Israeli Experts Converge: China Can’t Afford to Back Iran

One week into the war triggered by the American-Israeli joint offensive on Iran launched on Saturday, February 28, Tehran’s retaliation has already expanded from targeting U.S. military assets to striking Gulf energy and civilian infrastructure. On March 7, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian publicly apologized to neighboring countries on behalf of the Interim Council. However, any tentative hope for de-escalation quickly faded after U.S. President Donald Trump demanded Tehran “unconditionally surrender,” as both Iranian strikes on the Gulf and the American and Israeli bombing campaign intensified. Fears of a wider regional war have also grown as Israel’s offensive has expanded to include Lebanon, where more than 300,000 people were displaced last week.

Tehran’s “comprehensive strategic partner” Beijing has remained absent from the crisis beyond calls for de-escalation, while delegating the immediate security of Chinese nationals and institutions to host countries in the region. More than 3,000 Chinese citizens have evacuated Iran as of March 2, while nationals in Israel were advised to adhere to local security instructions. So far, the once-outspoken Chinese Ambassador in Tel Aviv Xiao Junzheng has not delivered public statements, limiting his activities to visiting Chinese nationals and project sites to assess safety conditions and arrange the departure of those unable to do so.

Despite widespread allegations of covert military cooperation between Beijing and Iran during and after the first Israel-Iran War in June 2025 – claims refuted by Ambassador Xiao – Israeli experts this time do not expect China to come to the rescue of the Islamic Republic. In contrast to last year, recent analyses have been more cautious. In January, the Israel-China Policy Center of the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) itself dismissed reports of unconfirmed Chinese military assistance to Iran as part of a “disinformation campaign” by Tehran, amid growing American pressure and threats during the negotiations halted by the current war. This recalibration reinforced the consensus that Beijing is unlikely to meaningfully intervene in the conflict besides dispatching its Middle East Special Envoy Zhai Jun, who arrived in Saudi Arabia on Sunday, March, 8.

This ChinaMed Observer examines the limited debate surrounding China within Israeli commentary, as well as perspectives on the conflict’s implications for Tel Aviv’s relations with the Arab Gulf countries, which for the first week have borne the brunt of Iranian retaliation. Informed by last year’s war and in line with assessments shared by several China-Middle East analysts, Israeli experts do not expect Beijing to intervene on behalf of Tehran, but to monitor developments from a distance – particularly with regard to U.S. military operations and the deployment of artificial intelligence in combat.

As for Israel’s regional standing, moderate voices in the debate warn of the limits of force, arguing instead that Tel Aviv’s long-term “rehabilitation” will depend less on the outcome in Iran than on its policy toward Palestinians and its commitment to the two-state solution.

Israeli Interpretations of China’s Position

China’s limited response to and non-involvement during the Twelve-Day War in June 2025 appear to have consolidated the belief in Israel that Beijing, under no circumstances, would intervene to support Tehran during wartime. In this context, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ expressions of “concern” over the American-Israeli strikes, along with its condemnation of the killing of Ayatollah Khamenei as violations of Iranian sovereignty and international norms, were interpreted in Israeli commentary as a mere “standard pattern of response.”¹

Meny Vaknin, a Research Associate at the Israel-China Policy Center of the INSS, characterized Beijing’s reaction as a calculated attempt to present itself “as a responsible and stabilizing actor” while avoiding any meaningful political cost. At the same time, this restrained posture allows China to “avoid direct diplomatic confrontation with Washington” ahead of U.S. President Donald Trump’s planned visit to settle bilateral economic disputes later this month (which, as discussed by Wang Zichen of Pekingnology, appears to be going ahead regardless of the war).²

This assessment seems to resonate within the Israeli security establishment. As early as February 19, Oded Ailam, former head of the Mossad Counterterrorism Division and currently a researcher at the Jerusalem Center for Security and Foreign Affairs (JCFA), had anticipated China’s restrained stance toward Iran, describing it as a strategy of “asymmetric risk management.”³ In his view, Beijing seeks to minimize its exposure to geopolitical risks while still benefiting from the crisis, particularly by increasing Tehran’s economic dependence on its market. As recently noted by ChinaMed Head of Research Andrea Ghiselli and Research Fellow Theo Nencini, Iran is important for China but not important enough to justify risking escalation with the United States or other powers.

Ailam nevertheless suggested that Chinese involvement could deepen should its core interests in the region be threatened, notably in the event of a closure of the Strait of Hormuz – a critical artery for Beijing’s access to the region’s energy resources and global trade. Thus far, however, China has shown no indication of military involvement such as escort operations for its tankers. While Iranian interdictions reportedly spared Chinese vessels, skyrocketing insurance premiums and mounting security risks have effectively disrupted commercial traffic through the waterway.4 For the time being, China has stuck to its usual diplomatic playbook by sending its Middle East Special Envoy Zhai Jun to de-escalate tensions, reaffirming Beijing’s consistent position of neutrality and willingness to “engage all parties” to safeguard peace and stability in the region.⁵

However, as noted by INSS Non-resident Fellow Tuvia Gering, China’s influence and room for maneuver in the Middle East are precisely constrained by its deep entanglement with both Iran and the Gulf monarchies. In this context, Beijing’s restrained response reflects not only limited military leverage but also the challenge of balancing competing regional interests.⁶

The War’s Implications for China

Despite the Netanyahu government – alongside the Trump administration – initiating a war that provoked Iranian retaliation against neutral countries and disrupted global trade and energy flows, Israeli experts largely agree that the further weakening and even demise of the Islamic Republic would ultimately benefit not only the Middle East but also distant yet entrenched powers like China, albeit at the expense of the region’s human security.

From a strategic perspective, Ailam argued that an erosion of the U.S. capabilities, “even at the cost of the fall of the Iranian regime,” would only serve Beijing’s broader geopolitical confrontation with Washington.⁷ Professor Avner Ben-Zaken, a historian and Lecturer at Ono International School, echoed this view, suggesting that China might have “an interest in such a conflict continuing and drawing the United States deeper into the Middle East, hoping that Iran will become what Ukraine became for Moscow” in service of Chinese objectives around the Taiwan Strait.⁸

Contrary to Beijing’s cautious position, Taipei has explicitly supported the American-Israeli offensive by framing it as part of a broader fight to “eliminate terrorism from the region” while condemning “Iran’s indiscriminate attacks on other countries.”⁹ Taipei’s representative office in Israel even announced a USD $180,000 humanitarian donation to the town of Beit Shemesh hit by Iranian missiles.¹⁰ This political support aligns with Taipei’s effort to deepen technological ties with Israel to develop its own “T-Dome” air-defence system.

In this context, Israeli analysts raised the possibility that Beijing may be closely monitoring the conflict “to draw important military lessons” for future Chinese military expeditions.¹¹ Carice Witte, Founder and Executive Director of the SIGNAL Group (Sino-Israel Global Network & Academic Leadership), contended that, from Beijing’s perspective, the war provides valuable insights into its intensifying great-power competition with Washington, particularly by revealing the operational reach of the U.S. military, the effectiveness of American alliances, and the resilience of global energy networks:

“[Chinese] strategists are watching the degree to which the United States can sustain a high-intensity conflict in the Middle East without weakening its deterrence posture in Asia … and whether the United States retains the ability to operate credibly in multiple regions simultaneously.”¹²

Moreover, Yediot Aharonot Tech Editor Israel Wullman described the conflict as a “live testing ground for Western AI technology,” a field particularly relevant for Chinese strategists who increasingly view artificial intelligence as central to modern warfare.¹³ Wullman’s observations coincide with growing scrutiny over the alleged use of AI-automated targeting by U.S. and Israeli forces in Iran. As highlighted in Jesse Marks’ summary of Chinese military commentary on the conflict, several analysts have cautioned that AI-driven systems devoid of human oversight risk becoming blunt weapons “harming both sides.”¹⁴

As such, the Israeli commentary has framed the military operation in Iran as a testing ground and case study for modern warfare, with technology developed and tested during previous wars, including the Gaza genocide.

Israel’s Relations with the Gulf will Depend not on Iran, but Palestine

Israeli commentary devoted considerable attention to the war’s implications for Tel Aviv’s relations with Arab Gulf states affected by its military offensive, which for the first week have borne the brunt of Iranian retaliation. On the one hand, Israeli experts acknowledged that “the aggression of the Netanyahu government” may further widen the existing wedge.¹⁵ On the other hand, a widely echoed hope persists that unrestrained Iranian retaliation may ultimately place “Israel and the Arab states on the same side of the fence.”¹⁶

This expectation partly reflects the perception that Arab Gulf states’ longstanding hedging strategy toward Tehran has failed. Moreover, despite brokering the Saudi-Iranian normalization agreement three years ago, China’s unreliability in offering a security umbrella akin to that of the United States has been viewed as a potential driver for Gulf governments to further rely on Washington and, by association, consider Israel as an attractive option. For it is also in the Gulf that the intersection of U.S. security guarantees and China’s economic presence is most pronounced.

On this note, INSS Senior Researchers Eldad Shavit and Avishay Ben Sasson-Gordis argued that, given Washington’s demonstrated sensitivity “to the interests of these states over the past years,” Israel may need to seriously mobilize their support as the campaign continues, by framing its offensive as part of a broader plan to “create a more stable regional order.”¹⁷ Similar arguments had appeared in earlier analyses. In November 2025, for instance, INSS Research Associate Yuval Less had called for the establishment of a “common diplomatic front with the countries of the region – Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain – that are directly affected by Iranian activity.”¹⁸

While relations with non-normalized Arab Gulf states remain a desired objective among Israeli experts across the political spectrum, moderate voices caution that Tel Aviv’s standing in the post-war Middle East will not depend on the outcome in Iran, but ultimately, on how it will address the Palestinian issue in its aftermath and in the context of the October 2026 Israeli legislative elections.

Among them, Professor Eli Podeh from the Department of Middle Eastern Studies at the Hebrew University argued that it is the “Palestinian arena” that will determine whether “the success of the attack on Iran [will] restore Israel’s positive image that prevailed during the period of the Abraham Accord – as a military power worth cooperating with against shared threats.”¹⁹ Former Member of Knesset Ksenia Svetlova similarly contended that regional integration hinges upon a fundamental shift in Israel’s “policies toward the Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank.” Without such changes, she argues, Israel will continue to be perceived as an agent of chaos, rather than “a calculated, pragmatic, and reliable actor.”²⁰

Dr. Omer Zanany, director of the Program for Advancing Israeli–Palestinian Peace at Mitvim (The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies), reinforced the argument, noting that:

As the situation for Palestinians continues to deteriorate, “no arrangement will move forward as long as Israel’s far-right government refuses to advance the vision of two states.”²¹

Former deputy head of Israel’s National Security Council Eran Etzion captured the logic behind these debates in a recent Haaretz op-ed where he warned about the limits of a military action supported by 80.5% of Israelis across political and sectoral gaps (INSS Survey). Instead, he envisioned a post-war policy initiative in which a different Israeli government would seek neither confrontation with Iran under a new regime, nor conflict with the Palestinians and other Arab states, but “join hands with Mohammed bin Salman’s Saudi Arabia and with the pragmatic elements throughout the region.”²²

Gulf perspectives, however, diverge from this outlook. Dr. Aziz Alghashian, Professor at Naif Arab University for Security Sciences (NAUSS) in Saudi Arabia, underscored that with the continuation of the occupation and Israel’s rhetoric of territorial expansion in the region – the so-called “Greater Israel” project (which recently received support from U.S. Ambassador to Israel Mike Huckabee), “prospects of normalization are certainly dead for the foreseeable future.”²³

Dr. Ali Alsayegh, Lecturer at the Community College of Qatar, offered a similar assessment in a commentary shared with the author, contending that “the war has only exacerbated Israel’s image as the main threat to regional peace among non-normalized Gulf states, pushing normalization further into the realm of wishful thinking.” According to Alsayegh, Arab Gulf states’ “deliberate and prudent restraint” in response to Iranian aggression, rather than aligning with the American-Israeli offensive, reflects a profound distrust of Israel’s regional ambitions. He further highlights non-normalized Gulf states’ deep skepticism of Israel by stating:

“The fact that diplomatic relations exist with Iran but not with Israel sends an indirect message: while remaining wary of Tehran’s regional intentions, Gulf states see utility in diplomatic relations with Iran and believe a somewhat constructive relationship is possible. No such dynamic exists with Israel.”

Conclusion: Whither China–Middle East Relations?

This overview is far from comprehensive, as much of the Israeli debate focuses on the immediate and practical aspects of the current offensives across Iran and Lebanon. Yet, the findings of this ChinaMed Observer are consistent with earlier analyses identifying the emergence of a region-wide understanding of Beijing’s restrained diplomatic posture in the Middle East’s complex environment. While China is deeply embedded in the region economically, it remains largely absent from its security architecture.

While a more active Chinese role had been generally anticipated by observers following Beijing’s mediation of the March 2023 Saudi-Iranian rapprochement, the subsequent October 7 attack and the two-year Gaza War – along with its spillover across Lebanon, Syria, Qatar, Iran, Yemen and the Red Sea – have underscored the structural constraints in Beijing’s ability to meaningfully engage with, and de-escalate regional crises.

Israeli commentary interpreting China’s non-intervention in the current war and its marginal role in regional security dynamics ultimately echoes a position long-articulated by most China-Middle East specialists, including Professor Jonathan Fulton from Zayed University in Abu Dhabi and ChinaMed Head of Research Andrea Ghiselli. Rather than signalling a decline of Chinese influence, Beijing’s restraint may instead reflect the reality that China never intended to assume a direct security role in the Middle East – nor was such a role necessarily expected by its regional partners, including Iran and the Arab Gulf states.

In this light, the relatively limited attention devoted to China in Israeli commentary may represent a more realistic assessment grounded in a deeper understanding of Chinese foreign policy and Beijing’s (and the region’s) preference for a multipolar international order. Within such a framework, Iran’s unrestrained retaliation has only underscored the need for integrated collective defence mechanisms led by local actors, especially when the American security umbrella repeatedly failed to protect Arab Gulf states from being involved in Israel’s wars.

Under this vision, moderate voices in the Israeli debate continue to emphasize that Israel’s own path toward regional rehabilitation, before integration, will ultimately depend not on military outcomes but on addressing the longstanding Palestinian question, confronting the realities of its decades-long occupation of Palestinian and Arab lands, and meaningfully advancing toward a viable two-state solution.

**The author wishes to offer condolences to all the victims, the injured, and their families across the countries and communities impacted.**

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Amanda CHEN is a Research Fellow at the ChinaMed Project covering China’s relations with Israel and the Arab Gulf states. She is a graduate of SOAS University of London, Sciences Po Paris, and Peking University. Her interests include China–Middle East relations, conflict mediation practices, and global philanthropy, with a focus on the role of civil society in shaping these transnational processes.

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