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Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni is set to embark on her first trip to China since taking office in October 2022. Although invited by Chinese President Xi Jinping back in November 2022 during the G20 Summit in Bali, it has taken nearly two years for Meloni to make the journey to the People’s Republic. This delay is likely due to recent developments in Sino-Italian relations, most notably the Italian PM’s decision to withdraw Italy from the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
While Beijing and Rome have seemingly successfully navigated the BRI issue by reaffirming their comprehensive strategic partnership as the new foundation of their relationship, another matter in the background is Italy’s growing ties with Taiwan. Prior to getting elected, Meloni gave an interview to the Taiwanese press affirming her support for Taipei. Moreover, Italy, like other EU member states, has become increasingly interested in the Indo-Pacific region and cross-Strait relations, particularly after the victory of Lai Ching-te, the chairman of the China-skeptic Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), in the 2024 Taiwanese presidential elections.
In this edition of the ChinaMed Observer, we examine the press coverage from both Italy and Taiwan, exploring Italian and Taiwanese perspectives on Lai’s presidency, the prospect of maintaining peace across the Taiwan Strait, and the potential of Italo-Taiwanese collaboration in the diplomatic, economic, and cultural spheres.
Overall, although it is clear that the relations between Italy and Taiwan may not be a top priority for either side, both Italian and Taiwanese media have a positive outlook on the developing Italo-Taiwanese relationship. This is despite several Italian analysts voicing concerns that Meloni might be shifting her focus away from Taiwan to foster a stable relationship with China and some Taiwanese commentators worrying that close alignment with the controversial far-right Italian PM might strain relations with the US Democrats and the European Union.
Representatives of fifteen EU member states, including Italy, attended Lai Ching-te’s presidential inauguration on May 20, 2024. The Italian delegation was led by Gian Marco Centinaio, Vice President of the Italian Senate and a member of the right-wing Lega Nord party. He was accompanied by fellow Vice President of the Italian Senate Licia Ronzulli and senator Daniela Ternullo, both from the center-right party Forza Italia.
During their stay in Taipei, Centinaio’s comments were reported on by the Central News Agency (CNA), Taiwan’s state-sponsored news agency. For Centinaio, Lai’s inaugural speech “expressed the important signal of peace.” He also praised the new Taiwanese president’s emphasis on the value of democracy and affirmed that Italy can play a crucial role in conveying the importance of Taiwan to other European states. Moreover, he advocated that Rome adopt a firmer stance toward Beijing, stating “Italian diplomatic policy cannot be dictated by other countries, especially China.”[1]
The Italian press also offered some coverage of Lai Ching-te’s inauguration, with most articles emphasizing Taiwan’s strategic role in the escalating rivalry between the US and China, and Beijing’s claims over the self-governing island.[2] Italian interest in Taiwan’s “geopolitical” relevance was evident in the extensive reporting on the large-scale military exercises conducted by the People’s Liberation Army around the island following Lai’s inauguration, described as “the biggest and closest exercises ever held near Taiwan.”[3]
Italian journalists also delved into Lai’s background, political positions, and, most importantly for the Italian press, how he is perceived by Beijing, which has labeled him as a "troublemaker" and “dangerous secessionist.”[4] Lorenzo Lamperti, a Taipei-based journalist, highlighted the disputes and differing stances between the “unpredictable” Lai and his more moderate predecessor Tsai Ing-wen.[5] While Lai has in the past often expressed support for a formal declaration of independence—a red line for Beijing—Tsai has deemed such a move unnecessary, arguing that Taiwan is already de facto independent. However, for Lamperti, while “one can expect some rhetorical excesses and an increased use of symbolic messages,” he argued that it is likely that Lai will maintain Tsai’s cautious approach and maybe even reopen dialogue with Beijing.[6]
However, despite the presence of the Italian delegation, there was minimal analysis in the Italian media on Italo-Taiwanese relations and Rome’s potential role in cross-Strait relations. Italian commentators largely focused on what the “international community” could collectively do to ensure stability across the Taiwan Strait.
Writing for la Repubblica, Gianni Vernetti, former Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs under the center-left Prodi government (2006-08), placed the Italian delegation in the context of the significant international attendance at Lai’s inauguration.[7] According to Vernetti, the presence of delegations from Europe, the US, Japan and Taiwan’s “diplomatic allies” marks “the end of [Taiwan’s] international isolation” and:
“[…] challenges Beijing’s narrative of ‘one China’ by making it clear that there are two Chinas: a larger, totalitarian China that increasingly struggles to present itself as a responsible global actor, and a smaller, democratic China—Taiwan—which is ever more integrated into the community of democracies and the global economy.”[8]
Giulia Pompili, a journalist for the Asia desk at the Atlanticist liberal-right newspaper Il Foglio, offered a rare analysis of the Italian delegation to Taiwan.[9] She noted that, although the delegation included representatives from various parties within Giorgia Meloni’s governing center-right coalition, none were from Meloni’s own far-right party, Fratelli d’Italia (FdI). This is now a developing pattern given that a year earlier, a planned trip to Taiwan by the Italy-Taiwan Parliamentary Friendship Group, led by FdI Senator Lucio Malan and predominantly composed of FdI members, was abruptly canceled at the last minute.[10]
Pompili suggested that the absence of FdI representatives is connected to Meloni’s trip to China and her efforts to balance diplomatic relations between Washington, Brussels, and Beijing. For example, Italy’s departure from the BRI signal to Washington that:
“we are no longer the soft underbelly of Europe in terms of Beijing's propaganda and predatory business practices.”[11]
However, Pompili also observed that “everything China has requested in exchange for not retaliating against Italy’s mild hostility has been granted” from hosting China-Italy business events to abstentions on votes against China within the EU.[12]
One of the few other journalists to cover the Italian delegation to Lai’s inauguration was Gabriele Carrer, writing for the Atlanticist news outlet Formiche. In his article, he interviewed Centinaio who affirmed that:
“It is essential that the government at least upholds the status quo. Meloni, before becoming Prime Minister, spoke of respecting the status quo and of Taiwan as a country. I hope she hasn't changed her mind.” [13]
Centinaio also highlighted the need to ensure regional safety and peace, noting that any cross-Strait conflict would have disastrous economic and geopolitical repercussions, also for the West. Carrer supported this view, writing:
“Consider the semiconductor sector, for instance: the world, and especially Europe, is not prepared for a naval blockade and its impact on the chip industry, given Taiwan's central role in the production process and the importance of chips in daily life.”[14]
Analyzing the Italo-Taiwanese relationship from an economic perspective is commonplace across the Italian media, with the island’s integral role in global value chains not going unnoticed.
The Taiwanese press had also shown interest in Italy’s potential role ensuring regional stability, having paid some attention to Rome’s position on cross-Strait issues for quite some time. Already back in July 2022, CNA reported on the visit of Stefano Stefanini (former Diplomatic Advisor to Italian President Giorgio Napolitano), highlighting his remarks that “a Taiwan contingency is a global contingency.”[15]
Similarly, Giorgia Meloni’s interview with CNA during her successful electoral campaign for the Italian general elections attracted the attention of Taiwanese media.[16] Her comments, which described Taiwan as a “strategic trading partner,” criticized Beijing’s military coercion against Taipei, and advocated for the EU to press China to maintain the status quo, were well received. This led Taiwanese commentators to perceive Meloni as aligning with the Atlanticist world, which has shown stronger support for Taiwan in recent years. It is in this context that the Taiwanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs publicly praised Italy as being one of the like-minded countries resisting authoritarian expansion.[17]
This has led Taiwanese media to generally view the Meloni government and her foreign policy quite positively, a perception further reinforced by Centinaio’s visit in June 2023. According to CNA reporter Chen Youwei, Centinaio acknowledged that “what the Taiwanese fear is to be abandoned, like Afghanistan.”[18] Chen, in another article, interpreted the arrival of the Italian offshore patrol vessel Francesco Morosini in Japan as a symbol of Italy's commitment to stability in the Indo-Pacific region.[19]
Jian Hengyu, a reporter for major online independent media outlet Storm Media, also noted Centinaio’s visit and his comments reaffirming his commitment to promoting the support of democracies like Taiwan. For Centinaio, Taiwan, like Ukraine, deserves international support and called on Taiwanese to help Europeans better understand how they could assist Taiwan effectively.[20]
However, not all Taiwanese commentators were eager to embrace Italian support. Zheng Jieyi, an investigative reporter from one of Taiwan’s most acclaimed online media outlets, The Reporter, warned about the potential consequences of aligning with Meloni, who has faced criticism across the West for her party’s refusal to completely disavow its fascist origins. As Zheng explained:
“While the US’ Democratic Party is wary of Meloni, the EU establishment is even more suspicious of her [...] Germany and France are concerned that engaging with her might legitimize their own domestic far-right forces [...] Although, befriending Italy could encourage the EU to be more supportive of Taiwan, Taiwan must also beware of the problems Meloni’s complicated associations might bring.”[21]
The Italian press has also noted Italy’s recent efforts to bolster its presence in the Indo-Pacific, in particular Rome’s decision to deploy the aircraft carrier Cavour—the flagship of the Italian Navy—along with its strike group, a fleet of F-35 fighter jets, and the training ship Vespucci to the region.[22] Although these vessels did not transit the Taiwan Strait, they did participate in the US-led RIMPAC (Rim of the Pacific) 2024, the world’s largest naval exercise.
Many Italian analysts described this deployment as a sign of Italy’s commitment to the stability of the Indo-Pacific, freedom of navigation, and regional partners concerned about China’s assertiveness.[23] However, other observers suggested alternative motives, such as promoting and selling Italian military equipment.[24] Others still interpreted the deployment as an effort by the Meloni government to strengthen its Atlanticist credentials and align more closely with Washington’s efforts to rally its seemingly recalcitrant European allies in countering the threat posed by China.[25]
However, overall media coverage of the naval mission has been relatively subdued. According to her sources, Giulia Pompili reports that this is due to the Italian government intentional downplaying the deployment’s visibility ahead of Meloni’s visit to Beijing. According to Pompili, Rome is attempting:
“to get through Meloni’s visit to Beijing [...] without overly publicizing any Italian positions that are too aligned with those of America and its allies, and thus avoid provoking tensions with China—such as by not sending a congratulatory message to the new Taiwanese president, Lai Ching-te, for example [...]).”[26]
Despite Meloni appearing to sacrifice her pledge to strengthen relations with Taipei in favor of stable relations with Beijing, the reality is that Italy and Taiwan have significantly deepened their diplomatic, economic, and cultural ties in recent years, something which has not gone unnoticed by certain analysts in both countries.
For instance, in 2022 the Italy-Taiwan Scientific Exchange Association (ITASEA) was established to leverage Italy’s expertise in biotechnology, medicine, and electronic engineering alongside Taiwan’s advancements in ICT, electronics, and green energy.[27] It is within this context that Vincent Y.C. Tsai, Taiwan’s representative to Italy, highlighted that Taipei is closely following the growth of Italo-Taiwanese technological and economic collaboration.
Diplomatic relations have also seen notable improvements. While Italian delegations to Taiwan were once infrequent, recent years have witnessed several Italian parliamentary visits to the island. Moreover, in June 2023, Taiwanese Foreign Minister Joseph Wu met with Italian parliamentarians during his visit to Italy, and a new Taiwanese representative office opened in Milan in October 2023.[28]
Turning to economic relations, Italy ranked as Taiwan’s fourth-largest trading partner within the EU in 2023, behind Germany, the Netherlands, and France, with bilateral trade reaching approximately US$6 billion.[29] Meanwhile, Italian investments in Taiwan totaled US$7.4 million that year, while Taiwanese investments in Italy amounted to US$193.6 million across four projects.[30]
However, Taiwanese investment in semiconductor manufacturing—an area where Taiwan is a global leader—has been notably scarce. Despite Italy’s efforts to attract Taiwanese investment in this ever-increasingly strategic sector, including reports by Bloomberg suggesting that Italy might have offered to exit the BRI in exchange for such investments, interest from Taiwanese semiconductor firms in Italy has so far been minimal. The notable exception is GlobalWafers, which has invested in a facility of Memc Electronic Materials (formerly Montecatini Group) in Novara, Piedmont.[31] This facility is set to produce 300-millimeter silicon wafers. Marco Sciamanna, the plant's general manager, highlighted the importance of this investment, as it supports the broader goal of relocating chip production to Europe.[32]
Beyond semiconductors, Italy aims to strengthen economic ties with Taiwan in other sectors. Representative Tsai noted that Italian luxury goods, renowned for their heritage, have significant potential for growth in the Taiwanese market. He added that in the wake of Rome’s exit from the BRI, Italian companies could find a welcome alternative in Taiwan.[33]
The Taiwanese press (the Italian media not so much) has also been active in covering Taiwan's increasing involvement in Italy’s numerous internationally famous cultural events—support that Taipei has actively facilitated through its government agencies and MOUs. These events include the Bologna Children’s Book Fair, the Venice Biennale, the Milan Furniture Fair, and Milan Design Week.[34] Notably, at the Venice Film Festival in 2023, Taiwanese filmmaker Lee Hong-chi gained significant recognition with his debut film, Love Is a Gun, which won the Lion of the Future Award.
Our analysis reveals a generally optimistic view from both Italian and Taiwanese media regarding the Italo-Taiwanese relationship, even though it is not a top priority for either country. Rome is focused on balancing its relationships with the EU, US, and China, while Taipei is grappling with a significant domestic political crisis. Both Italian and Taiwanese commentators hope Italy will become more actively involved in the Indo-Pacific, including a through potential military presence, despite some Italian analysts worrying that Rome may be deprioritizing the region to appease Beijing.
In terms of economic cooperation, both Taiwanese and Italian media express interest in developing trade and investment relations further, with Italian commentators expressing particularly keen desire for Taiwanese semiconductor investments, something which, Taiwanese officials and commentators have not shown any interest in so far. Meanwhile, in the field of art and culture, Taiwan’s eagerness to engage in Italian cultural events has yet to generate substantial interest in Taiwanese culture from the Italian media and commentators.
Anja DUVNJAK is Research Fellow at the ChinaMed Project. She is also a graduate of the University of Turin-Zhejiang University Dual Degree in International Relations and China Studies, and holds a B.A. in Asian Languages, Cultures and Markets from the University of Bologna. Her research focuses on the relations between China and the Balkans.
LIANG Chia-Yu has just received his PhD in International Relations from the University of Sussex. His research interests include Chinese politics, cross-Strait relations, Comparative Political Theory, International Relations Theory, and Global IR. He is a research fellow at the Academy for Contextual Theologies in Taiwan, and a guest speaker at the Eurac Research Institution.
[1] Guo Wuhuang, Yìdàlì cān yuàn fù yìzhǎng: Lài zǒngtǒng jiùzhí yǎnshuō fāchū chóng yào hépíng xùnhào, zhōngyāngshè 義大利參院副議長：賴總統就職演說發出重要和平訊號, 中央社 [Italian Vice President of the Senate: Lai’s Inaugural Speeh Delivered Important Message of Peace], Central News Agency, May 21, 2024, link.
[2] Guido Santevecchi, Il discorso inaugurale del presidente di Taiwan: «Dialogo e pace». Ma Pechino: «Inganno separatista, incita allo scontro» [The inaugural speech of the president of Taiwan: “Dialogue and peace”. But Beijing: “Separatist deception, incites conflict”], Corriere della Sera, May 20, 2024, link;
Gianluca Modolo, Taiwan, Lai Ching-te ha giurato da presidente. Messaggio a Pechino: “Basta con le intimidazioni politiche e militari”. La Cina: “Invia segnali pericolosi” [Taiwan, Lai Ching-te sworn in as president. Message to Beijing: "Enough with political and military intimidation." China: “Sends dangerous signals”], la Repubblica, May 20, 2024, link.
[3] Gianluca Modolo, Navi e aerei militari cinesi circondano Taiwan, prove di assedio dopo l’insediamento del nuovo presidente: “Puniremo gli indipendentisti" [Chinese ships and military planes surround Taiwan, simulating a blockade after the inauguration of the new president: "We will punish the separatists"], la Repubblica, May 23, 2024, link;
Luca Miele, La Cina «assedia» Taiwan [China "besieges" Taiwan], Avvenire, May 24, 2024, link;
Lorenzo Lamperti, Avvio burrascoso per Lai Ching-te: l’obiettivo status quo si complica [Stormy start for Lai Ching-te: the status quo objective becomes more complicated], Eastwest.eu, May 27, 2024, link.
[4] Il primo giorno di Lai Ching-te come presidente di Taiwan [Lai Ching-te's first day as president of Taiwan], Il Foglio, May 21, 2024, link.
[5] Lorenzo Lamperti, Chi è Lai Ching-te, il nuovo presidente di Taiwan [Who is Lai Ching-te, the new president of Taiwan], Wired Italia, May 18, 2024, link.
[6] Ibid.
[7] Gianni Vernetti, Taiwan, Lai Ching-Te's inauguration ceremony marks the end of international isolation [Taiwan, Lai Ching-Te's inauguration ceremony marks the end of international isolation], la Repubblica, May 20, 2024, link.
[8] Ibid.
[9] Giulia Pompili, Putin e Xi, l'alleanza anti occidente. A luglio Meloni in Cina [Putin and Xi, the anti-Western alliance. In July Meloni in China], Il Foglio, May 17, 2024, link.
[10] Michelangelo Cocco & Vanessa Ricciardi, Il giallo della missione di Fratelli d’Italia a Taiwan: il viaggio salta all’ultimo [The mystery of the mission of Fratelli d’Italia to Taiwan: the trip is cancalled at the last minute], Domani, April 11, 2023, link.
[11] Giulia Pompili, Putin and Xi, the anti-Western alliance. In July Meloni in China.
[12] Ibid.
[13] Gabriele Carrer, Il G7 italiano si preoccupi di Taiwan. L’appello di Centinaio (Lega) da Taipei [Italy's G7 should be concerned about Taiwan. The appeal from Centinaio (Lega) in Taipei], Formiche, May 20, 2024, link.
[14] Ibid.
[15] You, Kai-xiang, Yóu Kǎixiáng, ‘yìdà lì qián zǒngtǒng wàijiāo gùwèn: Táiwān yǒushì jiùshì quánqiú yǒushì’ 游凱翔, ‘義大利前總統外交顧問：台灣有事就是全球有事’ [You Kai-iang, ‘Former Diplomatic Advisor to the President of Italy: If something happens to Taiwan, it means something will happen to the world’] Central News Agency, July 7, 2022, link.
[16] Zhèng Jiéyì, fàxīsī shàonǚ dào yìdà lì zuì tǐng tái lǐngxiù, táiwān réng xū xiǎoxīn `shuāng miàn Méiluòní de jiāoyǒu xiànjǐng,鄭傑憶, 法西斯少女到義大利最挺台領袖，台灣仍需小心「雙面梅洛尼」的交友陷阱 [From a fascist girl to Italy’s most pro-Taiwan leader, Taiwan still needs to be careful of the “double-faced Meloni” dating trap], The Reporter, October 10, 2022, link.
[17] Liu Yuqiu, Liú Yùqiū, ‘méi luò ní kěndìng táiwān shì zhànlüè huǒbàn wàijiāo bù: Tái yì gòng kàng wēiquán kuòzhāng xiépò’ 劉玉秋, ‘梅洛尼肯定台灣是戰略夥伴 外交部：台義共抗威權擴張脅迫’ [Liu Yuqiu, Meloni Affirms Taiwan’s Role as Strategic Partner; Taiwan’s MoFA: Taiwan and Italy Resist the Expansion of Authoritarian Regimes Together] Radio Taiwan International, October 25, 2022, link.
[18] Chen Youwei, Chén Yōuwěi, ‘yìdàlì cānyìyuàn fù yìzhǎng: Táiwān mínzhǔ bǎolěi xūyào bèi bǎowèi’ 陳攸瑋, ‘義大利參議院副議長：台灣民主堡壘需要被保衛’[Chen Youwei, ‘Italian Vice-President of Senate: Taiwan as a Bulwark of Democracy Must Be Defended’] Central News Agency, June 22, 2023, link.
[19] Chen Youwei, Chén Yōuwěi, ‘Yìdàlì jūnjiàn zhì Yìn-tài xùnliàn xúnluó Zhīchí Táihǎi wéichí xiànzhuàng’,《Zhōngyāng shè》陳攸瑋, ‘義大利軍艦至印太訓練巡邏 支持台海維持現狀’, 中央社 [Chen Youwei, ‘Italian warship conduct training patrols in the Indo-Pacific - Supporting the Status Quo across the Taiwan Strait’] Central News Agency, June 23, 2023, link.
[20] Jian Hengyu, Jiǎn Héngyǔ, ‘lè jiàn gèng duō tái wān zhèng zhì rén wù fǎng yì ！Yìdàlì cān yì yuàn fù yì zhǎng ：ōu zhōu bù néng zhī tǐng wū kè lán ér bù gù tái wān’ 簡恒宇, ‘樂見更多台灣政治人物訪義！義大利參議院副議長：歐洲不能只挺烏克蘭而不顧台灣’ [Jian Hengyu, ‘Pleased to See More Taiwanese Politicians Visiting Italy! Italian Vice-President of the Senate: Europe Cannot Forsake Taiwan by Limiting Its Support to Ukraine’], Storm Media, June 19, 2023, link.
[21] Zheng Jieyi, Zheng Jieyi, a fascist girl went to Italy to support Taiwan’s leader, Taiwan still needs to be careful of the dating trap of “double-faced Meloni”.
[22] Meloni, l’Italia sempre più presente nell’Indo-Pacifico [Meloni, Italy ever more present in the Indo-Pacific], ANSA, February 5, 2024, link
[23] Gianluca Di Feo, Manovre dell’altro mondo: ora la Marina italiana fa rotta sull’Oceano Pacifico [Maneuvers from another world: now the Italian Navy is heading for the Pacific Ocean], la Repubblica, June 28, 2024, link.
[24] Nicola V. Stellini, Significato e opportunità della missione del Cavour in Indo Pacifico [Meaning and opportunities of the Cavour’s mission to the Indo-Pacific], Formiche, July 2, 2024, link.
[25] Paolo Mastrolilli, Messaggio a Pechino: le navi militari italiane in rotta per il Pacifico [Message to Beijing: Italian military ships en route to the Pacific], La Repubblica, April 22, 2023 link
[26] Giulia Pompili, Il Cavour salpa per l'Indo-Pacifico, ma zitto zitto. Meloni non vuole irritare la Cina [The Cavour sets sail for the Indo-Pacific, but quietly. Meloni doesn't want to irritate China], Il Foglio, May 29, 2023, link.
[27] Zhou Yongjie, Yì-Tái kēxué jiāoliú xiéhuì chénglì shēnhuà kējì jiāoliú 義台科學交流協會成立 深化科技交流 [Italian-Taiwan Scientific Exchange Association Founded, Deepening Scientific Exchange], Central News Agency, Feburary 25, 2022, link.
[28] Giulia Pompili, Il fattore Taiwan mobilita il centrodestra italiano [The Taiwan Factor Mobilizes the Italian Center-Right], Il Foglio, June 20, 2023 link
[29] Data from Taipei Representative Office in Italy
[30] Data from Taipei Representative Office in Italy
[31] Marcello Giordani, Memc annuncia investimenti per 300 milioni nel sito di Novara [Memc announces 300 million investment in Novara site], La Stampa, February 18, 2022, link.
[32] Filomena Greco, Memc, a Novara fabbrica per le “fette” di silicio [Memc, a factory for silicon “wafers” in Novara], Corriere della Sera, February 23, 2022, link.
[33] Taiwan: amb. Tsai, Molto apprezzata e chiara posizione di Roma su stretto [Taiwan: Amb. Tsai, Rome's clear and highly appreciated position on the Strait], Giornale Diplomatico, December 14, 2023 link.
[34] Qiánjìn MIA Wén-cè-yuàn shǒudù bùjú Yìdàlì zuìdà yǐngshì shìchǎng zhǎn 前進MIA 文策院首度佈局義大利最大影視市場展 ‘To MIA: TAICCA Participating in Italy’s Biggest Audo-Visual Industry Exhibition for the First Time], Taiwan Creative Content Agency, October 15, 2021, link;
Yìdàlì bōlóngnà értóng shūzhǎn Táiwān-guǎn: Táiwān gùshì dǎo shǎnyào Bōlóngnà 義大利波隆那兒童書展臺灣館: 台灣故事島 閃耀波隆那’, 財團法人台灣書展基金會 [Taiwan Stand at the Bologna Children’s Book Fair: Taiwan the Story Island Shines at Bologna], Taiwan Book Fair Foundation, April, 8, 2024, link;
Tái-Yì wénhuà jiāoliú “dāng liǎnggè hǎiyáng zài Bōlóngnà xiàngyù” Tái-Yì liánzhǎn zài Yìdàlì kǎogǔ bówùguǎn zhòngbáng dēngchǎng 臺義文化交流「當兩個海洋在波隆那相遇」 臺義聯展在義大利考古博物館重磅登場 [Taiwan-Italy Cultural Exchange: “When Two Oceans Converge at Bologna” - Taiwan-Italian Joint Exhibition Open at Italian Archaeological Museum], Ministry of Culture, April 17, 2024, link;
Kai Lun, Tái-Yì guānxì fàngdàjìng: Yìdàlì rúhé zài yìshù, wénhuà, jīngmào hézuò miànxiàng yǒu Tái?, 臺義關係放大鏡：義大利如何在藝術、文化、經貿合作面向友臺？ [Taiwan-Italian Relations under Magnifier: How Italy Can Strength Its Support for Taiwan in Art, Culture and Economic Cooperations?], Crossing, April 21, link.
