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China’s economic interests and energy security hinge upon a relatively stable Middle East since the region was designated as an extension of its periphery during the Third Plenum in 2013. While previous escalations had been geographically contained, the Gaza War, the recent U.S.-Israeli joint offensive and Iran’s retaliation have regionalized the crisis from the Gulf to the Levant – generating persistent uncertainty, mass displacement in Lebanon, and wider disruptions to global food, economic and energy security.
As Beijing prepares to host the Second China–Arab States Summit later this year, developments in the Iran War will inevitably shape the conference agenda. This is especially true as Chinese diplomacy is being tested not only by the scale of violence in the region, but also by Arab states and publics’ expectations of what a responsible major power should do. After all, the widely invoked notion that “with great power comes great responsibility” was echoed by Beijing itself. As Chinese FM Wang Yi noted, “In 2026, with the start of the 15th Five-Year Plan, China’s major-country diplomacy with Chinese characteristics should accomplish more.” The question is, how?
Having explored Gulf and “resistance-aligned” Arab perspectives in our previous ChinaMed Observer, this issue features an interview between Research Fellow Amanda CHEN and Palestinian scholar Razan Shawamreh focusing on the Levantine front – which has so far remained underexamined in the China–MENA expert commentary. Shawamreh candidly interprets Beijing’s current posture and its strategic limits, before exploring possible ways to bridge the gaps between regional expectations and China’s Middle East policy.
Dr. Razan Shawamreh is a scholar of Chinese foreign policy with a regional focus on the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). Her research explores China’s diplomatic, economic, military, and soft power engagement across the region. She was selected as a member of the MESA Global Academy and serves as a lecturer at the American Arab University. You can follow her on X (formerly Twitter) @RazanShawamreh.
The interview was conducted in written form and finalized on April 8, in the immediate aftermath of Trump’s announcement of a two-week ceasefire with Tehran, all while Iranian missiles continued to rain on Arab Gulf states and Israel conducted its deadliest strikes to date on Beirut, killing at least 203 people in the Lebanese capital. While accounting for these developments, Shawamreh’s analysis ultimately transcends near-term trajectories to examine Beijing’s strategy, and the region’s interests and expectations shaping China–Arab relations.
The views presented herein are the author’s or the expert’s own and do not necessarily reflect the views of the ChinaMed Project, the Torino World Affairs Institute and the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Amanda CHEN: How do you interpret China’s posture in the war?
Razan Shawamreh: A useful starting point for understanding China’s posture may come from the Chinese proverb “Sit on the mountain and watch the tigers fight.” In my view, this logic explains Beijing’s position toward the ongoing war: it has no interest in rescuing the U.S. as it sinks under the weight of its own mistakes. This became clear when Beijing deflected Trump’s request for direct Chinese intervention. Rather, China has operated within strict diplomatic boundaries from the outset, with a rhetoric emphasizing a “cessation of military actions” and the “resumption of dialogue,” coupled with cautious engagement.
There are differences, however, when this rhetoric is compared to that issued during the “Twelve-Day War” in 2025. While Beijing then issued explicit condemnations, it now avoids condemning American-Israeli strikes on Iran, opting instead for expressions of “high concern.” This restraint likely stems from direct U.S. involvement and a desire to avoid provoking the Trump administration ahead of the rescheduled May summit and sensitive economic negotiations. Explicit condemnation has been reserved only for attacks on civilians and the assassination of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.
The China-Pakistan Five-Point Initiative further illustrates this cautious approach. Notably, the document omits the war’s causes and fails to name the U.S. or Israel. By focusing on humanitarian aid, infrastructure protection, and maritime security, the initiative seems more like conflict management than resolution, or at best, a diplomatic off-ramp for all parties toward de-escalation, if they want. At this stage, this proposal is not to resolve the conflict. It intends to offer a platform for negotiation, and we should not expect more. A way for parties to move down the high tree they climbed.
This initiative, I think, remains largely confined to broad normative principles. By emphasizing conflict management rather than resolution, it functions more as a statement of intent than an actionable peace plan. Crucially, it avoids identifying aggressors or distinguishing between offensive and defensive actions, which undermines accountability. It also lacks essential implementation mechanisms: there are no provisions for sanctions, monitoring, verification, or enforcement, nor any peacekeeping or guarantor structure. As a result, while the initiative aligns with international law and diplomatic norms, it does not address the fundamental political realities required to terminate hostilities.
Indeed, this cautious approach also has its limits. This is evident in China’s veto of the draft resolution proposed by Bahrain on April 7 aimed at reopening and securing the Strait of Hormuz. This veto can be understood through a distinction between the said and the unsaid: China’s official justification on the one hand, and its underlying strategic interests on the other.
Officially, China justified its veto by saying that “the draft resolution fails to capture the root causes and full picture of the conflict in a comprehensive and balanced manner,” referring to the war launched by the United States and Israel. China further stated that these strikes were conducted “without authorization from the Security Council and while negotiations between Iran and the U.S. were underway,” constituting a violation of the UN Charter and the basic norms of international relations.
However, I think that this explanation appears incomplete. In its own initiative with Pakistan, Beijing also avoided addressing the root causes of the conflict or naming the aggressors. This suggests that the veto is also driven by unspoken strategic considerations, namely, China’s economic and geopolitical interests. During the war, Iran appears to have provided China with significant strategic advantages. By leveraging U.S.–China competition, Iran may have strengthened China’s position by offering security guarantees to Chinese shipping through the Strait and maintaining oil exports to China. Iran also signalled its willingness to accept payments in Chinese yuan for shipping passing through the Strait. These developments suggest that China may anticipate a stronger role in the Strait of Hormuz after the war, which could explain its decision to veto the resolution.
At the same time, this position should not be interpreted as being directed against Gulf countries. In previous instances, such as a Bahrain-sponsored resolution (UNSC res 2817) concerning Iranian attacks in the Gulf, China chose to abstain rather than veto, allowing the resolution to pass. This contrast indicates that China’s decision in the Hormuz case is driven by its direct and substantial interests in that specific context.
AC: Do you see an underlying strategy shaping this response?
RS: China’s underlying strategy is one of calculated adaptation rather than intervention. Beijing appears to stick to its strategy of prioritizing economic security over political alignment. Rather than attempting to shape the conflict’s outcome, China is preparing to manage its consequences, manifesting the pragmatic wisdom that it does not matter if the cat is black or white, as long as it catches mice.
This pattern is evident in Syria, where Beijing normalized relations with the new government less than three months after the collapse of its “longtime friend,” the Assad regime. Similarly, in Venezuela, despite strongly condemning U.S. actions against Nicolás Maduro, reports indicated that China quickly transitioned to trading oil through U.S.-approved channels. The U.S. subsequently labelled these deals as legitimate business, proving that China is willing to operate within U.S.-established power structures to secure resources. This suggests that China’s strategy toward Tehran is not about saving/backing a specific regime, but about ensuring that, regardless of the victor, and whether the regime will prevail or not, Chinese economic interests and energy flows remain uninterrupted.
AC: In a recent article for The New Arab, you argue the war is both a challenge and opportunity for China. On the one hand, it challenges Beijing’s professed “neutrality”. On the other hand, you suggest that from China’s perspective, this may be an “opportunity to reshape international and regional relations” if only the region could emerge more “sovereign and independent.” Could you elaborate more on that?
RS: The current conflict could be seen as a challenge to China because it engulfs countries which have comprehensive strategic partnerships with Beijing: Israel, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE. Yet, China’s relations with U.S. allies (Israel, UAE, and KSA) have often been more stable than its ties with a sanctioned Iran, even if Beijing views Tehran as a vital partner in its global anti-U.S. hegemony club.
This tension was reflected in China’s abstention from the aforementioned UN Security Council Resolution 2817, proposed by Bahrain on behalf of the GCC and Jordan condemning direct Iranian attacks on Gulf states as a breach of international law. By choosing to abstain, China allowed the resolution to pass, a move that could be interpreted as a quiet “win” for its Gulf partners, and, by extension the U.S., despite Beijing’s refusal to formally condemn Iran, preferring a broader denunciation of attacks on civilians whether in Iran or the Gulf countries.
Regarding the opportunity, Beijing could be seen as applying elements of what could be called the “Sino–Central Asian Model” to the Middle East. With this I mean that China leverages regional instability and rising anti-American sentiment to challenge the existing security order. We saw this playbook in action in 2005, when the Shanghai Cooperation Organization leveraged regional volatility to push for the closure of U.S. bases in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan.
Today, Beijing may be using the war, and the Gulf’s exposure to it, to question the long-term utility of the American security umbrella. When Foreign Minister Wang Yi told his Omani counterpart that Gulf states should “oppose external interference, develop good neighborliness, and truly hold their future firmly in their own hands,” he was delivering a message. Beijing is framing U.S. military presence as a primary source of regional vulnerability. The subtext is clear: if the Gulf seeks a deeper partnership with China, it must first move toward a post-American regional architecture by reducing foreign military footprints. In this framework, Beijing remains reactive; the initiative must be taken by regional actors first, only after which China can move to consolidate its presence, a sequence previously demonstrated in Central Asia.
AC: Do you observe differences between Palestinian, Levantine, and broader Arab perceptions of Beijing in the current war?
RS: To understand current Arab perceptions of China, we must recognize a recurring historical pattern in the Middle East. Historically, Arab perceptions have often been shaped by the “liberation rhetoric” of rising global powers seeking to challenge an established hegemon. We see a recurring historical pattern where Great Britain first utilized anti-Ottoman rhetoric, claiming to “liberate” Arabs from “Turkish occupation” during WWI to secure its own regional interests. The United States later entered the region under the banner of “anti-colonialism,” utilizing Wilsonian principles and Roosevelt’s rhetoric to displace European colonial powers. Today, China employs a similar “anti-hegemony” rhetoric to position itself against U.S. dominance.
In this sense, perhaps the primary distinction in regional perceptions is not necessarily found between different Arab sub-regions, but rather in how China is perceived relative to the United States. Recent data, such as the 2025 Arab Opinion Index, suggests that while China’s favourability rose following the events of October 7, 2023, this shift was driven more by a collapse in the credibility of the U.S. and the EU, than by China’s specific interventions. In this context, China is often viewed through the prism of “the enemy of my enemy is my friend,” appearing as a more attractive partner by default because it is perceived as the only viable alternative to a Western-led order.
However, a significant mismatch exists between regional expectations and China’s actual preferences. After two years of war and China’s relatively passive role toward Gaza, leaders and citizens are more likely to reconsider Beijing’s actual influence. This tested and tried reality suggests that while China’s rhetoric sounds supportive, its power position remains limited. This is now evident in the case of Iran: despite close ties, China’s approach signals that its boundaries are narrower than many in the region initially hoped.
Ultimately, regional favor is constructed not necessarily out of an alignment with the rising power’s specific policies, but out of frustration with the established power. This pattern is repeating: from anti-Ottomanism to anti-colonialism, and now to anti-hegemonism. These powers reshape regional perceptions to reflect their own rising status, often transforming the Middle East into a battleground for Great Power competition. In doing so, they create spheres of influence that prioritize global strategic rivalry over the actual security and developmental needs of the regional populations.
For Palestinians and the broader Arab public, “neutrality” and “anti-hegemony” that fail to deliver tangible change risk being seen not as a revolutionary alternative, but as another chapter in a long history of great power pragmatism.
AC: The Gulf and Levantine fronts appear to differ markedly in both dynamics and implications. Can you elaborate on that, and how this may persist after the war?
RS: The dynamics of the Levantine and Gulf fronts are driven by distinct historical factors that will create divergent post-war trajectories. In the Levant, Palestine, Lebanon, and Syria, instability is chronic. This region serves as the primary theater for Israel’s settler-colonial objectives and territorial expansion. The absence of a long-term political resolution guarantees a continuous state of conflict. Even as Syria attempts to navigate survival by distancing itself from the frontline, it remains a target for Israeli escalation. Consequently, the Levant lacks indicators of near-term stability, remaining trapped in a cycle of occupation and unresolved territorial struggle.
In contrast, instability in the Gulf is a situational byproduct of the broader confrontation between the U.S., Israel, and Iran. Recent Iranian strikes against Gulf targets represent an unprecedented escalation rather than a manifestation of a permanent state of war. Post-war trajectory is likely to prioritize a rapid return to managed coexistence.
Once the current war on Iran concludes, Gulf states are expected to focus on insulating their economic modernization plans from further shocks. The shape of regional security is the concern of everyone; and ideas range from containment and cooperation with Iran to confrontational posture. Oman and Iran are reportedly engaged in talks regarding a draft protocol to monitor traffic in the Strait of Hormuz. Most importantly, a statement made by the Gulf Cooperation Council on April 2, emphasized that the Gulf states want to establish normal relations with Iran and resolve all security issues cordially.
Driven by the need to protect their long-term developmental goals, actors like Qatar and Oman are positioned to lead diplomatic de-escalation efforts between Tehran and the U.S. Ultimately, while the Gulf will move toward insulating itself to restore stability, the Levant will likely persist as a zone of permanent friction due to the fundamental nature of the unresolved conflict at its core. The countries of the Levant will likely follow the GCC’s lead on post-war posture and relations with Iran. These are weak countries and rely on Gulf support, both financially and diplomatically.
AC: China is among the few global actors with friendly relations with all the parties involved in the war. As the ceasefire remains fragile and hostilities continue in Gaza and expand in Lebanon, do you think this position of neutrality is sustainable in the eyes of Arab publics, and Palestinians?
RS: The current war on Iran could be seen as a critical geopolitical expansion of the regional instability that began with the Israeli genocide in Gaza since October 2023. To evaluate China’s position as a “neutral” actor, we must first interrogate the structural nature of that neutrality. In a landscape defined by asymmetrical power, military occupation, and long-standing colonial structures, can any state truly maintain a detached or impartial stance? In simple terms, is neutrality even possible in a context defined by colonialism and occupation? When great powers present themselves as neutral, this may mask moral disengagement, allowing interest-driven policies to operate under the cover of balanced rhetoric. In this sense, neutrality may amount to implicitly siding with the occupier.
In conventional political terms, neutrality implies maintaining an equal distance from all contending parties. However, this claim must be tested against a concrete benchmark. If we take UN resolutions and international law as a minimal baseline, any genuine impartial position should at least uphold core Palestinian rights, including self-determination, statehood in the West Bank, East Jerusalem, and Gaza, the return of refugees, and the dismantling of settlements. Within this framework, China’s official discourse appears to align with these principles, while also emphasizing Israel’s security and right to exist.
However, in practice, this neutrality becomes questionable when scrutinizing the extent and nature of China’s economic engagement with Israel, particularly its involvement in settlements expansion in the West Bank and East Jerusalem. While it is unclear why the Chinese government would allow its state-owned and private enterprises to operate in illegal Israeli settlements, this reality nevertheless suggests a material contribution to the continuation of the colonial reality on the ground. This contradiction reflects what I described as “biased impartiality”: a state where declared diplomatic neutrality is contradicted by economic and material actions that favor the occupying power. Given this gap between rhetoric and practice, such a position is unlikely to remain sustainable in the eyes of Arab publics and Palestinians. As the conflict intensifies, perceptions are shaped less by diplomatic language and more by tangible actions. A neutrality that appears to accommodate or enable ongoing occupation risks being seen not as balanced, but as complicit, therefore undermining the credibility of a rising great power and its global responsibilities in the eyes of Arab publics.
As for the American-Israeli war on Iran, I would argue that China is not a neutral actor; rather, it is a cautious one. I believe that as a rising power with long-term strategic ambitions, China’s actions are dictated by its own interests, which often diverge from those of the regional parties. This strategic caution means that, as an emerging global power, China’s regional policy is dictated by long-term ambitions that often diverge from the immediate survival or security needs of regional actors. After more than two years of devastating warfare in Gaza, followed by Israeli military escalations in Lebanon, Syria, Yemen, Qatar and now Iran, many in the region are contrasting Beijing’s caution with the more assertive stances taken by other middle powers in the Global South.
For Palestinians and the Arab public, this wait-and-see approach risks eroding China’s credibility as a reliable alternative to Western influence. While the region remains in need of a development partner, it is also a theater of intense insecurity where states seek political partners/allies, not just economic investors. China’s reluctance to engage directly in conflict resolution, exemplified by its preference for joint initiatives with third parties like Pakistan, or its tendency to delegate responsibility to a deadlocked UN Security Council with regard to the Palestinian cause, suggests that while China is a major player, it has yet to assume the role of a decisive political stakeholder. This suggests that its current posture may eventually face a crisis of legitimacy among those who once viewed Beijing as a potential counterweight to the prevailing global and regional order.
AC: If that is the case, to what extent, do you think, might the war drive policy adjustments in Beijing’s approach toward regional actors?
RS: In the short term, I do not foresee a major shift in Beijing’s approach toward Middle Eastern actors. China’s strategic focus is currently consumed by two existential priorities: the security of its energy supply and, more critically, the escalating tensions over Taiwan. The recent, historic shift in Japan’s defense posture has fundamentally altered Beijing’s regional calculus. By explicitly linking Taiwan’s security to its own national survival and asserting a right to self-defense in the event of a change in the island’s status, Tokyo has redefined a territorial issue as an existential threat to the Japanese state. For Beijing, the revival of what it perceives as Japanese militarism, framed under the guise of “survival-threatening situations,” is a far more immediate and dangerous development than any conflict in the Middle East. Consequently, this regional tension necessitates Beijing’s full strategic attention, leaving little room for a policy overhaul in the Levant, Iran or the Gulf.
AC: Finally, if Beijing is unlikely to adjust its policy in the region, how may this affect expectations that regional stakeholders hold regarding China’s role?
RS: There is a persistent gap between rhetoric and reality. Regional stakeholders have always expressed hopes for a more robust Chinese role. It is difficult to find a diplomatic statement from the Gulf or the Levant that does not emphasize the expectation for Beijing to exert more effort to mediate or intervene. However, China has remained largely passive across all regional conflicts since 2023 due to the strategic boundaries mentioned above. As these wars continue without a significant Chinese breakthrough, regional stakeholders are likely to conclude that Beijing lacks the necessary leverage or will to act as a diplomatic guarantor. Consequently, despite their frustrations, these countries will likely remain aligned with the United States as the only power capable of direct intervention.
Amanda CHEN is a Research Fellow at the ChinaMed Project covering China’s relations with Israel and the Arab Gulf states. She is a graduate of SOAS University of London, Sciences Po Paris, and Peking University. Her interests include China–Middle East relations, conflict mediation practices, and global philanthropy, with a focus on the role of civil society in shaping these transnational processes.
