PROMOTED by
On the occasion of the 53rd anniversary of the establishmentof China-Türkiye diplomatic ties, we reflect on these very eventful past twomonths for Sino-Turkish relations.
From June 3 to 5, Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Hakan Fidan visited China, where he met with his Chinese counterpart Wang Yi and toured the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR). This province in Northwest China has been a focal point of diplomatic tension between Türkiye and China, with Ankara having often criticized Beijing’s policies toward the Uyghur people.
Regardless, Fidan’s trip appears to have successfully reset Sino-Turkish relations as in the following weeks, Chinese electric vehicle giant BYD announced plans to construct a USD 1 billion plant in Türkiye, several official Sino-Turkish exchanges took place, and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan revealed that he will visit China in September and that Chinese President Xi Jinping will visit Türkiye in 2025.
In this edition of the ChinaMed Observer, we take stock of these events and examine the Turkish media debate on these recent developments in Sino-Turkish relations.
Overall, the Turkish press showed interest in Beijing and Ankara’s efforts to reconcile their diverging views on Palestine and the situation of the Uyghurs. However, the primary focus of Turkish commentators has been the potential of enhancing Sino-Turkish economic ties. This emphasis likely stems from Türkiye’s ongoing economic struggles and growing disillusionment with the EU and the West amidst the Gaza War.
Despite concerns over the heavily imbalanced bilateral trade relationship, Turkish analysts remain confident—perhaps overly so—in their country's capacity to foster more favorable and fruitful economic relations with China. The decision by BYD seemingly validated this confidence. While some analysts voiced concerns, the overwhelming majority of Turkish commentators—including President Erdoğan’s political opponents and representatives of the Turkish auto industry—welcomed the arrival of Chinese EV manufacturers and praised the effectiveness of Ankara’s policies in attracting these significant Chinese investments.
Upon his arrival in Beijing on June 3, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan’s first stop was the headquarters the Chinese think tank, the Center for China Globalization. In his speech, Fidan underscored the potential for strengthened Sino-Turkish economic and diplomatic cooperation through the BRICS and between Türkiye’s proposed Trans-Caspian Middle Corridor and China's Belt and Road Initiative.[1] He also announced his upcoming participation in the BRICS+ Foreign Ministers meeting in Nizhny Novgorod, Russia on June 10-11 and Türkiye’s intention to join the BRICS.[2] Interestingly, Fidan drew a comparison between BRICS and the EU, stating:
“While we have a customs union with the EU, we are also exploring new cooperation opportunities with various partners in different platforms such as BRICS.”[3]
Fidan also affirmed Ankara’s support for an immediate ceasefire in Gaza and stressed the importance of resolving the conflicts in Syria and Ukraine while combatting terrorism. He specifically cited “terrorist organizations like Daesh/ISIS, the PKK, its Syrian branch the YPG, and the Fethullah Terrorist Organization (FETO).”[4]
Türkiye and China have openly expressed differing views on their respective counter-terrorism efforts in the past. For instance, in October 2021, in response to the Turkish government’s criticism of Beijing’s policies in Xinjiang, China's Deputy Permanent Representative to the UN, Ambassador Geng Shuang, labeled Ankara’s actions in northeast Syria as “illegal.” Fidan’s speech seemed aimed at reconciling Beijing and Ankara’s perspectives by drawing parallels between the two countries’ concerns, as the Turkish FM emphasized the “separatist agenda” of the groups Türkiye is combatting and affirmed Ankara’s support for China and Syria’s territorial integrity.[5]
On the issue of Syria, Fidan's visit came on the heels of the 10th Ministerial Conference of the China-Arab States Cooperation Forum, attended by Syrian Foreign Minister Faisal Mekdad. During this event, Chinese officials reiterated Beijing’s support for Syrian territorial integrity and the Chinese press celebrated Syria’s “grand reunion” with the rest of the Arab world. Given Türkiye's direct military interventions and occupation of parts of Syria over the past decade, Fidan’s remarks have been seen by some Turkish analysts as signaling Türkiye’s alignment with China in supporting international recognition of the government of President Bashar al-Assad (over the past month Ankara has been taking steps to normalize its relations with al-Assad’s government, provoking unrest both in Türkiye and in Turkish-backed Syrian opposition-held territories in Northern Syria).
In the following days, Fidan further reiterated Ankara’s support for Palestine, China’s territorial integrity and the one-China principle in his meetings with Chinese Vice President Han Zheng and Minister of Foreign Affairs Wang Yi.
Fidan then travelled to Xinjiang, making him the highest-ranking Turkish official to visit the region since 2012. Besides visiting several cultural and religious sites in both Urumqi and Kashgar (the latter being a Uyghur-majority city and important cultural center for the Uyghur people) Fidan met with Ma Xingrui, the CCP secretary of the XUAR, as well as Erkin Tuniyaz, the deputy secretary of the CCP Xinjiang Committee and chairman of the XUAR.
While the English-language press largely emphasized Türkiye’s apparent pivot toward China, Russia and the BRICS, Turkish media coverage of Fidan's visit spotlighted his stay in Xinjiang. This focus is unsurprising given the Turkish press’ long-standing concern for the Uyghur people (see our 2022 report)—a concern rooted in cultural and religious affinity and Türkiye’s sizable and vocal Uyghur diaspora (~50,000 people).
Despite Fidan’s remarks that the Uyghur issue is “a cultural matter,” that terrorism has inflicted “great harm” on Xinjiang’s social stability, and that Türkiye is willing to strengthen counterterrorism cooperation with China, most of the Turkish press argued that Fidan did not compromise on Ankara’s support for the Uyghurs. This contrasts sharply with the coverage in many Western news outlets, which have implied that Türkiye has sold out the Uyghurs in exchange for Chinese investments and to join the BRICS.
Pro-government Turkish media instead underscored how Fidan raised Türkiye’s concerns over Chinese policies in Xinjiang. For instance, the government-friendly newspaper Sabah highlighted that "Minister Fidan explained Türkiye’s views to Chinese authorities in Beijing and Xinjiang with sincerity and openness during his visit."[6] They also covered this statement from Fidan during his press conference with Wang Yi:
“Urumqi and Kashgar are two ancient Turkic Muslim that contribute to the cultural richness of China. These cities play a bridge role between China and the Turkish and Islamic world.”[7]
Similarly, TRT News, Türkiye’s public broadcaster, reported that:
“Diplomatic sources noted that during his meetings, Minister Fidan emphasized the importance of protecting the cultural rights and heritage of the Uyghur Turks, highlighting the sensitivities of the Turkish and Islamic world on this issue. Minister Fidan stated that addressing these concerns would benefit everyone. The FM stressed that changing the perception on this matter would only be possible through steps taken by China. ”[8]
The Turkish government and media also highlighted Fidan’s visits to Uyghur cultural and religious sites and his interactions with local Uyghurs, including a chat in Turkish with an 80-year-old Uyghur woman (Turkish and Uyghur are somewhat mutually intelligible).[9] Several Turkish analysts argued that these gestures demonstrate Ankara’s concern for Uyghur culture and the cultural bond between the Turkish and Uyghur people.[10] Some even suggested that Fidan’s choice to wear an azure tie and white shirt during his stay was a gesture of solidarity toward the Uyghurs, as these colors are those of the flag of the short-lived and unrecognized East Turkestan Republic (1933–1934) and of many Uyghur rights and independence movements.[11]
Regardless of whether this was an intentional gesture, Turkish analysts agreed that Fidan aimed to show solidarity with the Uyghurs, though there was debate on the motivations.[12]
TRT News, for instance, argued that the visit was meant to reaffirm Türkiye's role as “the patron of the Turkish world,” asserting that “Türkiye and its President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan will never abandon Turks, no matter where they are.”[13] The article included an interview with Associate Professor Ramin Sadık of Bayburt University’s Department of History, who posited that the visit excited people across “Türkiye, Azerbaijan, and the Turkish world,” as Xinjiang holds an “important place in Muslim Turkish memory.”[14] Sadık echoed the idea of Türkiye having purportedly responsibility toward all Turkic peoples, stating:
“Türkiye, of course, defends the rights of its compatriots living in China.”[15]
A more politically cynical perspective was offered by journalist Murat Yetkin, the former editor-in-chief of the newspaper Hürriyet Daily News, who was forced to resign in 2018 due to his critical reporting. In an article for his blog, Yetkin argued that:
“the [Uyghur] issue is a domestic political issue. It is a matter of competition between nationalist and Islamist parties and groups.”[16]
However, he added that:
“Although Türkiye has criticized China, it has done so on its own terms, not following the propaganda line of the U.S. and Western European countries.”[17]
Professor Abdurresit Celil Karluk of Haci Bayram Veli University echoed this view in comments to the US state-supported news outlet Voice of America, stating that:
"It seems that the message was intended for both China and Turkish domestic politics and the Uyghur diaspora."[18]
This perspective, which interprets Fidan’s visit to Xinjiang as an effort to navigate Beijing’s red lines while placating Turkish sensibilities is well-founded.[19] When the Uyghur issue is brought up in Türkiye, it is usually leveraged by government and opposition politicians to rally popular support rather than to directly criticize China (Ankara has never supported Western calls for investigations into Beijing’s policies in Xinjiang at the UN).
Similarly, criticism toward Fidan’s trip to Xinjiang was mainly from the political opposition. Namık Tan, a member of parliament from the opposition Republican People's Party (CHP), criticized Fidan's visit on X, accusing it of being “a show filled with touristic visits, shopping and [prayers], without producing any concrete results.” Tan stated that:
“It appears that our ‘independent foreign policy’ is limited to touristic visits as far as China allows. […] the ‘education camps’ where Uyghur Turks are subjected to oppression and torture were not part of this visit.”
Besides this politically motivated critique, the only other significant criticism of Fidan’s trip in Türkiye came from Uyghur rights groups and East Turkestan “governments-in-exile.” Their statements, however, received almost no coverage in the Turkish press.[20]
The Turkish press also showed interest in the Chinese reaction to Fidan’s visit to Xinjiang, particularly his remarks on the "Islamic and Turkic" nature of Urumqi and Kashgar.[21] On this note, the Turkish foreign policy analysis platform Harici published an article by Professor Yang Cheng, Executive Director of the Center for Turkish Studies at Shanghai University, who criticized Fidan's statement as “very strange” as:
“we Chinese never use words such as Islamic, Turkic, Christian, Buddhist to describe Chinese cities, which trigger many negative connotations among Chinese people”.[22]
Regardless, the rather muted reactions by Chinese officials during and after the visit seem to confirm the view that Fidan managed to strike the right balance with China.[23]
The ongoing crisis in the Middle East loomed over Fidan’s time in China. The Turkish FM’s trip to Beijing came on the heels of his meeting with US Secretary of State Antony Blinken on May 30 in Prague, where they discussed Palestinian question. Moreover, the Gaza War was a top issue at the 10th Ministerial Conference of the CASCF, held in Beijing right before his arrival.
Unsurprisingly, Fidan and Chinese officials discussed the Gaza War, noting the potential for enhanced cooperation due to their somewhat similar stances, especially compared to Türkiye’s traditional Western partners. After his meeting with Wang Yi, Fidan stated:
“[Some] countries unfortunately continue to be complicit in the genocide that Israel is implementing. We will continue to work with China in the upcoming process for a ceasefire in Gaza, the uninterrupted and safe delivery of humanitarian aid to the people of Gaza, and a two-state solution."[24]
Both Beijing or Ankara have also shown openness to engaging with Hamas (designated a terrorist organization by Israel, the US, and the EU). President Erdoğan has defined Hamas “freedom fighters” and met with Hamas Political Bureau Chairman Ismail Haniyeh (whose recent assassination led Erdoğan to call for a day of mourning). Similarly, China has refrained from directly condemning Hamas and has hosted its representatives in Beijing.
While China and Türkiye previously had strong economic ties with Israel, both countries have recently openly condemned Israeli military actions, holding Tel Aviv responsible for escalating regional tensions. However, despite China often facing criticism from Western analysts for its "pro-Palestinian neutrality" and “disregard for Israeli security concerns,” it is Türkiye, a NATO member and EU candidate, which has adopted a more openly hostile stance toward Israel.
The Turkish government has backed South Africa’s genocide case against Israel at the International Court of Justice and, in early May, ordered an immediate suspension of all trade with Israel. Erdoğan has also accused Israel of committing the “biggest genocide of the century” and even threatened to “enter” Israel to protect Palestinians. This strong rhetoric has led Tel Aviv to call for NATO to expel Türkiye, despite Israel not being a NATO member and there being no mechanism to expel a country from the alliance.
Ankara's policy and rhetoric toward Israel are mostly a response to the Turkish population’s strong pro-Palestinian sentiment. A significant number of Turks even believe that Erdoğan has not been sufficiently harsh against Israel, a sentiment that the secular-nationalist, socialist and Islamist opposition have all been attempting to capitalize on.
It is in this context that China's approach to the Gaza War, especially its role brokering the Beijing Declaration—a reconciliation agreement between Hamas, Fatah, and 12 other Palestinian factions—was discussed in the Turkish press. Most Turkish analysts have praised China’s approach as better than that of the US and Western countries. However, some more radical commentators have criticized Beijing for not doing enough, accusing it of engaging in empty rhetoric. Despite these differing views, there is a consensus in Turkish media that Beijing is filling a void in the Middle East left by the perceived moral shortcomings of US foreign policy, which is seen as influenced by the “Israeli lobby.”[25]
Liberal journalist Murat Yetkin noted:
“The Palestinian reconciliation is the latest sign that China is now entering the Middle East not only as an economic power but also as a political and diplomatic force. And it’s the aspect that will most disturb the US and Israel. […] As the world’s second-largest economic and significant military power, China operates outside the influence of global capital groups steering Netanyahu’s aggression in the US and Israel.”[26]
In a column for the conservative newspaper Yeni Şafak, researcher Mehmet Rakipoglu concurred that the “US [by supporting Israel’s genocide] has lost its influence in the Arab world and China has filled the power vacuum that has emerged.”[27] However, Rakipoglu expressed some concern for the Palestinians as:
“Firstly, China supports Palestine in a manner that avoids direct confrontation with the West, especially the United States. Secondly, China has deep economic ties with Israel, which it does not leverage to pressure Israel in favor of the Palestinian state. Thirdly, China's power is constrained by its ongoing trade war and diplomatic-political struggle with the US, which unfailingly supports Israel. This restricts China's ability to support Palestine within the components of the current international system. Fourthly, China's support for Palestine is fundamentally seen as part of Beijing's broader struggle against the West. Therefore, in a scenario where a new world order is established and China emerges victorious against the West, its policy towards Palestine could change.”[28]
A similarly critical perspective, but from the opposite side of the political spectrum, is that of journalist Yusuf Karadaş, writing for the left-wing newspaper Evrensel. Karadaş agreed that “the Beijing Declaration is an important step against Israeli aggression and the support this aggression has received from Western imperialists,” but argued that:
“China is also giving a "humanitarian" appearance to its struggle for hegemony with the US and Western imperialists in the Middle East. […] and to give their imperialist ambitions in Africa and expansionist policies a "humanitarian" and even "anti-imperialist" appearance.”[29]
As we discussed in a previous ChinaMed Observer on the Turkish debate on the Chinese EV sector (check it out for trade data), most Turkish analysts emphasize the economic dimension of Sino-Turkish ties. This focus largely stems from Türkiye's recent economic hardships, the widespread belief that Beijing can offer substantial economic opportunities, and concerns over the massive trade imbalance with China. This latter issue was a major factor behind Türkiye’s recent decision to impose 40% tariffs on Chinese EV imports.
Therefore, while Xinjiang and Palestine have garnered significant Turkish media attention, most articles discussing Fidan’s visit to China centered on the potential for enhancing economic cooperation and rebalancing trade relations. This is expected given how Fidan himself highlighted these topics multiple times during his stay in China.[30]
Numerous Turkish analysts, especially when commenting in English, expressed optimism on Türkiye’s capacity to rebalance its trade relations with China. Sibel Karabel, head of the Southeast Asian Countries Strategic Studies and Research Center at Gedik University, told Al-Monitor that Beijing has its own reasons to pursue closer ties with Ankara as “It is a time when China also needs to diversify its investments.”[31]
Murat Yeşiltaş, a professor at the University of Ankara’s Department of International Relations at Social Sciences, echoed this sentiment in an opinion column for Daily Sabah. He argued that “Türkiye’s strategic location as a bridge between Europe and Asia makes it a key player in China’s BRI”. However, he also expressed concerns that:
“Increasing economic ties with China could also lead to dependencies that might limit Türkiye’s economic autonomy. Over-reliance on Chinese investments and trade could expose Türkiye to economic coercion, where political disagreements might lead to economic repercussions.”[32]
One sector where Turkish analysts saw significant potential for Chinese investment is the energy sector. This was likely due to Fidan’s visit being preceded by that of Turkish Energy Minister Alparslan Bayraktar, who travelled to China to attempt to finalize the long-awaited Sino-Turkish Nuclear Energy Plant Agreement. Under this agreement, China will assist Türkiye in constructing its second nuclear power plant in Thrace (the first nuclear plant, the Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant, is currently under construction in collaboration with Russia).
However, media attention quickly shifted to the EV sector when, in early July, a Turkish presidential decree announced that no additional financial liabilities would apply to automobile imports from China for companies that invest in Türkiye and obtain a investment incentive certificate. Turkish media highlighted this announcement, noting it came shortly after a meeting between President Erdoğan and President Xi at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit in Astana.
Following the announcement of this tax exemption, BYD revealed that it plans to construct a US$1 billion plant in Manisa, Türkiye. This plan was formalized with an agreement between BYD and the Turkish Ministry of Industry and Technology, and the signing ceremony was even attended by President Erdoğan.[33]
BYD’s move is expected to be mirrored by Chery, which is considering a similar investment, potentially in the city of Samsun.[34] Moreover, AK Party Deputy Chairman Zafer Sırakaya disclosed that Chinese companies are eager to partner with Turkish EV manufacturer TOGG. Notably, there are ongoing negotiations between Guangzhou Automobile Group and TOGG to establish a joint production mechanism.[35]
These developments have been widely celebrated in the Turkish press, seen as a testament to the effectiveness of Ankara's investment incentive policies and a significant step toward addressing the trade deficit with China.[36] The deal with BYD has even been praised by Erdoğan’s opponents, including Özgür Özel, the leader of the opposition CHP (the fact Özel is from Manisa likely contributed to his enthusiasm).[37]
Even representatives from the Turkish automobile sector did not express concern. Cengiz Eroldu, Chairman of the Turkish automobile manufacturer Tofas, commented to English-language news outlet Türkiye Today:
“We have the power to compete with Chinese brands in Türkiye; in this regard, we are more advantageous than countries like Italy […] We have a capacity of 2 million units. Today, 1 million vehicles are not produced in Italy. This year, Fiat is celebrating its 125th anniversary, so in a country with 125 years of automobile history, less than 1 million vehicles are currently being produced. Therefore, if someone is going to compete with the Chinese, we should be one of them.”[38]
In an opinion piece for Anadolu Ajansı, Yunis Sharifli, a Junior Research Fellow at the Caucasian Center for International Relations and Strategic Studies, also shared a positive perspective, explaining that:
“For China, the new plant in Türkiye will help BYD lower production costs and access Türkiye’s domestic market. Moreover, in light of the European Union's recent imposition of provisional tariffs of up to 38% on Chinese EVs, this move allows BYD to leverage the customs union between the EU and Türkiye to continue exporting its EVs to the EU.”[39]
Interestingly, Sharifli linked BYD’s decision to Türkiye’s interest in joining the BRICS and Ankara and Beijing’s similar stances on the Gaza War.[40]
One of the few critical perspectives on the BYD deal came from economist Mehmet Ali Verçin. In an opinion piece for the conservative and nationalist newspaper Karar, Verçin argued that the financial incentives Ankara is offering to BYD amount to a “giveaway.”[41] According to him:
“If an incentive is to be given to automobiles and batteries, it should only be given to TOGG. I do not find it appropriate to give incentives to anyone else in the [EV sector].”[42]
The Turkish media has closely examined Foreign Minister Fidan’s visit to China, underscoring contentious issues, such as the Gaza War and Beijing's policies in Xinjiang. On the latter topic, the Turkish press presented Ankara as having upheld its commitment to the Uyghur people, with Fidan depicted as adeptly conveying Türkiye’s concerns without antagonizing China.
Regarding Gaza, Turkish commentators have welcomed Beijing’s growing diplomatic role in the Middle East—viewed as a preferable alternative to Western engagement. However, there are lingering doubts in Türkiye, where public opinion is strongly pro-Palestine, on China’s genuine commitment to the Palestinian cause.
Despite these geopolitical debates, the Turkish press has largely focused on the economic dimension of Türkiye-China relations. The recent announcement of BYD’s US$1 billion investment in Türkiye garnered widespread praise across the political spectrum and even from Turkish automotive industry leaders. This enthusiasm reflects Turkish confidence in their country’s economic potential and the perceived benefits of deepening ties with Beijing, as well as the need to rebalance trade relations with China.
Ahmet Faruk ISIK is Research Fellow at the ChinaMed Project. He is also a Ph.D. candidate at Shanghai International Studies University with a project on Comparative Politics and Area Studies. His research interests include Türkiye’s relations with Greater China and the economic and political dimensions of Chinese foreign policy toward Türkiye.
Leonardo BRUNI is Project Officer and Research Fellow at the ChinaMed Project. He is also a Research Fellow at the University of Milan and a graduate of the Sciences Po-Peking University Dual Master’s Degree in International Relations. His research interests include China-EU relations and international development cooperation.
[1] Serdar Dincel, Türkiye, China play major roles in protecting global supply chain: Turkish foreign minister, Anadolu Ajansı, June 3, 2024, link.
[2] Idem.
[3] Ezgi Akin, In China, Turkey’s Fidan says he plans to attend BRICS meeting in Russia, Al-Monitor, June 4, 2024, link.
[4] Serdar Dincel, Türkiye, China play major roles in protecting global supply chain: Turkish foreign minister.
[5] Can Efesoy, Ecem Sahinli Oguc & Sumeyye Dilara Dince, Dışişleri Bakanı Fidan, Çin'de "Değişen Dünya Düzeninde Türkiye-Çin İlişkileri"ni anlattı [Foreign Minister Fidan talked about "Türkiye-China Relations in the Changing World Order" in China], Anadolu Ajansı, June 3, 2024, link.
[6] Betul Ustam 12 yıl aradan sonra üst düzey ziyaret: Gündemde 3 kritik başlık var! Bakan Fidan'dan "Uygur Türkleri" vurgusu [High-level visit after 12 years: There are 3 critical topics on the agenda! Minister Fidan emphasizes " Uyghur Turks "], Sabah, June 5, 2024, link.
[7] Lutfullah Goktas, Ambassador & Chief Media Adviser of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, X (formely Twitter), June 4, 2024, link;
Mehmet Shah Yilmaz, Emre Aytekin & Busranur Koca, Bakan Fidan: Türkiye ile Çin arasındaki ilişkiler, bölgesel ve küresel barışın sağlanmasına katkı sağlayacaktır [Minister Fidan: Relations between Türkiye and China will contribute to regional and global peace], Anadolu Ajansı, June 4, 2024, link.
[8] Bakan Fidan, Uygur Özerk Bölgesi'ni ziyaret etti [Minister Fidan visited the Uyghur Autonomous Region], TRT Haber, June 5, 2024, link.
[9] Faruk Hanedar, Dışişleri Bakanı Fidan, Urumçi'de Yanghang Camii'ni ve Uluslararası Büyük Pazar'ı ziyaret etti [Foreign Minister Fidan visited Yanghang Mosque and International Grand Bazaar in Urumqi], Anadolu Ajansı, June 5, 2024, link;
Hakan Fidan ve Uygur Türkü Emine teyzenin sıcak sohbeti gülümsetti [The warm conversation between Hakan Fidan and Uyghur Turk Aunt Emine made people smile], CNN Turk, June 6, 2024, link.
[10] Nurettin Akçay, Hakan Fidan'ın Çin'i rahatsız eden sözleri: Peki bundan sonra ne olacak? [Hakan Fidan's disturbing words for China: So what will happen next?], Independent Türkçe, June 8, 2024, link;
Ayse Simsek, Türkiye Türk dünyasının hamisi: Hakan Fidan Uygur Türklerini ziyaret etti [Türkiye is the patron of the Turkish world: Hakan Fidan visited the Uyghur Turks], TRT News, June 10, 2024, link.
[11] Doğu Türkistan'ı ziyaret eden Bakan Fidan kravatıyla mesaj Verdi [Minister Fidan, who visited East Turkestan, gave a message with his tie], Haberet, June 6, 2024, link.
[12] Ezgi Akin, Have Turkey, China hit reset button on Uyghurs as Fidan visits Xinjiang?, Al-Monitor, June 5, 2024, link.
[13] Ayse Simsek, Türkiye is the patron of the Turkish world: Hakan Fidan visited the Uyghur Turks.
[14] Ibid.
[15] Ibid.
[16] Murat Yetkin, Çin’den iki soru: Türkiye BRICS’e mi girecek? Fidan Sincan’da ne dedi? [Two questions from China: Will Türkiye join BRICS? What did Fidan say in Xinjiang?], Yetkin Report, June 5, 2024, link (also available in English).
[17] Ibid.
[18] Kasim Kashgar, Turkish diplomat's visit to Uyghur region in China raises concerns, Voice of America, June 6, 2024, link.
[19] Çağdaş Üngör, A Turkish foreign minister in China: Subtitles of a silent visit, Middle East Institute, June 12, 2024, link.
[20] Uygur STK’ları Hakan Fidan’ın Çin ve Doğu Türkistan ziyareti ile ilgili açıklama yaptı [Uyghur NGOs made a statement regarding Hakan Fidan's visit to China and East Turkestan], Haber Nida, June 3, 2024, link.
[21] Nurettin Akçay, Hakan Fidan's disturbing words for China: So what will happen next?.
[22] Fidan ziyareti Türkiye-Çin ilişkilerinde yeni bir kapı açacak mı? [Will Fidan's visit open a new door in Türkiye-China relations?], Harici, June 10, 2024, link.
[23] Ezgi Akin, Have Turkey, China hit reset button on Uyghurs as Fidan visits Xinjiang?.
[24] Çin’in Filistin’e desteği önemli [China's support for Palestine is significant], Yeni Şafak, June 5, 2024, link.
[25] Ufuk Batum, Fidan'ın Çin ziyaretinin kodları [The keys to Fidan's visit to China], 24 TV, June 7, 2024, link;
Doğa Öztürk, ‘Filistin-İsrail meselesine dahil olacak’ ['He will get involved in the Palestine-Israel issue'], Cumhuriyet, July 30, 2024, link
[26] Murat Yetkin, ABD İsrail’in katliamını alkışlarken Çin Filistin’i birleştiriyor [While the US applauds Israel’s massacres, China unites Palestine], Yetkin Report, July 27, 2024, link (also available in English).
[27] Mehmet Rakipoglu, Batı'nın Gölgesinde Doğan Güç: Çin'in Filistin Siyasetinde Artan Etkisi [Power Emerging in the West’s Shadow: China’s Growing Influence on Palestinian Politics], Yeni Şafak, July 29, 2024, link.
[28] Ibid.
[29] Yusuf Karadaş, Ortadoğu’daki egemenlik mücadelesi ve Çin’in Filistin hamlesi [The struggle for sovereignty in the Middle East and China's move in Palestine], Evrensel, July 30, 2024, link.
[30] Burak Elmali, OPINION - Decoding Hakan Fidan's China visit: Economic cooperation and multipolarity, Anadolu Ajansı, June 7, 2024, link;
Banu İric, Hakan Fidan'dan kritik Çin ziyareti: Uygur Türkleri ve Filistin masada [Hakan Fidan's critical visit to China: Uyghur Turks and Palestine at the table], TGRT Haber, June 5, 2024, link.
[31] Ezgi Akin, Have Turkey, China hit reset button on Uyghurs as Fidan visits Xinjiang?.
[32] Murat Yeşiltaş, Türkiye's growing engagement with China, Daily Sabah, June 8, 2024, link.
[33] Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan, elektrikli araç üreticisi Çinli BYD Yönetim Kurulu’nu kabul etti [President Erdoğan received the Board of Directors of Chinese electric vehicle manufacturer BYD], Republic of Türkiye Directorate of Communications, July 8 , 2024, link.
[34] Halit Bolkan, BYD’den sonra Çinli Chery’nin de fabrika kuracağı öne sürüldü: Yatırım Samsun’a mı? [Claims that after BYD, Chinese Chery will also establish a factory: Will the investment be in Samsun?], Cumhuriyet, July 27, 2024, link.
[35] TOGG ile Guangzhou Automobile görüşmelere başladı [TOGG and Guangzhou Automobile started talks], Haber Global, July 5, 2024, link;
Aksam Gazetesi, Çin devinden Türkiye kararı! Resmi teklif çıktı BYD ‘yatırım' dedi [Decision from the Chinese giant on Türkiye! Official offer came out, BYD said 'investment'], 24 TV Canlı Yayını, July 6, 2024, link.
[36] Shuayip Alabay, Çinli BYD Türkiye'de üretecek: Fabrika yapana ek vergi yok [Chinese BYD to produce in Türkiye: No additional tax for those who build factories], Yeni Şafak, July 6, 2024, link.
[37] Özgür Özel'den çarpıcı açıklama: Genel Başkan olduktan sonra Erdoğan'a dosya teslim ettim! BYD'nin Türkiye'ye gelmesini destekliyorum [Striking statement from Özgür Özel: I delivered a file to Erdoğan after becoming the Chairman! I support BYD coming to Türkiye], Takvim, August 1, 2024, link.
[38] Türkiye’s local automotive industry not afraid of China’s BYD, Turkiye Today, July 17, 2024, link.
[39] Yunis Sharifli, OPINION - Deepening ties between Türkiye and China: Türkiye's volume of trade increasing, Anadolu Ajansı, July 27, 2024, link.
[40] Ibid.
[41] Mehmet Ali Verçin, 30 milyar dolarlık amatörlük: HIT–30 yüksek teknoloji yatırım program [$30 billion worth of amateurism: HIT-30 high-tech investment program], Karar, July 30, 2024, link.
[42] Ibid.
