recent ministerial conference as the natural continuation of the first China-Arab Summit in 2022, with Ding defining it as “the implementation of the Riyadh Declaration.”^[13] Ningxia University’s Niu Xinchun suggested that the meeting was an important milestone “for the unfolding of China-Arab cooperation over the next twenty years.”^[14]

Other scholars highlighted that this year's ministerial meeting saw for the first time, the attendance of four Arab heads of state. Dong Manyuan from the China Institute of International Studies emphasized that this turnout holds “great significance.” Niu Xinchun remarked that it underscores the growing importance that both China and Arab nations attach to Sino-Arab relations. Niu stated:

“It is rare that President Xi attended the opening ceremony of the ministerial meeting with four Arab heads of state. Both Arab countries and China are paying more and more attention to the China-Arab Cooperation Forum. Over the past 20 years, the forum has played a key role in China-Arab cooperation.”^[15]

On the Gaza War, Professor Liu Zhongmin of SISU, Dong Manyuan, and Sun Degang all emphasized Arab and Chinese leaders’ common outlook on the Palestinian issue.^[16] Dong referenced the bullet points outlined in Xi Jinping’s keynote speech: “immediate ceasefire in Gaza, no obstruction of international humanitarian aid to Gaza, and allowing people driven out by Israel to return home.”^[17] Niu Xinchun and Sun Degang also reiterated Beijing’s official position on the necessity of holding a large and authoritative international peace conference to settle the Israeli-Palestinian question.^[18]

Given how Chinese and Arabs share similar foreign policy positions, the Chinese press argued they should also align on economic matters. In a pointed reference to the US-China trade war and the EU’s “de-risking” efforts, an article by China’s state news agency Xinhua underscored the potential benefits of unbridled Sino-Arab economic cooperation:

“At a time when the world economy is recovering sluggishly and unilateralism and protectionism are resurfacing, China and Arab countries are constantly expanding the flow of technology, capital, products and personnel, which is bound to further benefit the people of both sides and the international community.”^[19]

In an article originally published in Guangming Daily, Professor Sun Degang argued that there are major points of convergence in policies aimed at addressing global challenges such as achieving carbon-neutrality, reducing emissions, and promoting green development.^[20] In his opinion, the shared focus on economic development or, as Sun writes, the common duty to deal with the “development deficit,” is what underpins such alignment despite differences in ideology and political systems. Western commentators, he argued, are wrong for blaming a “democratic deficit” as the “root cause of turmoil” in the region.^[21] Echoing these sentiments, a Global Times editorial stressed China being a member of the Global South, highlighting Beijing’s vision of a “China-Arab community with a shared future” as a pathway for modernization for Arab countries, which is also adaptable to each country’s conditions.^[22]

Interestingly, Sun Degang also categorized Middle Eastern and North African countries into four groups based on their structural characteristics. The first group, consisting of the most advanced Gulf states, have long-term developmental strategies focused on transitioning from traditional industry to new industry, from traditional economy to digital economy, and from traditional energy to new energy. This transformation is being driven by cutting-edge technologies such as 5G and AI, fields in which China is a global leader.

In support of Sun’s thesis, Dong Manyuan added that:

“In many fields such as development and innovation, economic restructuring, and green development, the UAE is a leading country in the Arab world and is full of vitality.”^[23]

The second group includes Iraq, Kuwait, Bahrain, Algeria, and other significant energy exporters whose economies benefit from access to the Chinese market. Of note, Niu Xinchun and Wang Guangda point out a convergence of interests between China and these countries because:

“China's technology, industrial capacity and infrastructure capabilities are also helping Arab countries promote economic diversification and re-industrialization.”^[24]

The third group is comprised of countries with labor-intensive economies, namely Egypt, Morocco, Jordan, and Tunisia, which are still in the early stages of industrialization. Supporting Sun’s opinion, Wang Guangda argued that as these “Arab countries are undergoing the process of industrialization, China has a complete industrial system,” creating a favorable alignment in their interests.^[25] Dong Manyuan, in particular, highlighted Egypt’s role as Beijing’s traditional partner in the region:

“Egypt was also one of the first countries to join the Belt and Road Initiative, actively connecting its development strategy with the Belt and Road Initiative and strongly supporting China's cooperation with the Arab world. As an important political power in the Arab world, Egypt's participation will undoubtedly inject vitality into China-Arab cooperation.”^[26]

Lastly, the fourth group encompasses countries experiencing social unrest, such as Yemen, Libya, Lebanon, Palestine, Somalia, Syria, and Sudan, which rely heavily on external aid.^[27] Although Sun does not explicitly state it, he seems to imply that China could help consolidate the socio-economic foundations in these countries.

According to Sun, this convergence with Beijing is beneficial for Arab strategic autonomy, a central theme in Chinese commentaries. This supposed Sino-Arab convergence has been further bolstered by the Gaza War, which has unified the Arab world behind Palestine, with all governments rejecting Israel’s actions and Washington’s “divisive policies.”^[28] For him, this desire for greater strategic autonomy explains the growing relevance of institutions like the Arab League and the Gulf Cooperation Council. Furthermore, Arab participation in the BRI and the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor has shifted their role from “passively following major powers” to “actively shape relations.” That said, he also clarified that:

“Middle Eastern middle powers are also actively ‘looking East’ economically, forming energy supply chain alliances with Asian countries. However, they cannot detach themselves from the security dependence on the U.S. and the West. Therefore, in the so-called great power strategic competition and the security contest between Israel and Iran, they implement a hedging strategy—they are unwilling to get involved in conflicts and do not want to become victims of the so-called great power strategic competition.”^[29]

Chinese commentators also argued this China-Arab policy convergence is not solely based on economic complementarity and similar perspectives on the Palestinian issue. Rather, a broader sharing of historical experiences is supporting the growth of Sino-Arab relations, and that this connection should be leveraged through improved people-to-people exchanges. For example, Sun Degang stated that:

“China and Arab countries jointly fought against imperialism, colonialism and oppression, and formed a political partnership of sharing weal and woe. Under the new situation, the young people of China and Arab countries, especially "generation Z" youth, still do not know each other well enough. Many of them are keen to study in Western countries but are unwilling to study in the target countries of China and Arab countries. In front of the powerful Western media, the influence of Chinese and Arabic media is limited, and there are still many misunderstandings between the people of China and Arab countries.”^[30]

Once that will be done, he added, it will become clear that:

“The development of China-Arab relations has no historical baggage, only unlimited opportunities.”^[31]

Unsurprisingly, such assessments are usually paired by views that emphasize Washington’s perceived decline, especially in comparison with China’s rise to become the largest trading partner and biggest energy importer for Arab countries. Dong Manyuan for instance posited:

“More importantly, the US has long favored Israel and pursued double standards on a series of issues such as regional security, democracy and human rights. This hypocritical practice has seriously damaged the US' credibility among Arab countries and its international reputation, and will inevitably lead to a decline in US influence in relevant regions.”^[32]

That said, our analysis of recently published economic data indicates that this black-and-white portrayal should be taken with a grain of salt, as China’s growing economic presence in the region is not uniform.

Conclusion

The Chinese narratives around the 10^th ministerial conference of the CASCF aimed to display the “like-mindedness” between China and Arab countries, centered on their shared stance on the Palestinian issue and strengthened by a convergence of interests regarding free trade, industrialization (through the involvement of Chinese companies), and deepening technological integration.

Chinese experts highlighted that this event, which saw the participation of several high-level officials, is proof of China and Arab countries’ growing commitment to their relationship. Beijing is not only upgrading its ties with Arab states, but it is also expanding engagement with them both bilaterally and, increasingly, in multilateral settings. Chinese commentators appear extremely confident in the future of Sino-Arab ties.

However, there is a consistent call from Chinese experts for stronger people-to-people exchanges, which are seen as essential for fostering deeper mutual understanding among both policymakers and wider Arab and Chinese societies. This indicates that there is also awareness in China of the limits of Beijing’s soft power and appeal, raising questions about how significant these challenges might be for the development of Sino-Arab relations.

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Ádám KOI is Research Fellow at the ChinaMed Project. He is a PhD candidate in Sinology at ELTE Eötvös Loránd University in Budapest. His primary areas of research are China's governance and administrative system, and China’s foreign policy and economic strategy.