Serbia’s Anti-Corruption Protests and Serbian Perceptions of Chinese Investments

On November 1, 2024, the canopy of a train station in Novi Sad, Serbia’s second-largest city, collapsed, claiming the lives of sixteen people. The station was recently renovated, leading many to blame this tragedy on inadequate oversight and poor construction standards. Soon after, student-led protests broke out against the government of Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić, demanding an end to corruption, increased transparency and greater governmental accountability.

In the five months since, the protest movement has widened beyond universities to encompass a wide cross-section of Serbian society. On March 15, an estimated 300,000 people took to the streets of Belgrade, a significant figure in a country with a population of just 6.6 million.

While the scale of the protests and the government’s harsh response have attracted considerable media attention internationally, an emerging focus among global media outlets has been on the role of China. Reporting by The Associated Press and Nikkei Asia have highlighted how the Novi Sad station renovation was part of the Belgrade-Budapest high-speed rail line, a flagship project of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and a symbol of China-Serbia economic and political ties.

In this edition of the ChinaMed Observer, an extract of our upcoming report on current issues in Sino-Serbian relations, we examine how Chinese investments are discussed within Serbia and by Serbian commentators. Specifically, we attempt to assess if Belgrade’s economic relationship with Beijing constitutes a significant factor driving the ongoing protest movement against Vučić.

According to our analysis, while Chinese investment continues to be an object of concern for most Serbian experts and NGOs, the protests themselves have expanded beyond the tragedy in Novi Sad, with the disaster being seen as just one example of systemic government corruption. Furthermore, if there is a global actor increasingly drawing the ire of the Serbian protest movement, it is not China but rather the European Union (EU), which many demonstrators and prominent Serbian voices are increasingly perceiving as complicit through its inaction.

Serbian Debate on Chinese Investments

Over the past decade, Chinese investment has increasingly poured into the Western Balkans, drawn in by the region’s proximity and access to the European single market. Formalized and promoted under the umbrella of the BRI, Chinese projects in the region span sectors such as transportation, energy, telecommunications, resource extraction and heavy industry. Although this economic engagement was initially met with enthusiasm across the region, many of these projects have, in recent years, faced growing public scrutiny and backlash, from Montenegro to Bosnia and Herzegovina.^[1]

Among the countries of the Western Balkans, Serbia stands out both for the scale of Chinese investment and the controversies surrounding its bilateral partnership with China. Since signing a memorandum of understanding on the BRI in 2015, Chinese investment in Serbia has surged. According to ChinaMed Data, the stock of Chinese foreign direct investment in Serbia grew from less than USD 50 million in 2015 to USD 545.6 million by 2023, more than an elevenfold increase. Likewise, the value of contracts awarded to Chinese firms rose from approximately USD 717 million in 2015 to an estimated USD 4.6 billion in 2022. The number of Chinese contract workers in Serbia also climbed dramatically, from just 313 in 2015 to 7,791 by 2022.

While this growth has raised alarm among EU-based analysts, who view China’s expanding economic footprint in the Balkans with apprehension, many Serbian commentators have expressed just as much concern. However, as we noted in a previous ChinaMed Observer, not all Serbian analysts are wholly negative on Sino-Serbian economic ties, with it remaining a contentious topic within Serbian public discourse.

Serbian government officials, pro-government media outlets and certain commentators defend the partnership with China citing their alleged contributions to economic growth, infrastructure development, and its role as a pragmatic alternative amid limited support from Western partners. Conversely, opposition figures, civil society groups and independent analysts frequently accuse Chinese projects of poor labor standards, offering limited long-term economic benefits, placing Serbia into debt distress, derailing its EU accession process, and empowering authoritarianism.

Environmental concerns also feature prominently in Serbian critiques of Chinese investments, including the Smederevo steel mill, acquired by China’s Hesteel Group in 2016—an oft-cited symbol of the “ironclad friendship” between China and Serbia. As Igor Rogelja notes in his profile of the plant for The People’s Map of Global China, the Smeredevo mill has had significant environmental repercussions for surrounding towns and villages. One reason is the facility’s legal exemption from national waste regulations, effectively permitting Hesteel to dispose of industrial waste near the plant without proper oversight or accountability.^[2]

Investigations by the Center for Investigative Journalism of Serbia have also documented a dramatic deterioration in local air quality since Hesteel’s acquisition.^[3] Despite this, authorities have reportedly been hesitant to inform nearby residents or publish pollution data. This opacity has spurred protests and mobilized the Smederevo-based environmental NGO Pokret Tvrđava to try to obtain reliable data on local pollution levels and contest Hesteel’s practices.

In August 2023, Tvrđava’s petition to the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg calling on it to protect citizens’ right to a healthy environment was dismissed, with the court ruling that domestic legal avenues had not yet been fully exhausted.^[4] The following year, these avenues led to Serbian courts fining Hesteel just one million dinars (~USD 9,600), much to the disappointment of local residents.^[5]

Another controversial Chinese project is the Linglong tire plant in Zrenjanin. According to the Serbian government, the factory represents Serbia’s largest-ever greenfield investment, with an estimated value of USD 1 billion. Construction began soon after its first announcement in August 2018, but the project quickly became mired in legal disputes. The Regulatory Institute for Renewable Energy and Environment (RERI), a Serbian environmental think tank, accused Linglong of failing to conduct a legally required environmental impact assessment. On this issue, RERI recently published a report accusing the Chinese firm of employing a strategy of “salami slicing,” dividing the project into smaller ones to bypass environmental regulations, a salient concern given the plant’s proximity to a protected nature reserve.^[6]

According to the Dutch NGO Just Finance International, however, the Chinese project in Serbia which has attracted the most criminal complaints is the Bor Mining and Smelting Complex. Acquired by Zijin Mining Group in 2018, the project has been at the center of many environmental issues. As documented by both Just Finance and The People’s Map of Global China, the complex has been accused of severe water, air and soil pollution; unlawful displacement of locals (many of whom belong to the underrepresented Vlach minority); illegal demolition; and construction without permits or environment impact assessments.^[7]

Despite mounting evidence of environmental degradation and legal violations by China-backed projects, the public debate in Serbia on this issue remains polarized. While a vocal segment of civil society continues to raise concerns, much of the Serbian population remains supportive of economic engagement with China (according to a 2024 survey conducted by the International Republican Institute, 88% of Serbian citizens view China positively).

Beyond just consistently favorable portrayals of China in mainstream government-aligned media, Stefan Vladisavljev, Program Coordinator at the Foundation BFPE for a Responsible Society, argues that public support for Sino-Serbian economic cooperation is fueled by widespread misconceptions, largely stemming from a lack of transparency. Writing for the economic and political magazine Nova Ekonomija, Vladisavljev identifies several common misunderstandings about the nature of Chinese investments in Serbia.^[8]

One such misconception concerns the actual volume of Chinese investment. While China has been among Serbia’s most visible investors in recent years, Vladisavljev contends that a closer analysis reveals that Beijing is neither Serbia’s primary economic partner nor a significant alternative to the West. Between 2010 and 2023, total Chinese investment in Serbia amounted to approximately €5.5 billion—substantially less than the €20.6 billion invested collectively by EU member states, not including an additional €1.4 billion from the United Kingdom and €800 million from the United States.^[9]

Vladisavljev also stresses that the quality of investment is just as important as its quantity. He points out the lack of comprehensive analyses of whether Chinese-funded projects genuinely support local employment, community development, or the transfer of skills and technology. Instead, many of these ventures seem to serve mainly as channels for resource extraction, which do little to address Serbia’s significant trade deficit with China. He highlights how 92.1% of Serbia’s exports to China consist of goods with limited added value, in particular copper in the form of ores and cathodes.^[10]

Moreover, Vladisavljev challenges official claims that Chinese involvement in Serbia primarily takes the form of foreign direct investment, as many Chinese infrastructure projects are in reality financed through loans from Chinese policy banks. While pushing back against alarmist narratives about potential “debt slavery,” he acknowledges that Serbia’s debt to the China Eximbank—amounting to €2.7 billion or approximately 7% of Serbia’s total public debt—still warrants attention.^[11]

More troubling than the debt itself, Vladisavljev argues, is the pervasive lack of transparency surrounding Chinese-financed projects. Under the terms of the 2009 agreement signed by the Serbian government under President Boris Tadić, Chinese-funded infrastructure projects are exempt from public procurement rules, competitive tender procedures, and are shielded from standard transparency obligations.^[12]

This framework has significant implications for accountability, as Vladisavljev notes in his article, published in December 2024, a month after the disaster in Novi Sad:

“Closely tied to the problem of a lack of transparency, if the terms of a contract are not publicly known, it becomes difficult for any party to be held responsible in the event of damage—or even tragedy—resulting from joint infrastructure projects. Given the scale and significance of the projects that have been implemented, ensuring accountability should be one of the key priorities, which is currently not the case.”^[13]

China’s Role in the Novi Sad Tragedy: Accountability and Controversy

The renovation of the Novi Sad train station was part of the broader Belgrade-Budapest high-speed rail line project, undertaken by a consortium led by China Railway International and China Communications Construction Company. Financed through a multi-billion-euro loan from China Eximbank, this project was envisioned as a section of the BRI’s flagship effort to link Central Europe with the China-operated port of Piraeus in Greece.

While the Belgrade-Novi Sad section was completed in March 2022, the renovation of the Novi Sad station itself was not finalized until July 2024 in preparation for the extension of the line toward the Hungarian border, scheduled for November 22, 2024. However, the collapse of the station’s canopy brought the project to an abrupt halt and triggered a wave of public outrage.

The tragedy profoundly affected the Serbian public, particularly students, who began holding silent vigils to honor the victims. Although the government pledged a thorough investigation, public anger intensified amid accusations that the disaster was no mere accident, but rather the consequence of inadequate standards.^[14] Claims that the authorities were intentionally delaying the investigation to avoid political repercussions further inflamed Serbian students, who were angered both by initial government assertions that the collapsed canopy had not been part of the renovation project as well as the Ministry of Construction, Transport, and Infrastructure’s refusal to release relevant documentation—citing confidentiality clauses in the agreements with the Chinese consortium.^[15] As was reported by the Novi Sad-based broadcaster Radio 021 back in January 2024, the Ministry of Transport allegedly stated that “no contract-related information can be shared with third parties until the project is completed and a certificate of satisfactory completion issued.”^[16]

This lack of transparency catalyzed a student-led protest movement that soon expanded beyond Novi Sad, demanding the public release of all documentation related to the station’s reconstruction, institutional accountability, and greater government transparency. Authorities responded with repression, including the detention and violent dispersal of protestors. Nonetheless, mounting public pressure led to the resignation of government ministers and the release of documents related to the renovation of the Novi Sad station.

In their analysis, Transparency Serbia, an anti-corruption NGO, contended that the released documentation was incomplete, but they nevertheless exposed systemic issues in the way infrastructure projects are managed in Serbia.^[17] These revelations as well as concerted efforts by the government to shield such practices from scrutiny prompted a wave of criticism from some Serbian media figures. Journalist Nenad Kulačin, in an opinion piece for Al Jazeera Balkans, characterized the treatment of Chinese firms in Serbia as privileged, describing them “as protected as polar bears.” He went on to state:

“All the jobs that Chinese companies get in Serbia are awarded without tenders and public procurement. Not to mention that all the contracts between Serbia and Chinese companies are secret. […] His [President Vučić’s] friends from the Far East impose no conditions when granting loans to Serbia, which is slowly but surely sliding into a vassal-like relationship with China. […] If the money for the reconstruction had been obtained from European funds, much of it would have to be public and it would be known how every euro was spent.” ^[18]

However, despite Serbian Prime Minister Miloš Vučević dismissing concern over the irregularities over the station renovation as “potential anti-China hysteria,”^[19] as the protest movement expanded nationwide it ultimately focused on broader issues of corruption, lack of transparency and insufficient accountability. As Foundation BFPE’s Stefan Vladisavljev writes for China Observers in Central and Eastern Europe (where he is a visiting fellow), Chinese companies have largely escaped scrutiny as “public outrage over the Novi Sad station collapse was overwhelmingly directed at the Serbian government and its officials.”^[20]

Vladisavljev explains that Chinese firms were partly shielded from public scrutiny due to the government’s swift move to place blame on a Serbian subcontractor. As reported by Forbes Srbija, official documents show that the Chinese consortium overseeing the project had delegated responsibility for renovating the Novi Sad station canopy to a Serbian company named Starting.^[21] However, despite the difficulties in assigning blame due to the lack of transparency and the involvement of numerous subcontractors, Vladisavljev still raises the crucial question: who ultimately enabled and facilitated the practices that led to the disaster.^[22]

Other Serbian experts and commentators, while acknowledging the tragic loss of life in Novi Sad, do not view the incident as an isolated case but as one dramatic example of how Belgrade systemically mismanages infrastructure projects, with or without Chinese involvement.^[23] This is in line with most empirical studies which suggest that, when subject to proper regulation and oversight, Chinese-financed projects can be just as or even more effective than those from traditional Western partners.^[24]

This focus on the Serbian government and its officials as the root of the problem is not new. Experts on China’s role in the region, such as Vuk Vuksanović, a Senior Researcher at the Belgrade Centre for Security Policy, voiced a similar perspective even before the Novi Sad disaster. In comments to Voice of America in May 2024, Vuksanović stated:

"The main risks relate to a lack of transparency and the failure to uphold environmental and labor standards. But ultimately, the main responsibility always lies with the local elites, not with the Chinese. The key issue is how an individual government manages its partnership with China, not the Chinese government itself."^[25]

Serbia’s Historic Protests, China, and the European Union

As previously noted, the protest movement in Serbia has grown beyond the immediate context of the Novi Sad tragedy, evolving into a broader expression of public discontent with the Vučić government. The scale and persistence of this mass mobilization have significantly weakened Vučić’s hold on power, with several high-ranking officials resigning, including Prime Minister Vučević.

Attempts by Serbian authorities to discredit and repress the demonstrators have largely failed. Notably, the alleged use of a sonic weapon against protestors on March 15 has only galvanized public outrage, further legitimized the protest movement, and rallied support from a broad swath of Serbian society.^[26]

Despite Beijing signaling its support for Vučić and his framing of the unrest as a Western-backed "color revolution," Chinese influence remains far from a central issue for protestors. A possible factor may be the protests’ increasing heterogeneity. What began as a student-led movement has grown to encompass a wide and politically diverse spectrum of Serbian society. As journalists have noted, recent protests have seen the participation of nationalist groups, some of whom have carried anti-EU and anti-NATO flags or even displayed “Z” symbols in support of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, contrasting with past pro-democracy protests in Georgia and Ukraine, where EU flags and anti-Russian slogans were prominently displayed.

While this divergence reflects longstanding public sentiment in Serbia, the absence of pro-EU symbolism also points to growing frustration with Brussels’ approach to Vučić’s leadership. Criticism from Serbian commentators is increasingly directed not at China, but at the EU, which many in Serbia accuse of turning a blind eye to democratic backsliding.^[27] This frustration has been exacerbated by the EU’s own controversial involvement in environmentally harmful projects in Serbia—most notably, the Jadar lithium mine.^[28]

In July 2024, the EU and Serbia signed a Memorandum of Understanding on raw materials cooperation, centered around the development of a lithium mine in the Jadar Valley by British-Australian multinational Rio Tinto. The mine may soon be designated as a “strategic project” by the EU under its Critical Raw Materials Act, legislation aimed at reducing dependence on Chinese imports by securing alternative supply chains, including for lithium, a key component in battery production for electric vehicles.

However, the project has been highly controversial in Serbia for years, drawing criticism over its lack of transparency, questionable economic viability, and fears that it will cause irreversible environmental damage to the Jadar Valley. Since 2021, there have been frequent protests in Serbia over the project, with many activists accusing the EU of outsourcing the environmental costs of lithium extraction to Serbia, despite untapped lithium reserves in EU member states such as Germany. The project has sparked continued protests against both the Serbian government and the EU itself, even in recent months. Indeed, public opposition to the project is strong; polls show that 55% of the Serbian population is firmly against it.

Although not all EU policymakers support the mine, the European Commission continues to push forward the project, with it receiving explicit support from Commissioner for Trade and Economic Security Maroš Šefčovič. This is regardless of concerns about electoral irregularities in Serbia during recent elections, nationalist rhetoric from Belgrade, and the mass protests now unfolding. Many commentators argue that the relative silence toward Vučić from the EU and member states reflects a broader strategy: maintaining a close relationship with Vučić as a guarantor of regional stability (and critical raw materials), regardless of his democratic shortcomings.

Conclusion

Chinese-backed infrastructure projects in Serbia remain a contentious issue, drawing sustained criticism from NGOs, analysts and local residents over their environmental, labor and safety issues. While one such project—the Novi Sad train station renovation—sparked recent protests following the deadly collapse of its roof, public outrage has not been directed at Chinese involvement. Rather, most protestors and analysts have placed the blame squarely on the Serbian government, widely viewed as the chief beneficiary of opaque contracts, nepotism, and regulatory negligence. Indeed, Chinese investments are not necessarily seen as the root cause but mostly as enablers within a wider system of governmental mismanagement and corruption. Similar backlash has also arisen in response to EU-supported projects in Serbia, like the Jadar lithium mine, criticized for its projected environmental damage and lack of public consultation.

With the protest movement also expanding well beyond its initial catalyst, it is unsurprising that Chinese economic engagement has not been singled out, nor that EU flags are largely absent from demonstrations. In fact, Brussels is increasingly accused by the Serbian opposition and commentators of prioritizing regional stability over democratic accountability, with many accusing the EU of being tacitly complicit in President Vučić’s growing authoritarianism. These allegations are likely exacerbated by the little perceived difference between EU and Chinese investment practices; both are now associated with environmental degradation, non-transparent processes, and the entrenchment of unaccountable governance. As Vučić aims to hold on to power by forming a new government, Serbian confidence in the European integration process will unlikely improve unless the EU takes concrete steps to reassert itself as a credible and principled partner. This requires not only highlighting the risks of Chinese practices but also ensuring that its own investments meet the same advocated standards of transparency, environmental sustainability, and accountability.

‍

Anja DUVNJAK is a Research Fellow at the ChinaMed Project. She is a graduate of the University of Turin-Zhejiang University Dual Degree in International Relations and China Studies. Her research focuses on the relations between China and the Western Balkans.

Leonardo BRUNI is the Project Officer and a Research Fellow at the ChinaMed Project. He is also a Research Fellow at the University of Turin and a graduate of the Sciences Po-Peking University Dual Master’s Degree in International Relations. His research interests include China-EU relations and Chinese foreign policy in the wider Mediterranean region.