The Chinese Debate on the Houthi-Saudi Escalation in Yemen

Over the past couple of months, the fighting in Yemen has intensified dramatically between the Iran-backed Ansar Allah movement – better known as the Houthis – and the forces of the internationally recognized Yemeni government and their Saudi patrons.

The latest escalation began on July 13, when a Mahan Air flight returning a Houthi delegation from the funeral of Iran’s Ayatollah Ali Khamenei attempted to land at Sanaa Airport. Seen as an Iranian attempt to establish a direct air link with Houthi-controlled territory, the Saudi-led coalition struck the airport runway. In response, the Houthis declared an end to the four-year Yemeni ceasefire, announcing a naval blockade of Saudi Arabia and striking Saudi oil tankers.

The ensuing Saudi airstrikes and Houthi retaliation rapidly broadened the conflict. The Houthis struck Saudi ports, air bases, airports, Aramco facilities, and pipelines, further straining global energy markets already weakened by the closure of the Strait of Hormuz and the U.S.-Israeli war on Iran. At the same time, fighting intensified within Yemen. In mid-September, in a military blitz, the Houthis seized the key port city of Mokha and the strategic islands of Greater and Lesser Hanish in the southern Red Sea, strengthening their capacity to monitor and interdict maritime traffic through the Bab al-Mandeb Strait. The contested city of Taiz has also come under siege from the Houthis, while fighting still rages around the Yemeni side of the Bab al-Mandeb and missile attacks on Saudi infrastructure continue unabated, exacting a mounting civilian toll.

The conflict has attracted considerable attention from commentators across the globe, who largely view it as a spillover of the war in Iran – and there is little mystery as to why. A Houthi official told the AP that Iranian advisers were “present at all levels,” from planning tactical maneuvers to working alongside front-line commanders.¹ As to why Tehran is getting involved, Steven Cook, Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, explained that “the Houthis’ ability to control or threaten the Bab al-Mandeb chokepoint is good for Iran.” By threatening this critical shipping route, the Houthis can put pressure on the global economy, giving Tehran more leverage in negotiations with Washington.²

If Iran is perceived by many international commentators as having strengthened its position through the fighting in Yemen, there is a clear loser: Saudi Arabia. Giorgio Cafiero, CEO of Gulf State Analytics, described Riyadh as facing a “humiliating dilemma” in which it has “no good options,” arguing that any settlement would likely require concessions to the Houthis. The situation is compounded by Washington’s reluctance to intervene directly. U.S. officials have indicated that American support may be limited to intelligence and target-identification assistance, while President Donald Trump dismissed the escalation as a conflict affecting only one country. Secretary of State Marco Rubio pledged that the United States would “live up to our commitments,” but offered little clarity on what that meant in practice. According to former U.S. ambassador to Saudi Arabia Michael Ratney, the ambiguity has deeply unsettled the Saudi leadership.³

Beyond the devastating humanitarian consequences for Yemen’s civilian population,⁴ the fighting has also led international analysts to question what role China may be playing. Reports have suggested that Chinese commercial vessels continue to transit through the Bab al-Mandeb even when sailing from Saudi ports.⁵ Moreover, both Saudi Arabia and the Houthis have reportedly used Chinese-made weapons,⁶ while Beijing has supposedly sought to pressure Tehran to rein in the Houthis.⁷

Amid this discussion, this edition of the ChinaMed Observer examines the Chinese government’s line on the developments in Yemen after the recent Saudi-Houthi escalation, as well as the surrounding Chinese media and expert debate. Our analysis shows that although Chinese officials refrained from making strong public statements, Chinese experts and scholars have offered a much more detailed and incisive assessment of Saudi Arabia’s security dilemma and possible future arrangements involving Riyadh, the Houthis and other regional actors. Their analysis is pessimistic about Saudi Arabia’s room for maneuver, particularly following the alleged U.S.-Houthi deal and the lack of support from Pakistan and Türkiye, Saudi allies under the newly signed Mecca Joint Defense Agreement.

China’s Official Stance on the Yemeni Escalation

Chinese officials have largely kept a low profile during the latest escalation in Yemen. During talks in Beijing with Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, Foreign Minister Wang Yi warned against allowing regional tensions to spill further into Yemen and the Red Sea, calling on all parties to stop complicating the situation and return to dialogue and negotiation.⁸ He further argued that the crisis once again exposed the inadequacy of the existing Middle Eastern security architecture, pointing instead to President Xi Jinping’s four-point proposal for a new Middle East security architecture based on “common, comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable security.”⁹

Foreign Ministry spokesperson Guo Jiakun likewise stressed that:

“attacks on civilian facilities related to people’s livelihoods are unacceptable. The sovereignty and security of all countries should be respected, and resolving disputes through political and diplomatic means is the only way forward.”¹⁰

China reiterated these principles most recently at the United Nations Security Council on October 9, when Fu Cong, China’s Permanent Representative to the UN, called for de-escalation, respect for international law, and a political settlement as the only viable long-term solution. Notably, Fu stated that “The international community universally recognizes the legitimate government of Yemen, and the sovereignty, security, and territorial integrity of Yemen and Saudi Arabia must be respected.”¹¹

These initial statements are largely consistent with China’s diplomatic posture during the Iran and Gaza wars: calls for de-escalation, appeals for “all sides” to return to dialogue, and the promotion of Chinese frameworks. In particular, while condemning “indiscriminate attacks on civilians and non-military targets; attacks on airports, energy facilities, and other infrastructure vital to people’s livelihoods” as “unacceptable,”¹² Beijing often refrains from explicitly identifying those responsible for such attacks. Even Foreign Ministry spokesperson Mao Ning, when condemning the deadly strike on Riyadh’s international airport on Sunday, October 11, did not explicitly name or blame the Houthi movement.¹³

This reluctance to directly assign responsibility for an attack (unless they are the U.S. or Israel) echoes Beijing’s immediate responses to Iranian strikes on the Arab Gulf states during the initial stages of the Iran War.¹⁴ Although often criticized as “selective” or “biased” neutrality, this stance likely reflects Beijing’s effort to maintain workable relations with all relevant parties. For China, Saudi Arabia remains an important economic and energy partner, while the Houthis are closely aligned with Iran, itself a strategic partner.

At the same time, a Reuters report by journalist Parisa Hafezi claimed that China had privately asked Tehran to rein in the Houthis following an appeal from Saudi Arabia.¹⁵ Such an intervention would likely reflect Beijing’s fear of further disruption in global energy supplies. Indeed, according to analyses published in Bloomberg, The Economist and Middle East Eye, China has drawn on its substantial strategic and commercial oil reserves (among the world’s largest according to estimates cited by The New York Times, drawing on Kpler data) to buffer domestic and global markets. Although this power over global oil prices has granted China significant international influence, more recent reporting suggests that this buffer is being depleted. Regardless of Beijing’s interest in energy-market stability, even if the reported diplomatic intervention took place, it remains unclear how much influence Beijing can exert over Tehran, and how much leverage Tehran, in turn, can exercise over the Houthis.

Any Chinese diplomatic intervention could therefore be understood as a token effort to reassure Saudi Arabia. The expectation is likely that Riyadh’s actual military allies, the U.S., Pakistan and Türkiye, are responsible for providing the hard-security support that Beijing is neither willing nor prepared to offer. However, Chinese analysts, like commentators elsewhere, have been pessimistic about the level of support Saudi Arabia has received or can realistically expect. Their assessment may in turn help explain Beijing’s cautious approach: China has an interest in preventing further escalation, but little incentive to become directly involved in an apparent military debacle with little global backing.

Chinese Experts See No Help on the Horizon for Saudi Arabia

As mentioned, Chinese experts have been far more outspoken than their government, and markedly more pessimistic about where the Yemeni crisis is heading. Much of this scholarly analysis has focused on the United States’ reluctance to provide Saudi Arabia with direct military support.

Even before the latest escalation, Liu Zhongmin, Professor at the Middle East Institute of Shanghai International Studies University (SISU), and doctoral candidate Nie Gancheng argued that the Trump administration was seeking to maintain U.S. hegemony at minimal cost. Yet the failure to achieve rapid regime change in Iran, they contended, had left Washington entangled in an asymmetric regional conflict of its own making.¹⁶ A similar assessment underpins the analysis of Cao Fengyu and Yang Boliang from Xi’an’s Northwest University. They justify American reticence in Yemen by noting how airstrikes have already proven themselves completely insufficient in stopping the Houthi advance. With airstrikes ineffective and American capacity limited by the war in Iran, they argue that Washington will likely only provide Riyadh with intelligence, early-warning and logistical support, while avoiding direct involvement.¹⁷ As Sun Yuan, a PhD researcher at SISU’s Middle East Institute, puts it:

“as long as the Houthis do not directly touch U.S. core interests, the Trump administration will not easily engage in direct military conflict with them.”¹⁸

While acknowledging that restraint in Yemen is a logical move for Washington, Chinese analysts note that this has led to a growing security dilemma for Riyadh. Wang Ruoxian, a reporter for Xinmin Evening News, underlined the depletion of Saudi air-defense interceptors and the Kingdom’s need to seek assistance from France, the UK, Pakistan and Türkiye.¹⁹ Even more worrying is the vulnerability of Saudi energy infrastructure. According to Cao Fengyu and Yang Boliang, the September 11 Houthi attack on the critical East–West Crude Oil Pipeline demonstrated just how difficult such infrastructure is to defend and replace.

“Once Saudi Arabia’s oil export capacity is continuously suppressed, the global energy market will no longer face short-term transportation disruptions, but rather a structural supply contraction.”²⁰

The reported reluctance of President Trump to answer Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s repeated calls for help, alongside reports of a secret U.S.-Houthi deal has likely made Riyadh’s position even more uncomfortable. By securing freedom of movement for American vessels in the Red Sea, the agreement would give Washington a further reason a further reason to avoid direct involvement in the Saudi-Houthi confrontation. Chinese commentators have taken the reported deal seriously, with Wang Ruoxian arguing that Saudi Arabia now has no choice but to seek support from other countries.²¹

However, for Sun Degang, the Director of Fudan University’s Center for Middle East Studies, the U.S.-Houthi deal is temporary and rests on divergent interests rather than any long-term alignment. He argues that the Houthis’ goal is to prevent the United States, Israel and Saudi Arabia from forming a united front, allowing the Yemeni group to confront each one of their adversaries sequentially, with Riyadh being the current priority. Sun also points to domestic political pressure on the Trump administration ahead of the midterm elections as a factor encouraging Washington to adopt a more conciliatory approach toward the Houthis. He nevertheless warns that the deal remains fragile, arguing that both sides’ “current engagement is more akin to a delaying tactic.”²²

Li Zixin, a Middle East expert at the China Institute of International Studies, offers a far blunter explanation: defending Saudi Arabia is simply not a priority for the U.S. In his view, the Trump administration’s cost-benefit calculus sees stabilizing oil prices and safeguarding navigation through the Strait of Hormuz as more profitable than protecting the Kingdom from Houthi attacks. Faced with Washington’s reluctance and unreliability, Riyadh has “reluctantly” been forced to turn to other regional actors, notably Pakistan and Türkiye, culminating in the signing of the Mecca Joint Defense Agreement in August.²³ Many experts, including Chinese ones, view the agreement as a part of a wider Saudi effort to diversify its security partnerships and reduce its dependence on the United States. However, the most recent escalation in Yemen has exposed the limits of this strategy.

As Chao Xinwen reporter Sun Yuan explains, “following the Houthi attacks on Saudi territory, neither Türkiye nor Pakistan expressed an intention to launch a direct military response against the Houthis.”²⁴ Only recently have both countries pledged to “rapidly deploy” their forces to Saudi Arabia, though it is unclear whether they will actively participate in the fighting.

The question for several Chinese analysts is therefore not whether Saudi Arabia can find alternative security partners, but whether those partnerships can translate into concrete military commitments when the Kingdom actually comes under attack. In any case, Chinese scholars believe that a second Saudi full-scale intervention in Yemen (an “Operation Decisive Storm” 2.0) might be even less effective than the one in 2015. Given how well-rooted the Houthi movement is in the Yemeni highlands and how it excels in protracted warfare, Sun Degang instead advocates that Riyadh and the Houthis maintain open dialogue channels and seek a political compromise.²⁵

Chinese Perspectives on the Future of Yemen

Despite the escalation, many Chinese scholars still see a political solution in Yemen as possible in the medium-to-long term. According to Cao Fengyu and Yang Boliang, both sides rely heavily on a tacit understanding that the conflict must not spiral out of control. The Houthis, they argue, are open to talks as they have never expected to defeat Saudi Arabia outright on the battlefield.²⁶ Their attacks are instead perceived by Chinese analysts as aimed at pressuring Riyadh into making concessions, while avoiding a level of escalation that could provoke a strong retaliation.²⁷

The Houthis may likely be hoping to reach a deal with the Saudis soon as, according to Niu Song, a professor at SISU’s Middle East Institute, the Houthis’ capacity to defend themselves and interdict maritime traffic is dwindling due to Iran’s heavy losses.²⁸ However, Riyadh also faces an equally difficult calculation. It can either refrain from further military interventions, thus risk turning Houthi threats to Red Sea shipping and Saudi energy infrastructure into long-term leverage, or deploy more forces and risk becoming trapped in a war with no clear way out.²⁹

Against this backdrop, Chinese experts see a stalemate as the most likely scenario, a state of “neither fighting nor stopping.” Such a situation would give the Houthis the time to consolidate their recent gains while allowing Saudi Arabia to reorganize its anti-Houthi strategy. However, if the anti-Houthi opposition remains fragmented, the Houthis could expand their offensive toward the cities of Taiz and Marib, the latter being home to Yemen’s main oil- and gas-producing infrastructure. This could force Riyadh to increase its reliance and investments in proxies and even deploy ground troops.³⁰

In the long-term, Cao and Yang warn of a possible “Sudan-style fragmentation and division in Yemen”, in which:

“there is neither a decisive military victory, nor a sustainable political solution, but rather a recurring cycle of conflict and ceasefires.”

This, the analysts conclude, would be the worst possible outcome for Yemeni civilians.³¹

Conclusion

While Chinese analysts have been far more explicit than their government in describing the dramatic situation in Yemen, they largely share the official line’s notably non-partisan view of the conflict. Chinese scholars generally avoided taking sides, reflecting not only a preference for neutrality but, more importantly, an awareness that a prolonged war in the Red Sea poses immediate risks to global energy markets and, by extension, to both domestic and international stability (it should be noted though that the commentaries examined in this article predate the Houthi attack on Riyadh’s international airport, which the Chinese Foreign Ministry condemned without, however, explicitly naming the Houthi movement).

At the same time, the recent escalation in Yemen has exposed a tension in Chinese thinking about the regional security order. Chinese experts, like Beijing itself, have long called for an end to U.S. military hegemony in the Middle East and the development of a more autonomous regional security framework led by local actors. However, this crisis has underscored the gap between that ambition and the ability of the region’s states to guarantee and provide credible security guarantees in practice – a capacity China has an interest in strengthening to safeguard the stability of global energy markets. The Mecca Joint Defense Agreement has so far done little to demonstrate that such an alternative can effectively replace the deterrent role once provided by Washington, now limited by its own wars and beholden to domestic political concerns.

Given this context and the widespread recognition of the Houthis’ tenacity and military capabilities, the Chinese debate focuses less on whether Ansar Allah can be defeated but on the increasingly stark choices facing Saudi Arabia. Chinese scholars generally view a large-scale Saudi intervention as an inevitable, costly and protracted debacle, while a settlement with the Yemeni militants would reward the Houthis with a sword of Damocles to hang over Saudi Arabia: the precedent and unfettered ability to threaten the Kingdom’s energy infrastructure and maritime access

This, in turn, raises a set of questions about how Saudi Arabia ended up in its current predicament. Why has its security apparatus remained so fragmented, and how much has that constrained its military effectiveness? Why have its diplomatic efforts failed to secure more reliable commitments from its partners? And how did Riyadh misjudge the weakness of the pro-government forces it has backed in Yemen? These questions are likely to be expanded upon in the Chinese expert debate as the conflict in Yemen seemingly continues to escalate, despite Chinese predictions (and hopes) for a stalemate and political settlement.

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Giorgia FACCHINI is a Research Fellow at the ChinaMed Project. She is currently a scholar at Peking University’s Yenching Academy. She also holds a master’s degree in International Relations and Institutions of Asia and Africa at the University of Naples “L’Orientale”. Her research interests include Sino–Middle Eastern relations, with a focus on China’s role in key maritime chokepoints and strategic corridors, and its economic interests and foreign policy behaviour in the region.