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For decades, China has maintained a position of cautious neutrality on the Western Sahara conflict, balancing its relations with both Morocco and Algeria while supporting UN-led processes. Yet, the territorial dispute has become embedded within great power rivalry – a trend accelerated by the disruptions precipitated by the Iran War – as global actors view the mineral-rich region through the prism of geoeconomic competition and strategic connectivity.
As the United States seeks to preserve influence along the Atlantic corridor by encouraging a rapprochement between Rabat and Algiers, China has simultaneously come to view the region as a pillar of its long-term energy strategy, one that hinges upon a predictable and stable security environment. These dynamics, and the rapid expansion of Sino-Moroccan relations in recent years, have raised questions over whether Beijing may be adopting a calibrated ambiguity compatible with Morocco’s autonomy plan, allowing China to safeguard its strategic interests without incurring meaningful political costs.
Against this backdrop, this ChinaMed Observer examines the evolution of China’s position on Western Sahara and the growing tension between diplomatic neutrality, geoeconomics, and geopolitical competition in the Maghreb. More broadly, this issue continues our ongoing series exploring China’s approach toward frozen and underexamined conflicts in the Mediterranean region (you can check out our recent analysis on Libya here).
The Western Sahara conflict dates back to the end of Spanish colonial rule in 1976, when both Morocco and Mauritania laid territorial claims to the region. Both countries entered into armed conflict with the Polisario Front, a Sahrawi political and military organization supported by Algeria that seeks the independence of Western Sahara.1
Ahead of the Spanish withdrawal, Morocco and Mauritania had requested an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice (ICJ) to clarify the legal status of the territory. While the ICJ acknowledged the existence of legal ties of allegiance between the Sultans of Morocco and certain tribes in Western Sahara, stating that the territory was not a Terra Nullius before Spanish colonization, it concluded that such ties did not constitute claims for territorial sovereignty under international law.2
Morocco rejected the judgment, arguing that the Court ignored the concept of bayʿa, the “act of allegiance” to the leader, in Islamic jurisprudence and within the Moroccan monarchical system.3 A few months later in November 1975, King Hassan II organized the “Green March,” during which nearly 350,000 unarmed Moroccans entered Western Sahara to assert the Kingdom’s territorial claim. The four-day march forced Spain to the negotiating table and precipitated the Madrid Agreement with both Morocco and Mauritania, to whom it delegated administrative responsibilities in the process to “decolonize the Territory of Western Sahara,” while affirming that the views of the local population would be respected.4
However, politically and practically, this paved the way for Morocco and Mauritania to take control of the territory after Spain’s withdrawal in 1976. The Polisario Front rejected the partition and launched a war of independence against both countries by proclaiming the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) in the same year.5 While Mauritania withdrew in 1979, over the years, Morocco has built a defensive wall known as the “sand berm,” encircling over 80% of the territory, with the remaining 20% under Polisario control. Since the eruption of the conflict, several Sahrawi refugees also fled into neighboring Algeria, where their descendants continue to live to this day relying on international humanitarian aid.
In 1991, a ceasefire was announced by the United Nations Security Council (res 690/1991) with the establishment of MINURSO, a UN mission tasked with overseeing the organization of a referendum on self-determination in Western Sahara. However, the referendum was repeatedly delayed due to Morocco and the Polisario’s disagreement over the eligibility criteria for Sahrawi voters, leading to a prolonged political stalemate.6 The repercussions of the impasse were not confined to the territory, but affected the geopolitical equilibrium of the entire region.
Due to Algeria’s long-standing support for the Polisario, the Western Sahara issue remains among the main drivers of its diplomatic tension with Morocco. Rabat has long been wary of Algiers’ role in the conflict, maintaining that its political, logistical, and diplomatic support for the Polisario makes it a key actor in the dispute.7 Jawad Kerdoudi, President of the Moroccan Institute of International Relations (IMRI), asserts that Algeria’s refusal to recognize itself as a party to the conflict makes it “responsible” for the impasse.8
In this context, regional tension and fundamental disagreements between Rabat and the Polisario/Algiers significantly undermined MINURSO’s mission. According to Riccardo Fabiani, North Africa Director of the International Crisis Group, “There were so many diplomatic and bureaucratic obstacles to the implementation of the referendum that it has become unattainable.”9 Sarah Zaaimi, a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s North Africa Program, further criticized the mission for “remaining paralyzed for years”.10
Since 2007, Rabat has shifted its approach by promoting an Autonomy Proposal for Western Sahara to be recognized under Moroccan sovereignty. This initiative has shifted the focus of the dispute from holding a referendum on independence as originally mandated by MINURSO, to finding a “mutually acceptable” political solution, which Morocco asserts is only possible through its autonomy plan.11 Yet, the Polisario has maintained its demands for a referendum and rejected the Moroccan initiative. For its part, Rabat does not recognize the Polisario’s claim to self-determination, which further stalls mediation efforts over the conflict.
Tensions have grown since November 2020, when the ceasefire temporarily broke down after Morocco used force to remove unarmed Sahrawi protestors in a UN-monitored buffer zone on the border with Mauritania. Hostilities were brief and no casualties were reported, since both the Moroccan army and Polisario fighters retreated almost immediately.12 The international community reacted with caution, as even Algeria urged both parties to avoid further escalation.13
In December, the first Trump Administration recognized Moroccan sovereignty on the territory as part of the Abraham Accords in exchange for Morocco normalizing its relations with Israel. Although the development led Algiers to break diplomatic relations with Rabat in 2021 over its perception of Moroccan-Israeli ties as a national security threat, Morocco’s position on the Western Sahara dispute has since continued to garner international support.
Over the past years, Morocco has encouraged the opening of consulates in the territory and accelerated its large-scale infrastructure and development projects in the Western Saharan cities of Laayoune and Dakhla under the banner of its Atlantic Initiative.14 By leveraging diplomatic outreach and geoeconomic incentives, especially among land-locked Sub-Saharan states seeking maritime access, Rabat has bolstered its sovereignty claim with growing international support.
According to Morocco’s Permanent Representative to the United Nations Omar Hilale, more than 120 countries today endorse Morocco’s Autonomy Plan as a serious, credible basis for resolving the issue.15 Egypt and land-locked Mali were the latest countries to present their support. Following Rabat’s historic success at the UN Security Council with the adoption of Resolution 2979 in October 2025, an emerging international consensus around Morocco’s position on Western Sahara appears to be prompting even China to recalibrate its traditional approach toward the conflict amid the shifting regional balance of power.
Beijing has historically adopted a position of diplomatic neutrality toward the Western Sahara conflict, refraining from explicitly taking sides between Rabat and the Algiers-backed Polisario, consistently declining to recognize either claim.16 Yet, this may appear odd when considering that in the early years since its foundation, China had supported anti-colonial struggles and national liberation movements in Third World countries through arms transfers and by training foreign fighters with its People’s Liberation Army.
For instance, China had not only supported Algeria’s provisional government since 1958, but also supplied it with weapons in its war of independence against France. Yet, this kind of military and political assistance was not offered to the Algiers-backed Polisario Front. Beijing’s differing approach toward the Algerian decolonization movement and the SADR were a result of a profound shift in its foreign policy in the 1970s. China was transitioning from the international revolutionism of the Mao era to a posture of peaceful development driven by economic growth under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping.
When the Western Sahara war broke out in 1975, Beijing had just regained its seat at the UN Security Council17 and was adjusting its role within the international system from that of a revisionist/challenger to that of a normative player. In this context, Wu Wanjun from Sun Yat-sen University and Pedro Sobral from Zhejiang Yuexiu University of Foreign Languages interpreted Beijing’s “non-interference” policy toward Western Sahara as a result of this pragmatic shift, aiming at maximizing Chinese economic interests in North Africa while balancing relations with both Morocco and Algeria.18
As a consequence, despite the Polisario’s self-identification as a “national liberation movement,” China did not extend the same level of ideological and material support it had previously provided to other national liberation movements. Moreover, Wu and Sobral argue that perceived similarities between Taiwan and Western Sahara as separatist regions supported by foreign powers may have consolidated a consensus between Beijing and Rabat, where “both sides remain neutral and do not interfere in each other’s domestic issues.”19
In spite of China’s position of diplomatic neutrality and support for MINURSO’s mandate by providing peacekeeping personnel to the mission, Moroccan, Algerian and Sahrawi commentators have interpreted Beijing’s stance as a form of veiled support for either claim.
In this regard, Fadoua Ammari from Hassan II University in Casablanca and Rida Lyammouri from the Policy Center for the New South have noted that Polisario representatives were excluded from the 2024 Forum on China–Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) despite their African Union membership. In their view, “participation in these summits is structured around China’s diplomatic recognition policy, which excludes the SADR as a legitimate government of a sovereign state.”20 Atalayar, a Spanish-based publication focused on Maghreb–Europe relations, went as far as suggesting that by excluding the Polisario, this China–Africa summit clearly supported “Morocco’s territorial integrity.”21
These comments did not go unnoticed, spurring reactions from the Algerian and the Sahrawi press. Writing for the Algerian channel Al24 News, Latifa Ferial Naili critiqued Moroccan media’s “falsely claimed victory” by clarifying that the SADR has never participated in FOCAC due to it being a bilateral mechanism between China and select African countries, and not a multilateral event involving the entirety of the African Union.22 23 For its part, The Sahara Press responded to the perceived Moroccan media campaign by emphasizing that:
“China has constant and unwavering positions on the issue of decolonization in Western Sahara … reflected in the statements of representatives of this country at the United Nations, particularly in the Security Council, as well as in the communiqués issued by the Chinese authorities on many occasions.”24
This divergence in interpretations raises a broader question about the extent to which China’s professed neutrality may be masking a more calibrated form of managed, strategic ambiguity.
From 2016 onward, China’s position on Western Sahara evolved from a strict, declarative neutrality to a managed ambiguity that increasingly aligned with Morocco’s diplomatic strategy while preserving Beijing’s ties with Algeria. A key inflection point was King Mohammed VI’s visit to Beijing in 2016, which took place at a critical moment for Morocco. Just weeks earlier, UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon had described Morocco’s presence in the territory as an “occupation,” a position that Washington also appeared to support at the Security Council.25
In this context, the visit heralded a new orientation in Moroccan diplomacy toward strategic diversification while maintaining traditional alliances with the United States and Europe. In Beijing, Mohammed VI and President Xi Jinping elevated bilateral ties to a “strategic partnership” and signed fifteen cooperation agreements. In 2017, Morocco became the first African country to join the Belt and Road Initiative. The political significance of this sequence was not only the scale of economic cooperation, but Rabat’s expectation that deeper ties with China might, over time, foster greater diplomatic receptiveness on Western Sahara.26
As China’s economic presence in Morocco expanded, maintaining strict neutrality became increasingly difficult in practice. Officially, Beijing’s doctrine remained unchanged: China continued to affirm support for a UN-led process based on sovereignty, territorial integrity, and non-interference. Yet, since 2018, its behavior at the UN began to show small but meaningful adjustments.27 China voted in favor of UN Security Council Resolution 2440, which introduced the idea of “a realistic, practicable and enduring political solution ... based on compromise”28 – terms seen as more compatible with Morocco’s autonomy proposal.
Meanwhile, China’s expanding economic footprint in both Morocco and Algeria made strict neutrality even more complex. To manage it, Beijing adopted a policy where caution prevailed whenever projects touched contested zones.29 Reports documented Chinese purchases of Western Saharan phosphates between 2018 and 2021, after which sourcing stopped.30 Beijing also showed hesitation over the Gâra Djebilet project – among the world’s largest iron ore reserves – located in Algeria’s Tindouf Province, home to Sahrawi refugee camps and a long-standing source of tension between Rabat and Algiers over mining rights.31 By adopting this approach of strategic caution, China was carefully protecting both relationships while avoiding steps that could be interpreted as political alignment.
When Algeria broke diplomatic relations with Morocco in 2021 over Rabat’s actions on Western Sahara and its normalization with Israel, Beijing again supported UN Security Council Resolution 2602, a text widely considered as favorable to Morocco’s autonomy proposal.32 While the vote was not a formal endorsement of Rabat’s claims, it nevertheless reflected Beijing’s transition toward a more flexible and pragmatic neutrality.
France’s recognition of Moroccan sovereignty in 2024 deepened Algerian perceptions of strategic encirclement. In this tense environment, President Xi’s stopover in Casablanca in late 2024 was widely interpreted in Morocco as a political signal.33 In Algeria, instead, frustration grew that Beijing’s position did not reflect the depth of Algerian support for China on issues such as Taiwan and Tibet.34 Reflecting these frustrations, the Algerian ambassador to China reportedly conveyed to Yahia Zoubir, a prominent expert on China–North Africa relations, his dissatisfaction with Beijing’s ambivalence:
“We have supported China on many issues, including China gaining a seat at the UN. We told our Chinese partners that Western Sahara is a different question from Tibet or Xinjiang to no avail.”35
At the same time, however, Chinese officials also sought to reassure Algeria of the importance Beijing attached to the bilateral relationship. In an interview with Zoubir, a former Chinese ambassador to Morocco observed that “ties with Algeria are more important and more comprehensive than those with Morocco.”36 China therefore sought to balance its commitments, navigating a landscape where both Algiers and Rabat expected their partnerships with Beijing to translate into more definitive diplomatic support.
This careful behavior became especially visible on October 31, 2025, when China abstained on UN Security Council Resolution 2797, which endorsed Morocco’s 2007 autonomy proposal as the framework for resolving the conflict. Fu Cong, China’s UN representative, justified the abstention by citing imbalances in the draft, but Moroccan observers saw it as a diplomatic success: China neither opposed the text nor shielded Algeria’s preferences.37 Neutrality had not disappeared, but it had become more flexible and strategically calibrated.
A similar pattern appeared in the security domain. While Algeria purchased advanced Chinese arms after the war in Ukraine constrained Russian supplies,38 Morocco also acquired Chinese combat UAVs in 2025 as part of its efforts to diversify military suppliers.39 Even reports of Polisario members using commercially available Chinese drones illustrate how China’s technological footprint reaches all sides without translating into political alignment.40
Taken together, developments since 2016 reveal a real evolution. By moving beyond mere declarative neutrality, China has adopted a policy of managed ambiguity: a calibrated stance where its investments, diplomatic behavior, and cautious silences shape an environment increasingly compatible with Morocco’s autonomy narrative; while still preserving the balance necessary to maintain its partnership with Algeria. Ultimately, this approach allows Beijing to influence the regional order to suit its interests without assuming the political costs or risks of a formal alignment.
While China has maintained a balance of interests since 2016, its policy now intersects with a broader recalibration of power across North Africa. The Western Sahara conflict has evolved beyond a regional territorial dispute, recast as a central theater in a new “Cold War” defined by competing global alignments.41
As traditional Western influence faces the challenges of a fragmented Mediterranean policy, China and Russia have consolidated their presence, treating the region as a strategic pivot. Consequently, the fate of Western Sahara now conditions the viability of critical international assets – including Atlantic maritime gateways, trans-Saharan energy corridors, and connectivity routes that link the Sahel to global markets.
In this context, American diplomacy actively started to encourage a settlement between Morocco and Algeria. Washington’s urgency appears driven by a strategic concern that prolonged instability could create openings for rival powers along the Atlantic façade – a maritime sphere that has historically remained within the Western security orbit.
The United States has organized several confidential meetings since last autumn, aimed at finding a formula that addresses Morocco’s autonomy proposal while maintaining a meaningful role for Algeria.42 The first-ever U.S.-Algeria military cooperation agreement signed at the start of the second Trump administration suggests that Algiers may be recalibrating its own strategic alliances, potentially moving toward a framework that could lead to regional pacification.43
While these diplomatic moves could lead to a more stable environment, both governments face significant internal challenges. Raouf Farrah, an Algerian political science researcher, observed in the Middle East Eye that a visible gap persists between state policies and domestic public opinion, particularly regarding the role of external powers in the region.44
In Morocco, the normalization with Israel and the resulting strategic trade-offs have created friction with a population that maintains a strong alignment with the Palestinian cause. Meanwhile, for the Algerian leadership, any perceived shift on Western Sahara risks contradicting the long-standing revolutionary principles and anti-colonial narrative that underpin its domestic legitimacy. This internal friction could make any formal agreement brittle or difficult to implement in the long term.
Ultimately, the drive for stability in North Africa is not exclusive to Western interests; it has also become a structural necessity for China. Zhang Chuchu, Deputy Director of the Center for Middle Eastern Studies at Fudan University, observed that Beijing increasingly views North Africa as a “new fulcrum for energy security” — a trend that made Jonathan Fulton raise the question of whether the region is becoming a “Second Gulf” for Chinese interests.45 To protect its long-term investments — ranging from Moroccan green hydrogen to Algerian hydrocarbons — a predictable security environment is now paramount.46
Indeed, the March 2026 Iran War and the resulting maritime blockade of the Strait of Hormuz have accelerated this transition. While the United States seeks to stabilize the area to limit rival influence, China is focused on securing alternative energy supply chains that are geographically insulated from the current volatility of the Gulf. In this context, while Algeria’s role as a vital energy supplier could grant it renewed diplomatic weight, Morocco remains structurally exposed to energy shocks and domestic pressure.47 Yet, despite Algiers’ energy leverage, Rabat has maintained significant diplomatic momentum regarding its autonomy plan, including efforts to link the Polisario to Iran in order to secure further American support.48
In this evolving geopolitical environment, Beijing is expected to maintain its strategy of cautious hedging while gradually accommodating the emerging international consensus surrounding the Moroccan position. Given the intractable nature of the territorial dispute,49 China is unlikely to assume an overt role as a mediator despite its growing regional interests. The Maghreb remains in a delicate transition where the pursuit of energy resilience and maritime security continues to clash with rooted local rivalries. While China will continue to expand its economic interdependence with both sides, it will likely defer to other powers – such as the United States – to manage the political complexities of the mediation process.
Disclaimer: The terminology and analysis presented here do not necessarily reflect the personal views of the authors or official stance of the ChinaMed Project, T.wai. For the sake of consistency and clarity, this piece employs the commonly recognized term “Western Sahara.”
Imane EZZEHOUANY is a Research Fellow at the ChinaMed Project. She is also a Ph.D. candidate in History, Cultural Heritage, and International Studies at the University of Cagliari. She holds a Master’s degree in Diplomatic Studies from the Mohammed V University of Rabat and a second Master’s degree in International Relations from the University of Cagliari, where she was subsequently involved in various academic projects as a researcher. Her research focuses on the implications of China’s Belt and Road Initiative for North Africa.
Bianca PASQUIER is Project Officer and Research Fellow at the ChinaMed Project. She is also a graduate student in International Sciences at the University of Turin and holds a B.A. in Political Science and International Relations from the University of Naples “L’Orientale.” Her research interests include the foreign policies of MENA countries and the media coverage of China in North Africa.
Amanda CHEN is a Research Fellow at the ChinaMed Project. She holds degrees from SOAS University of London, Sciences Po Paris, and Peking University. Her research spans China’s energy diplomacy, global value chains, and the nexus between geoeconomics and conflicts in the MENA region.
1 “‘abraz ‘ahdath qadiat al-sahra’ al-gharbia” أبرز أحداث قضية الصحراء الغربية [Major events in the Western Sahara issue], Al Jazeera, November 3, 2015, https://www.aljazeera.net/encyclopedia/2015/11/3/أبرز-أحداث-قضية-الصحراء-الغربية; UN, “Background,” MINURSO — United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara, https://minurso.unmissions.org/en/background.
2 Shoji Matsumoto, “On additional issues in the Western Sahara Advisory Opinion,” Policy Center for the New South, January 21, 2021. https://www.policycenter.ma/publications/additional-issues-western-sahara-advisory-opinion.
3 Jérôme Besnard, ed., Rethinking the Sahara Dispute: History and Contemporary Perspectives, trans. Nasser Bouchiba, preface by Yehuda Lancry (Rabat: Editions Bouregreg, 2024). https://en.hespress.com/82047-new-book-in-chiniese-examines-sahara-dispute-through-history-and-contemporary-perspectives.html.
4 “Declaration of principles on Western Sahara (Madrid Accords), Spain-Morocco-Mauritania,” November 14, 1975, United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 988, p. 257, I-14450. https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/unts/volume%20988/volume-988-i-14450-english.pdf.
5 The Polisario Front proclaimed the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) in 1976 with a government in exile in Algeria. It has been a full member of the African Union (AU), and its predecessor, the Organization of African Unity (OAU), since 1982. As for the United Nations, the SADR is not recognized as a member state although it maintains a representative in New York to coordinate with MINURSO.
6 Andrei Popoviciu, “The failed diplomacy between Morocco and Polisario,” Al Jazeera, November 18, 2020. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/11/18/the-failed-diplomacy-between-morocco-and-polisario.
7 “Western Sahara conflict is a Morocco-Algeria proxy war – Russian think tank,” African Press Agency, March 17, 2026. https://apanews.net/western-sahara-conflict-as-morocco-algeria-proxy-war-russian-think-tank/.
8 Jawad Kerdoudi, “La résolution 2602 du Conseil de sécurité de l’ONU sur le Sahara favorable au Maroc” [UN Security Council Resolution 2602 on the Sahara is favorable to Morocco], EcoActu, November 2, 2021, https://ecoactu.ma/la-resolution-2602-du-conseil-de-securite/.
9 Ibid. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/11/18/the-failed-diplomacy-between-morocco-and-polisario.
10 Sarah Zaaimi, “Why it’s time to terminate the UN’s dysfunctional mission in Western Sahara,” Atlantic Council, April 9, 2025. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/why-its-time-to-terminate-the-uns-dysfunctional-mission-in-western-sahara/.
11 United Nations Security Council, “Letter dated 11 April 2007 from the Permanent Representative of Morocco to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General," S/2007/206, April 13, 2007. https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/MINURSO%20S2007%20206.pdf.
12 “Time for International Re-engagement in Western Sahara,” International Crisis Group, March 10, 2021. https://www.crisisgroup.org/brf/middle-east-north-africa/western-sahara/b082-time-international-re-engagement-western-sahara.
13 “L’Algérie déplore vivement les graves violations du cessez-le-feu dans la zone d’El Guerguerat au Sahara occidental” [Algeria strongly deplores the serious ceasefire violations in the El Guerguerat area of Western Sahara], Ambassade d’Algérie en France, November 13, 2020. https://amb-algerie.fr/6419/lalgerie-deplore-vivement-les-graves-violations-du-cessez-le-feu-dans-la-zone-del-guerguerat-au-sahara-occidental/.
14 Simon Roger, “À Dakhla, au Sahara occidental, le Maroc intensifie sa politique de grands travaux” [In Dakhla, in Western Sahara, Morocco is intensifying its policy of major public projects], Le Monde Afrique, September 6, 2025. https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2025/09/06/a-dakhla-au-sahara-occidental-le-maroc-intensifie-sa-politique-de-grands-travaux_6639205_3212.html.
15 Safaa Kasraoui, “Hilale: Autonomy Plan is Demonstration of Morocco’s Goodwill, Only Path to Western Sahara Dispute,” Morocco World News, November 17. 2025. https://www.moroccoworldnews.com/2025/11/268259/hilale-autonomy-plan-is-demonstration-of-moroccos-goodwill-only-path-to-western-sahara-dispute/.
16 Jamal Laadam, “The Chinese stance on the Moroccan Sahara shifts from neutrality to subtle backing of sovereignty”, Modern Diplomacy, July 18, 2025, https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2025/07/18/the-chinese-stance-on-the-moroccan-sahara-shifts-from-neutrality-to-subtle-backing-of-sovereignty.
17 This occurred in 1971, when the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution 2758, which recognized the representatives of the People’s Republic of China as “the only lawful representatives of China to the United Nations,” a resolution for which Algeria was one of the principal sponsors.
18 Wanjun Wu and Pedro Sobral, “China’s non-interference policy towards Western Sahara conflict,” Africana Studia No. 29 (2018): 132. https://ojs.letras.up.pt/index.php/AfricanaStudia/article/view/7633.
19 Wu and Sobral, “China’s non-interference policy towards Western Sahara conflict,” p. 134. https://ojs.letras.up.pt/index.php/AfricanaStudia/article/view/7633.
20 Fadoua Ammari and Rida Lyammouri, “La Chine et la Russie face à la question du Sahara marocain : vers une convergence des intérêts stratégiques” [China and Russia on the issue of the Moroccan Sahara: toward a convergence of strategic interests], Policy Center for the New South, June 13, 2025, p. 16. https://www.policycenter.ma/publications/la-chine-et-la-russie-face-la-question-du-sahara-marocain-vers-une-convergence-des.
21 Raúl Redondo, “Le Forum de coopération Chine-Afrique soutient l’intégrité territoriale du Maroc” [The China-Africa Cooperation Forum supports Morocco's territorial integrity], Atalayar, September 5, 2024. https://www.atalayar.com/fr/articulo/politique/forum-cooperation-chine-afrique-soutient-lintegrite-territoriale-du-maroc/20240905120720204834.html.
22 Latifa Ferial Naili, “Morocco’s Makhzen Regime Uses Fictitious Claims of SADR Exclusion from FOCAC to Distract from Tokyo Scandal,” Al24 News, August 24, 2024. https://al24news.dz/en/moroccos-makhzen-regime-uses-fictitious-claims-of-sadr-exclusion-from-focac-to-distract-from-tokyo-scandal/.
23 It may be interesting to note that the other country excluded from the 53 African states parties to FOCAC out of 55 AU members is the Kingdom of Eswatini, the last African country to recognize the Republic of China instead of the PRC.
24 “Participation of SADR in FOCAC Summit: Makhzen regime is engaged in propaganda of fictitious victory to cover up its scandal in Tokyo,” The Sahara Press, August 26, 2024, https://www.spsrasd.info/en/2024/08/26/4874.html.
25 Samir Bennis, Why Morocco is Disappointed With the US Position on Western Sahara, Morocco World News, May 12, 2016, https://www.moroccoworldnews.com/2016/05/109506/why-morocco-is-disappointed-with-the-us-position-on-western-sahara/.
26 Samir Bennis, What Impact of Morocco-China Strategic Partnership on Western Sahara?, Morocco World News, May 21, 2016. https://www.moroccoworldnews.com/2016/05/109279/what-impact-of-morocco-china-strategic-partnership-on-western-sahara/.
27 See note 20. Ammari and Lyammouri, [China and Russia on the issue of the Moroccan Sahara], p. 4. https://www.policycenter.ma/publications/la-chine-et-la-russie-face-la-question-du-sahara-marocain-vers-une-convergence-des.
28 UN Security Council, Resolution 2440 (October 31, 2018), UN Doc S/RES/2440 (2018), https://docs.un.org/en/S/RES/2440(2018).
29 Alessandro Giuli, “The strategic caution of Russia and China in Western Sahara,” MedOr Italian Foundation, June 7, 2022, https://www.med-or.org/en/news/la-prudenza-strategica-di-russia-e-cina-nel-sahara-occidentale.
30 Eduard Soler i Lecha and Inés Arco Escriche, “The Western Sahara conflict in a post-hegemonic world: interests, values and foreign policy strategies,” The Journal of North African Studies Vol 30, No. 4: 579–610. https://doi.org/10.1080/13629387.2025.2500472.
31 Mohammed Jaabouk, “Algeria and Morocco’s joint exploitation of the Gara Djbilet iron mine ignored for a new project,” Yabiladi, April 1, 2021. https://en.yabiladi.com/articles/details/108002/algeria-morocco-s-joint-exploitation-gara.
32 See note 20. Ammari and Lyammouri, [China and Russia on the issue of the Moroccan Sahara], p. 4. https://www.policycenter.ma/publications/la-chine-et-la-russie-face-la-question-du-sahara-marocain-vers-une-convergence-des.
33 “Visite de Xi Jinping au Maroc : Une escale stratégique pour le partenariat sino-marocain” [Xi Jinping’s visit to Morocco: a strategic stopover for the Sino-Moroccan partnership], L’Opinion, November 22, 2024, https://lopinion.ma/fr/actu-maroc/visite-de-xi-jinping-au-maroc--une-escale-strategique-pour-le-partenariat-sino-marocain_a95677; Mariateresa Natuzzi, “Moroccan Media on Xi Jinping’s Visit and Increasing Cooperation with China,” ChinaMed Project, January 28, 2025. https://www.chinamed.it/observer/moroccan-media-on-xi-jinpings-visit-and-increasing-cooperation-with-china.
34 Degang Sun and Yahia Zoubir, China’s Participation in Conflict Resolution in the Middle East and North Africa: A Case of Quasi-Mediation Diplomacy?, Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 27 No. 110 (2018): 133. https://doi.org/10.1080/10670564.2018.1389019.
35 Yahia H. Zoubir, “Algeria and China: Shifts in political and military relations,” Global Policy, Volume 14, Special Issue (2023): 62. https://doi.org/10.1111/1758-5899.13115.
36 Ibid. https://doi.org/10.1111/1758-5899.13115.
37 Imane Ezzehouany, “From Geoeconomics to a Chinese Diplomatic Shift on the Western Sahara? Moroccan Press Coverage of FM Bourita’s Visit to Beijing,” ChinaMed Project, December 1, 2025. https://chinamed.substack.com/p/from-geoeconomics-to-a-chinese-diplomatic.
38 Yahia H. Zoubir, “China in the Maghreb: Forging a New Era of Geopolitical Influence,” Middle East Council on Global Affairs, October 20, 2025, https://mecouncil.org/publication/china-in-the-maghreb-forging-a-new-era-of-geopolitical-influence/.
39 Samir Bennis, “Morocco Acquires Advanced Chinese TB-001K Combat Drone,” Morocco World News, February 10, 2025. https://www.moroccoworldnews.com/2025/02/164709/morocco-acquires-advanced-chinese-tb-001k-combat-drone/.
40 See note 30. Soler i Lecha and Arco Escriche, “The Western Sahara conflict in a post-hegemonic world,” https://doi.org/10.1080/13629387.2025.2500472.
41 Bianca Pasquier, “Mediterranean Anxieties over the Sino-Moroccan Rapprochement: French, Algerian, and Tunisian Media Perspectives,” ChinaMed Project, November 10, 2025. https://chinamed.substack.com/p/mediterranean-anxieties-over-sino.
42 Yassine Ben Driss, “Western Sahara Dispute Entered Its Final Chapter Behind Closed Doors in Madrid,” Morocco World News, February 12, 2026. https://www.moroccoworldnews.com/2026/02/278575/western-sahara-dispute-entered-its-final-chapter-behind-closed-doors-in-madrid/.
43 Margarita Arredondas, “Algeria redirects military cooperation to the US in response to Russia’s influence in the Sahel,” Atalayar, January 25, 2025. https://www.atalayar.com/en/articulo/politics/algeria-redirects-military-cooperation-to-the-us-in-response-to-russias-influence-in-the-sahel/20250123163610210285.html.
44 Adlene Meddi, “War on Iran: How Algeria and Morocco manoeuvre the fallout,” Middle East Eye, March 15, 2026. https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/between-threats-and-opportunities-algeria-and-morocco-manoeuvre-fallout-war-iran.
45 Chuchu Zhang, “How Iran War Is Reshaping China’s Geo-Economic Cooperation with North Africa,” Stimson Center North Africa Program, March 27, 2026. https://www.stimson.org/2026/how-iran-war-is-reshaping-chinas-geo-economic-cooperation-with-north-africa/.
46 Mariateresa Natuzzi, Bianca Pasquier and Giorgia Facchini, “China’s Energy Strategy: The Case of North Africa,” ChinaMed Project, October 23, 2025. https://www.chinamed.it/publications/chinas-energy-strategy-the-case-of-north-africa.
47 Hafed Al Ghwell, “Impacts of the Iran War on North Africa, the Sahel, and the Mediterranean,” Stimson Center North Africa Program, March 31, 2026. https://www.stimson.org/2026/impacts-of-the-iran-war-on-north-africa-the-sahel-and-the-mediterranean/
48 “Strikes on Iran to weaken Polisario, Hezbollah and Houthi proxy networks,” North Africa Post, March 31, 2026. https://northafricapost.com/95865-strikes-on-iran-to-weaken-polisario-hezbollah-and-houthi-proxy-networks.html.
49 See note 34. Sun & Zoubir, “China’s Participation in Conflict Resolution in the Middle East and North Africa,” p. 237. https://doi.org/10.1080/10670564.2018.1389019.s
