On November 21, 2024, Xi Jinping, returning from his state visit to Brazil for the G20 Summit, made an unexpected landing in Casablanca. Officially described in the Chinese readout as a “technical stopover,” the Chinese President was welcomed at the airport by Crown Prince Moulay Hassan and Prime Minister Aziz Akhannouch. Brief meetings were held before Xi departed the following day.

Major international news outlets discussed Xi’s stopover within the context of China’s expanding investments in Morocco, particularly in the energy and infrastructure sectors. The timing of this visit also drew attention, as it came shortly after Donald Trump’s victory in the 2024 U.S. presidential elections.

In this edition of the ChinaMed Observer, we explore Moroccan press coverage of China’s economic presence in Morocco and analyze how Xi Jinping’s visit has been portrayed by local media outlets. Our analysis reveals that although the Moroccan press often echo European narratives that portray Chinese investments as a pragmatic or even opportunistic attempt to circumvent EU tariffs, local news outlets also celebrate the potential benefits these investments could bring to the Kingdom. These include enhancing infrastructure and fostering industrialization in emerging sectors. Nevertheless, Moroccan engagement with China, including Xi’s visit, is carefully framed as one part of Rabat’s broader strategy of foreign policy diversification, rather than alignment with Beijing—especially as Morocco braces for the second Trump administration.

Economic Cooperation: Opportunity in Opportunism

In mid-November, Chinese engineering firm China Gezhouba secured a USD 225 million contract to construct viaducts for the Kenitra-Marrakech high-speed rail line. This contract represents the ninth of ten packages into which the project has been divided and marks the fifth successfully secured by a Chinese company.

Interestingly, the largely state-controlled Moroccan media landscape has moved away from framing the rail project as a competition between China and France—a competition France appeared to be losing.^[1] This narrative was particularly prominent a couple years ago when the initial contracts were mostly being awarded to Chinese firms, excluding French companies such as SNCF, which had played a key role in constructing Morocco’s first high-speed rail line.

One possible explanation for this shift is the growing involvement of French companies in the current phase of the project. GTR (a subsidiary of the French civil engineering firm COLAS), in consortium with the Moroccan STAM/VIAS, secured the contract for the third package of the project, while French railway manufacturer Alstom will supply 18 high-speed trains for the line.

Another factor may be the recent improvement in Franco-Moroccan relations. France has recognized Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara, following an unsuccessful attempt at rapprochement with Algeria that contributed to straining ties between Paris and Rabat. Despite these developments, the French press remains skeptical of China’s growing presence in Morocco, particularly in the battery sector, framing Chinese investments as an attempt to circumvent EU tariffs through Morocco’s free trade agreements.^[2]

While Moroccan media acknowledge that Chinese investments may be motivated by a desire to bypass Western protectionist policies, they also emphasize the broader benefits these investments could bring, including attracting capital in emerging sectors and fostering significant improvements in Morocco’s infrastructure.^[3] Notably, positive coverage extends even to news outlets aligned with opposition parties, such as Ahdath.info, the online portal of the Socialist Union of Popular Forces-aligned newspaper Al Ahdath Al Maghribia.^[4]

This optimistic framing is even more pronounced in outlets typically aligned with the Royal Palace, such as Le Matin and Hespress, which while celebrating cooperation with China, place greater emphasis on the role of Morocco’s skilled workforce, strategic geographic location, “well-developed automotive ecosystem,” and “favorable business climate.”^[5]

A project that has received special praise is the planned EUR 128 million electric vehicle battery gigafactory in Kenitra, a result of a memorandum of understanding signed in June between the Sino-European group Gotion High-Tech and the Moroccan government.^[6] This project is expected to produce 20 GWh of lithium-ion batteries and cathode materials and is projected to create approximately 2,300 jobs.

A Pitstop or a State Visit?

Xi Jinping’s unannounced visit to Casablanca was celebrated by the Moroccan press, which however refrained from describing it as a “technical stopover,” as officially framed by the Chinese. Instead, it was characterized as a “short visit” that “reflects the strong bonds of friendship, cooperation, and solidarity between the Moroccan and Chinese peoples, thanks to the shared commitment of His Majesty King Mohammed VI and His Excellency President Xi Jinping to advancing the Sino-Moroccan strategic partnership.”

This emphasis on the strategic partnership, established in 2016 on occasion of Mohammed VI’s state visit to China, is a recurring theme in pro-government Moroccan press. L’Opinion, a newspaper aligned with the monarchist Istiqlal Party, remarked; “Since 2016, Sino-Moroccan relations have experienced an unprecedented surge following His Majesty the King's visit to Beijing, during which the two countries elevated their cooperation to the level of a strategic partnership.”^[7]

This narrative may be due to desire to center the role of the King, but it also appears to reflect an effort to frame the relationship bilaterally rather than positioning it within China’s broader global initiatives. Notably, Moroccan media has seemingly downplayed Rabat’s engagement with the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), despite the rapid growth of Chinese investments and Morocco’s unique status as the only North African country to have signed a BRI implementation plan (the few articles which do mention the BRI cite comments made to China Daily by Morocco’s Ambassador to China, Abdelkader El Ansari, a message clearly intended for the Chinese audience). Similarly, Morocco has not openly acknowledged its application to join BRICS, though this may also be due to tensions with South Africa.

The Moroccan media’s apparent effort to distance Morocco from China-led international frameworks may reflect Rabat’s strategy to start off on a good foot with the new government in Washington. Indeed, Trump’s return to the White House has not elicited significant concern in Moroccan media, likely due to his first administration’s decision to recognize Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara.^[8]

Nevertheless, concerns persist, particularly among left-leaning news outlets, about Trump’s rather belligerent stance on tariffs and the potential global protectionist wave it could trigger.^[9] Bayane Al Yaoume, a newspaper affiliated with the Party of Progress and Socialism, cautioned that U.S. tariffs could destabilize global markets, exacerbating challenges for emerging economies, including reducing capital flows and depreciating local currencies.^[10]

A more pressing concern voiced in Moroccan media relates to Trump’s plans to repeal or limit the Biden administration’s Inflation Reduction Act (IRA).^[11] The IRA’s focus on strengthening trade with countries that have free trade agreements with the U.S., such as Morocco, is considered by many international analysts as the key factor behind increased Chinese investments in the country.

Moroccan interest in this issue can be noted in Ahdath.info’s decision to publish an article by Rama Yade, the director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center and former French Secretary of State for Human Rights.^[12] In her piece, Yade highlights the many shared interests between Trump’s U.S. and Morocco, while also acknowledging the potential repercussions that the new president’s trade policies could have on the future of Chinese overseas investments. She notes that without the IRA, “Morocco could become less attractive to China” and that Rabat might need to “revise its strategy of equidistance between the two powers.”^[13]

Conclusion

While Morocco’s relations with China remain very positive, as evidenced by ever increasing Chinese investments and Xi Jinping’s brief visit, the rhetoric in local media suggests a growing desire by the Moroccan government to hedge its bets in light of Donald Trump’s return to the U.S. presidency. This is reflected in the Moroccan press’ downplaying of Rabat’s engagement with China-led initiatives such as the BRI and BRICS, instead emphasizing the country’s “commitment to an independent foreign policy and strong ties with its traditional partners.”^[14]

This desire to curry favor may arise from the hope that Trump could influence other governments to follow his lead in recognizing Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara. However, there is considerable concern in the Moroccan press about whether the second Trump administration might disrupt the conditions that have made the country an appealing destination for Chinese manufacturers. Local media outlets have highlighted that one of the primary drivers of Chinese interest in Morocco is the opportunity to circumvent Western tariffs through the country’s free trade agreements. Given Trump’s threats to impose high tariffs on countries, including allies like Mexico, for allegedly exploiting free trade agreements to attract Chinese manufacturing, it is unsurprising that Moroccan media would express apprehension.

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Mariateresa NATUZZI is a Research Fellow at the ChinaMed Project. She holds a Master's Degree in Transmediterranean Studies at Ca’ Foscari University of Venice. Her research focuses on the media coverage of China in North Africa, as well as issues related to food production and the environment in the region.