On December 27, 2024, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi arrived in Beijing for his first visit to China since his appointment in August. During his two-day stay, he met his Chinese counterpart, Wang Yi, and gave an interview to Chinese state television.

Araghchi’s visit comes less than a month after the fall of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s government to Turkish-backed opposition forces. As previously discussed, Chinese experts—much like their Western counterparts—view Iran’s position in the Middle East as severely weakened. The Assad regime was a key Iranian ally, and its collapse, coupled with Hezbollah’s political setbacks after its costly confrontation with Israel, has severely undermined Iran’s Axis of Resistance, leaving Tehran with difficult choices ahead.

In this edition of the ChinaMed Observer, we examine official statements from both China and Iran, alongside media coverage and expert opinions from both countries, to assess Chinese and Iranian perspectives on the state of Sino-Iranian relations and Tehran’s regional standing.

Our analysis reveals that while both sides stress the importance of closer ties due to shared foreign policy interests, there are significant divergences in viewpoints. Chinese commentators increasingly call for the Islamic Republic to reform its foreign and economic policies, whereas Iranian analysts largely seem to assume that Beijing will inevitably strengthen its support for Tehran, given Iran’s supposed strategic significance to China.

Beijing and Tehran’s Official Positions

In the Chinese readout of his meeting with Araghchi, Wang Yi emphasized not only the BRICS and Shanghai Cooperation Organization but also that China and Iran are “important members of the ‘Global South.’” Moreover, for Wang, strengthening these aforementioned organizations represents an opportunity to “better safeguard the common interests of the Global South.”

According to the Chinese readout, Araghchi stated that “developing and deepening the comprehensive strategic partnership between Iran and China is a priority of Iran’s foreign policy.” Additionally, it highlights Tehran’s adherence to the One China principle and Iran’s firm supports for China's stance on issues such as Xinjiang, Tibet, and human rights—details absent from the Iranian readout. However, unlike the Chinese version, the Iranian account references the 25-year Iran-China Cooperation Agreement, signed in 2021. This deal, initially expected to bring USD 400 billion in Chinese investment to Iran, has become a subject of some controversy in Iran due to the lack of tangible economic benefits experienced thus far.

A significant portion of both readouts focuses on Araghchi and Wang Yi’s bilateral consultation on developments in the Middle East, with the Iranian Foreign Ministry even publishing a list of “joint understandings” that emerged from the discussion. These include:

1. “The Middle East belongs to the people of the Middle East; it should not be a battleground for great power rivalry, nor a victim of geopolitical struggles and conflicts by external powers.”
2. The international community must respect the sovereignty, security, and cultural heritage of Middle Eastern countries while supporting regional peace and stability.
3. Lasting stability and peace in the Middle East require political solutions based on international law without foreign intervention.
4. Continued dialogue and improved relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia, as well as broader regional reconciliation efforts, should be supported.
5. Resolving the Palestinian issue requires restoring Palestinian rights and ending the occupation, with immediate priorities being a ceasefire in Gaza, military withdrawal, and the delivery of humanitarian aid. Moreover, the ceasefire in Lebanon must be enforced, while Syria requires a comprehensive approach to counterterrorism, internal reconciliation, and humanitarian assistance.

While both readouts align very closely on these points, the apparent consensus seems to reflect China’s priorities more than Iran’s. The first point is a common phrase used by Chinese officials, while the fourth highlights the Iran-Saudi reconciliation deal brokered by Beijing. The emphasis on counterterrorism and extremism in Syria is also noteworthy. Although Salafi jihadism is an issue for Iran, its influence in Syria is of particular concern to China due to presence Islamist Uyghur fighters among the ranks of the now-empowered Syrian rebels.

Another reason these “understandings” seem more aligned with China’s position is the absence of direct criticism of Israel, reflecting Beijing's recent adoption of softer rhetoric toward Israel.

Araghchi was, however, more explicit in addressing Israel during his interview with China Media Group on December 28 (though the interview aired a week later), stating: “While the UN Security Council may be paralyzed by U.S. veto power, the international community has a moral obligation to do everything it can to stop Israel’s war. It must exert pressure on the United States, Europe, and Israel.” He further asserted that Iran is “fully prepared for any future attacks Israel might launch.” However, in contrast to the typically confrontational stance taken by Iranian officials, he emphasized that Iran would pursue a “diplomatic approach” and engage with regional partners, including China.

This growing emphasis on diplomatic engagement with both regional actors and China may be motivated by concerns over Donald Trump’s return to the White House. During his first term, Trump withdrew the U.S. from the JCPOA (commonly known as the Iran nuclear deal) and initiated the “maximum pressure” campaign, significantly escalating economic sanctions on Iran. Securing allies that could help Tehran withstand a strengthened sanctions regime—or even direct military action—is likely a key Iranian concern.

Chinese Expert Debate

Sun Degang, Director of Fudan University’s Center for Middle East Studies, echoed China’s official position by emphasizing China and Iran shared identity within the “Global South.”^[1] He also underscored the compatibility between their economic strategies, stating:

“China's Belt and Road Initiative overall is oriented westward, while Iran’s current development is oriented eastward. Under these circumstances, the past ‘Back-to-Back’ relationship between China and Iran has transformed into a ‘Face-to-Face’ one.”

Similarly, Qian Xuming, Associate Professor at the Middle East Studies Institute of Shanghai International Studies University (SISU), pointed to overlapping foreign policy interests.^[2] For Qian, maintaining peace and stability in the Middle East benefits not only regional actors such as Iran and Saudi Arabia but also external powers like China and the United States. He noted:

"On Middle Eastern issues, China can work with Iran, Saudi Arabia, and other countries to strengthen the unity of nations in the region through cooperation. For example, by partnering with Iran, Saudi Arabia, and other oil-producing countries in the Middle East, it is possible to safeguard the stability of the international oil market."

Despite recognizing the necessity of Iran-China cooperation, Chinese experts see Iran as facing significant challenges. Sun Degang identifies two primary obstacles: Iran’s internal economic difficulties and its worsening geopolitical standing, particularly given the likelihood of renewed pressure from a second Trump administration.^[3]

^‍Sharing a similar perspective, Fan Hongda, a professor at SISU’s Middle East Studies Institute, argues that the financial burden of supporting the Axis of Resistance is becoming increasingly difficult to justify in light of Iran’s domestic problems.^[4] He suggests that not only the Iranian government but also the general public is increasingly reluctant to sustain such foreign commitments. He wrote:

“Every time I visit Iran, I hear complaints from the public that, despite facing international sanctions and a shortage of foreign exchange, the country still channels its valuable foreign exchange resources into supporting the actions of the Axis of Resistance. Many question the practical value of this approach and even doubt whether it is worth continuing.”

Fan Hongda notes that the collapse of the Assad regime may be the last straw, compelling Tehran to undertake significant reforms. Reiterating his recommendations in the immediate aftermath of Assad’s fall, he argues that if Iran continues its confrontational stance toward the U.S. and persists in refusing to recognize Israel, it will face growing domestic and international pressure. Fan also suggests that discussions within certain Iranian factions about the potential succession of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei by his son reflect domestic efforts to pave the way for future political changes.

On the future of Iranian foreign policy, Teng Jianqun, Director of the Diplomacy Studies Center at Hunan Normal University and Director of the Centre for Arms Control at the China Institute of International Studies, asserts that, from a historical perspective, Tehran is unlikely to act impulsively or escalate conflicts over minor provocations.^[5] While aware that conflict could endanger its long-term strategic achievements through the Axis of Resistance and the Shia Crescent, Iran is likely to carefully reflect on its role as a major regional power. Consequently, its withdrawal from the forefront of Middle Eastern politics remains unlikely.

‍Niu Xinchun, executive director of the China-Arab Research Institute of Ningxia University, notes Iran’s recent demonstrations of military force, including a video released by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps showcasing its underground missile facilities and its large-scale military exercises involving over 110,000 participants. ^[6] According to Niu, these actions serve as a strategic signal of Iran’s military capabilities, particularly its missile arsenal, aimed at deterring Israel and the United States from "acting rashly" or launching a preemptive strike in response to concerns over Iran’s rapidly advancing nuclear program.

Iranian Expert Debate

As previously analyzed, Iranian media, particularly those which lean reformist, often express criticism of China, especially in relation to its role as an economic partner. A central concern is the growing gap between the promises made by Chinese officials and the reality of Chinese economic activity in Iran, as exemplified by the implementation—or lack thereof—of the 25-year Cooperation Agreement. This disparity is especially apparent when contrasted to China’s activities in the UAE and Saudi Arabia, where Chinese economic engagement has flourished.

Nevertheless, some have interpreted Araghchi's visit to Beijing as signaling the beginning of a “new chapter” in Iran-China relations, due to Beijing’s supposed need for Tehran as a partner. Hamid Vafaei, Deputy Director of the Asian Research Center at the University of Tehran, notes that the invitation to visit Beijing was extended by the Chinese side.^[7] He also emphasizes that the meeting with Wang Yi was not the first high-level engagement since President Masoud Pezeshkian assumed office, as Chinese officials have already made multiple visits to Tehran. Vafaei further asserts that:

“Regardless of what happens in Syria, which direction Saudi Arabia takes, or who comes to power in the United States, the geopolitical position of the Islamic Republic in the eyes of the Chinese remains fixed.”

Vafaei argues that Iran plays a pivotal role in President Xi Jinping’s international initiatives. Due to its strategic location, Iran cannot be excluded from China’s Global Development Initiative. Additionally, Persian and Islamic civilizations are integral to the region’s history, and thus to the Global Civilization Initiative. In terms of the Global Security Initiative, Iran’s geopolitical significance is allegedly essential to the security of the region.

Similarly, analyst Ali Fekri also contends that the Iran-China partnership will remain resilient, positing that a new U.S. administration poses no serious threat to bilateral relations, since their partnership framework was designed to endure potential challenges of a new Trump administration.^[8] He also suggests that Araghchi’s visit was aimed at proposing new plans for Eurasian corridors, with Iran's full membership in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization representing an opportunity to deepen cooperation with China in areas of security, politics, and economics.

An editorial by economic newspaper Donya-ye-Eqtesad (translated in part into English by the state-controlled Tehran Times) has a similarly optimistic view of Beijing’s need for Tehran, as supposedly “China would like to see a regional security structure established on balance of power, with Iran as a strong pillar and as China’s partner in countering the dominance of the United States in regional security affairs.”^[9] To strengthen Iran, the newspaper hypothesizes that China could start “importing more crude oil from Iran, investing more in Iran's infrastructure, and supporting the country’s regional approach.”

In a statement to the Tehran Times, Houssain Eyvazlou, a member of the executive board of Iran’s National Development Fund, announced new plans for collaboration with China in foreign investment, underscoring the importance of attracting foreign capital to stimulate Iran’s economy.^[10] It is against this background that some Iranian analysts have pointed out that China’s continued purchase of Iranian energy, despite pressure from the Trump administration, reflects China's pragmatic, results-driven approach. However, others have noted that sanctions still hinder Iran’s ability to compete with regional players such as the UAE and Saudi Arabia.

Despite these developments, some uncertainty remains among Iranian commentators regarding the potential benefits of the relationship with China. For example, Vafaei cites a Chinese proverb, “Two hundred statements are not worth half an action,” to emphasize the need for a practical, long-term approach. He hopes that Araghchi’s visit will offer a detailed, long-term cooperation roadmap to present to Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, thereby demonstrating the Pezeshkian administration’s commitment to expanding ties with China. Vafaei argues that Iran should strive to elevate the bilateral relationship from “normal” to “strategic.” Even if no concrete plans are currently in place, Iran must signal its willingness to engage in planning and coordination.

Conclusion

Araghchi’s visit showcased the mutual recognition between Iran and China as valuable partners in Middle Eastern affairs, grounded in shared foreign policy interests. This understanding persists despite Tehran facing mounting challenges, both domestically and internationally—challenges that are unlikely to dissipate or ease in the near future.

Nevertheless, official statements, along with comments from Chinese and Iranian experts, reveal differing perspectives on the future trajectory of Iran-China relations. For the Chinese, Iran represents one part of its broader outreach to the Middle East and the Global South. While Tehran’s stance is widely regarded by the Chinese commentariat as a rational response to the threats posed by Israel and the U.S., there is growing pessimism regarding the sustainability of Iran’s current economic and foreign policies. Notably, Chinese experts have become increasingly vocal in calling for change, particularly following the collapse of the Assad regime. The prevalence of such views, which also resonate with Chinese netizens, suggests that China may not be willing to fully support Tehran unless Iran addresses its issues and adjusts its policies accordingly.

In contrast, Iranian commentators remain optimistic about their country’s ability to secure Chinese support, in particular in the economic sphere, emphasizing what they see as Iran’s strategic value to Beijing. Implicitly acknowledging Iran’s current vulnerabilities, Iranian commentators have also become more positive toward Chinese economic engagement, emphasizing the need for Iran to adopt a more proactive approach when engaging with China. Despite Iranian commentators denying its possible impact, this stance may stem from concerns that the second Trump administration could intensify U.S. pressure on Iran.

As such, a significant gap exists between Chinese and Iranian commentators regarding the necessity for reforms in Iran and the extent of China’s willingness to provide support. While it is reasonable to assume that China will continue to offer some level of assistance to ensure the stability of the Iranian regime, the possibility of a meaningful divergence in the expectations and capacities of both countries should not be dismissed.

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‍Miriam VERZELLINO is a Research Fellow at the ChinaMed Project. She is currently pursuing a Master’s in Political Science (Chinese Language Program) at the Communication University of China. Her research interests include scientific and technological cooperation between China and Europe, with a specific focus on Italy, as well as digital governance.

Giorgio PESCE is a Research Fellow at the ChinaMed Project. He is currently a pursuing a Bachelor's in Language, Culture and Society of Asia and Mediterranean Africa at Ca' Foscari University of Venice, with a focus on Persian and Armenian history and languages. His research interests include the Caucasus and Central Asia.