We present again an excerpt from our forthcoming report on Israeli media coverage of China in 2024. This section showcases an overview of Israeli commentators’ perspectives on trade and technological relations with China.

As noted in the excerpt published in last week’s ChinaMed Observer, Israeli public and expert opinion toward China remained overwhelmingly negative in 2024, largely due to the prevailing perception that Beijing tacitly—or even overtly—supports Hamas and Iran. This section further explores deepening Israeli distrust toward China, particularly as Chinese technology, both military and commercial, is increasingly portrayed in the media as a threat to Israel’s security and sovereignty, whether in the hands of Arabs or Israelis.

Nevertheless, despite widespread media concerns over Chinese espionage and boycotts, there remains a rather nuanced debate among Israeli experts and government officials. Some argue that the risks of Chinese tech have been assessed and contained, while others explain China’s trade behavior as a rational response rather than due to outright hostility. A notable few Israeli analysts even maintain that Chinese goods and well-managed economic ties remain beneficial—and, to some extent, essential—for ensuring Israel’s security and stability.

Chinese Weaponry in the Middle East

During their campaign in the Gaza Strip, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) uncovered large stockpiles of Chinese-made weaponry, including advanced drones, assault rifles and automatic grenade launchers, in the possession of Hamas fighters. This discovery prompted serious questions among Israelis about whether Beijing has knowingly supplied military equipment to Palestinian militant groups.^[1] However, most informed assessments suggest that China was unaware, as an anonymous Israeli intelligence source told Maariv:

“it is likely that there is another player involved in it, and it is likely that this player is Iran. China will not like the fact that this is what the Iranians are doing with their weapons. It does not look good, and this can become a problem for them.”^[2]

The issue of the proliferation of Chinese arms in the region extends beyond Hamas. Israeli analysts have also expressed unease over reports that Egypt is seeking to acquire the Chinese J-10C stealth fighter jet. In July 2024, negotiations for a potential sale reportedly took place during a meeting between Egyptian Air Force Commander Mahmoud Fouad Abd El-Gawad and his Chinese counterpart, Chang Dingqiu (常丁求). More recent, though unverified, reports suggest that Egypt may have already received its first batch of the export variant of the J-10C, equipped with PL-15 long-range air-to-air missiles.

The possibility of Egypt and other states procuring the J-10C has raised alarm among Israelis, particularly due to longstanding allegations regarding the aircraft’s origins. According to reporting by The Sunday Times, the J-10C is based on the IAI Lavi, an Israeli fighter jet developed with U.S. funding but canceled in 1987. The report claims that Israel transferred the Lavi’s design—including its American technology—to China, a claim that Israeli officials have denied.

Military analyst Udi Etzion, writing for Walla!, warned that the introduction of the J-10C into Egypt’s arsenal could significantly undermine Israel’s air superiority in the region.^[3] Until now, Israel has been the only Middle Eastern country operating stealth fighters, specifically the F-35I, a variant of the U.S.-made Lockheed Martin F-35.

Israel’s strategic advantage has long been reinforced by American efforts to restrict the proliferation of the most advanced military technology in the region. Washington has consistently pressured Middle Eastern partners to avoid purchasing major Chinese and Russian weapons systems, and has frustrated attempts by countries such as Türkiye and the UAE to procure the F-35. However, rapidly growing dissatisfaction with the Trump administration may push Middle Eastern states—which have so far used the prospect of Chinese weapons deals most likely as leverage in negotiations with Washington—to follow through with these acquisitions, potentially threatening Israel’s longstanding military technological dominance in the region.

Growing Distrust of Chinese Tech

Beyond military hardware, the strengthening military ties between China and Middle Eastern actors have raised serious concerns among Israeli cybersecurity experts, particularly regarding the security risks of imported Chinese goods.^[4] The most critical voices have even called for a general boycott of Chinese technology, especially in the wake of Israel’s “pager attack” in September 2024.

During this operation, booby-trapped pagers and walkie-talkies intended for Hezbollah members exploded, resulting in 42 deaths and over 3,500 injuries across Lebanon, the majority of whom were civilians. Although Tel Aviv claimed responsibility, the attack demonstrated for many Israelis the potential vulnerability of commercial electronic devices and may have set a precedent for similar future attacks, including those potentially targeting Israelis.

For this reason, Nadir Izrael, co-founder and CTO of Armis, a U.S.-Israeli cybersecurity firm, advised that, just as the U.S. government has placed bans on the purchase of Chinese equipment, Israel should similarly avoid integrating Chinese technology into its critical systems.^[5] Likewise, in response to the provision of 550 Chinese Chery Tiggo 8 Pro cars to IDF officers, Dr. Harel Menashri, a founder of the Shin Bet’s cyber division and currently the Head of Cyber at the Holon Institute of Technology, warned of the risks posed by allowing Chinese-made vehicles, equipped with their many sensors, onto Israeli military bases, adding that: “I know of almost no Chinese technology that doesn’t transmit [data back to China].”^[6]

These concerns over Chinese tech are well-reported across the Israeli media, with articles frequently highlighting how both Washington and Beijing have taken steps to mitigate potential espionage risks—for example, China’s restrictions on Teslas entering security facilities.

For instance, Globes has repeatedly discussed the security risks associated with the IDF, the police and other Israeli security agencies purchasing tens of thousands of Chinese-made cameras, drones, and electric vehicles.^[7] Additionally, due to a shortage of drones at the outset of the war in Gaza, it is noted that many Israeli reservists have relied upon commercially available Chinese drones, either purchased independently or received through donations.

In response, the IDF has clarified that the most advanced Israeli-made drones are now being reserved for military forces and that local companies are ramping up drone production capacity. Moreover, all Chinese drones undergo a “sterilization” process to prevent communication with their original manufacturers.^[8] A similar sterilization process is applied to Chinese vehicles, according to a military source cited by Walla!, ensuring that they do not transmit information to external entities.^[9] Soldiers are also prohibited from discussing classified topics while driving, and Chinese vehicles have been banned from the most sensitive military bases.

For its part, the Shin Bet—the agency responsible for countering foreign espionage in Israel—does not own any Chinese-made vehicles. However, Israel’s Ministry of Finance, which oversees government vehicle procurement, clarified that “as of today, no instructions have been received from the authorized bodies in the country regarding the use of Chinese vehicles.”^[10] Thus, despite widespread concern in the media, the Israeli establishment appears to believe that its current measures sufficiently mitigate potential threats.

However, the Israeli media debate on Chinese technology is far from one-sided. While security concerns are frequently raised, there is also recognition of the practical advantages Chinese products offer. Chinese drones have proven to be a useful stopgap for the IDF in the war in Gaza, and Chinese electric vehicles continue to attract Israeli consumers. As reported by Xinhua, BYD’s Atto 3 was the top-selling car in Israel in 2024, according to data from the Israel Vehicle Importers Association. Indeed, Chinese automakers dominated Israel’s EV market, accounting for 68.69% of total sales in 2024, with 46,137 units sold.

Another sector dominated by China is green energy, where Chinese-manufactured solar panels have largely captured the Israeli market. While concerns about potential security risks exist here as well, Israeli industry experts offered a measured perspective.

Moshe (Moshiko) Hassan, head of research at the Israeli cybersecurity firm Upwind, noted that although “China is everywhere in the Western world, they almost never carry out destructive attacks such as disabling the power grid or harming the masses.”^[11] Similarly, Shalev Julio, from Dream Security, a company specializing in protecting critical government infrastructure, emphasized that cybersecurity vulnerabilities exist in nearly all modern technologies, regardless of their country of origin.^[12]

Beijing’s “Silent” Boycott of Israel

Despite calls from some Israelis to boycott Chinese technology, it appears that China has itself restricted its tech exports to Israel. Since the outbreak of the war in Gaza, Israeli manufacturers have reported increasing difficulties in importing components from China.^[13]

An investigation by Globes revealed that, according to a document Israel received on December 17, 2023, “in light of the war, Chinese customs wished to delay the export to Israel of customs items classified in chapters 84 and 85, so that they will not be used by the IDF in the war effort.”^[14] These restricted items include various dual-use technologies—products primarily intended for civilian purposes but also applicable to military production—ranging from nuclear reactors and boilers to sound recorders and TV accessories.

Israeli importers have characterized the situation as an “Italian strike,” in which, despite the absence of an official sanctions, Chinese suppliers have been deliberately slowing operations by introducing bureaucratic hurdles and delaying shipments, with COSCO Shipping, the world’s largest shipping company, announcing it would completely suspend service to Israeli ports.^[15] In response, some Israeli companies have been attempting to circumvent these restrictions by rerouting imports through third parties in “non-sanctioned” countries, though this has significantly increased costs and extended delivery times.

These challenges have reinforced suspicions in Israel of a “silent boycott” by China, with many interpreting the growing difficulties as evidence of Beijing’s increasing diplomatic hostility. This perspective is also present within the Israeli government. An Israeli government source told Ynet:

“In all the checks we have made with [Chinese] official bodies, it is not about a change in regulations, but about enforcement that has not been done in the past. We are concerned that strict enforcement is being implemented because we are in a state of war. We have contacted the Chinese and their official response is that there is no change in policy. It is clear to all of us that this has a direct connection to the war.”^[16]

A business insider from the drone industry explained to Globes that “Chinese restrictions are just part of a process that is already taking place,” noting that Beijing is expected to announce additional measures this year to limit the export of dual-use components to Western markets (of which they consider Israel to be part of) in response to EU and U.S. sanctions.^[17]

Despite the record-breaking sales of Chinese vehicles in Israel, local car importers have also expressed concern that this so-called silent boycott could disrupt their thriving business ties with Chinese suppliers. A senior figure in the Israeli automotive industry told Walla! that while “the Chinese know how to separate politics and business,”^[18] maintaining ties with Israel is increasingly becoming a reputational liability:

“There is a clear attempt by Chinese manufacturers to lower their media profile, avoid publishing sales achievements in Israel and not to report on the signing of new export contracts with Israelis.”^[19]

The source did not rule out the possibility of further barriers and restrictions, especially if EU tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles discourage Chinese manufacturers from developing models suited for Israel, which often serves as a testing ground for automotive companies looking to enter the European market.^[20]

However, Globes’ Dubi Ben-Gedalyahu painted a more nuanced perspective, arguing that a “silent boycott” is not new in the industry. Even Japanese manufacturers, he pointed out, avoid overt presence in Israel to prevent backlash from Arab markets. Regarding security concerns over Chinese exports, he argued that frictions with Beijing over Gaza are unlikely to harm Chinese firms’ profits in Israel, as their competitive pricing and the trust they have with veteran Israeli importers largely offsets most consumer concerns.^[21]

As such, despite the widely reported restrictions imposed by China and the sharp decline in trade in 2023, the demand for continued economic cooperation appears strong as Chinese goods continue to reach Israel through available shipping channels. Some Israeli experts have even argued that maintaining economic engagement in the face of mounting political tensions serves Israeli national interests.

Galia Lavi, Deputy Director of the Glazer of the Israel-China Policy Center at the Institute for National Security Studies, emphasized that given China’s economic significance, “maintaining cooperation with a sober perspective is an Israeli interest and the key to a successful and secure relationship.” However, she also stressed that this does not mean Israel should avoid criticizing Beijing, adding that "the State of Israel should even consider appropriate diplomatic ways […] even if only symbolic” to counter China’s perceived anti-Israel stance.^[22]

Conclusion

In 2024, the Israeli press devoted considerable attention to trade and technological ties with China, especially as Beijing is increasingly perceived as aligned with Tel Aviv’s adversaries. Amid heightened concerns over Israel’s national security and fears of international isolation, media discussions have explored the possibility of China supplying arms to Palestinian groups and Arab states, using its consumer electronic exports for espionage or warfare, or engaging in a boycott of Israeli markets.

While some Israeli experts acknowledged these possibilities, many have pushed back against what they consider alarmist narratives. Government representatives have sought to explain the measures taken to mitigate the risks associated with Chinese products. Other industry experts have contextualized Chinese trade restrictions or defended trade with China, emphasizing how it serves Israel’s national interests.

Given that trade is often seen as a cornerstone of ties with Beijing and that China has become, and will likely remain, an essential partner in many economic sectors, it is understandable that many Israelis view China as a crucial economic partner. Thus, in 2025, as the Trump administration launches the first salvo of a global trade war, it will be interesting to observe whether the Israeli government can maintain what many see as a necessary trade partnership with China while also courting increasingly vital American diplomatic and military support.

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Amanda CHEN is a Research Fellow at the ChinaMed Project. She is also a graduate student of the Sciences Po-Peking University Dual Master’s Degree in International Relations. Her research interests include Chinese diplomacy in the Middle East and broader China-Middle East relations.

Leonardo BRUNI is the Project Officer and a Research Fellow at the ChinaMed Project. He is also a Research Fellow at the University of Turin and a graduate of the Sciences Po-Peking University Dual Master’s Degree in International Relations. His research interests include China-EU relations and Chinese foreign policy in the wider Mediterranean region.