The Chinese Debate on the Mecca Agreement and the Changing Security Landscape in the Middle East

The five-month U.S.-Iran war remains at a stalemate, as reciprocal U.S. port restrictions and Iranian pressure on shipping continue to disrupt traffic through the Strait of Hormuz. Gulf unity is under strain, with countries pursuing different strategies to safeguard their interests and security amid an increasingly uncertain regional situation.

Against this background, Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Pakistan signed the “Mecca Joint Defense Agreement” (henceforth Mecca Agreement) on August 7, 2026, building on a previous mutual defense pact signed between Islamabad and Riyadh in September 2025.

In this issue of the ChinaMed Observer, we look at how Chinese experts are reacting to these developments. We find that Chinese experts generally view the Mecca Agreement as an important, if still largely symbolic, first step toward a more autonomous and flexible regional security order – one shaped by shifting alliances and pragmatic cooperation, but whose durability and effectiveness remain uncertain. Some experts also highlighted the potential for the agreement to strengthen indirect channels for Chinese engagement within the emerging regional security architecture.

The End of the Old Regional Order

Since the beginning of the war, there has been an ongoing discussion about what the region will look like at the end of the hostilities. In general, Chinese experts have long expected or, some could say, hoped to see Middle Eastern countries pursue greater strategic autonomy vis-à-vis the United States, with many identifying the current conflict as a clear catalyst for this shift.

After all, the limits of American power have become evident. The disruptive nature of U.S. policy under Trump has raised questions about both the reliability of American power and the space this creates for its adversaries.

In an article published by Ai Sixiang, Ding Xueliang, Professor at the Department of Social Sciences at the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, observed that:

“In terms of international affairs, most of Trump’s actions have been ignorant and foolish, with only a very few being reliable. For those governments that view the United States as an adversary, they should be grateful for the choice made by American citizens in 2024, allowing Trump to return to the helm of the world’s leading power’s foreign and military affairs. If we, as bystanders, can see this, the Iranian leadership can surely see it too.”¹

Niu Xinchun, Vice-President of Ningxia University and Executive Director of its China-Arab Research Institute, added that if mutual deterrence between Israel and Iran underpinned the old order, the current conflict not only disrupted that balance, but might have also given Tehran an opportunity to reshape the region:

“Although severely weakened, Iran has regained its strategic deterrent capability against the U.S. and Israel, and control of the Strait of Hormuz has become a key strategic asset. Meanwhile, Iran awaits changes in the international situation.
On the one hand, the great power rivalry between the U.S., China, and Russia may develop in a direction favorable to Iran; on the other hand, the U.S. and Israeli attacks on Iran violate international law and basic norms of international relations, alienating many supporters. Israel’s military expansionism and adventurism may backfire.”²

Whether Iran will be successful, however, is far from certain. Nor is it clear how other countries in the region will position themselves amid the reconfiguration of existing alliances.

On this note, Tang Zhichao, Director of the Institute of West-Asian and African Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, argued that the traditional anti-American, anti-Israeli and anti-Iranian camps in the Middle East have become increasingly blurred:

“The anti-American and anti-Israeli camps are shrinking, the US-backed anti-Iran regional alliance is disintegrating, and the Iranian-led regional ‘axis of resistance’ has been severely weakened. Regional countries are increasingly forming alliances based on their own development strategies and core regional issues, leading to frequent changes in alliances.”³

The growing fluidity of regional alignments is particularly evident among the Arab Gulf states, which have recently pursued more proactive yet divergent security policies to mitigate risks amid the current crisis, moving away from their previous tendency to adopt a wait-and-see approach.⁴

Sun Degang, Director of the Center for Middle Eastern Studies at Fudan University, explained that policy divergence among Arab Gulf states reflects differences in their interests, as well as their pursuit of diplomatic pragmatism and diversification in the context of declining U.S. hegemony and security commitments.⁵

Overall, Chinese experts consider that these shifts reveal a significant rupture in the old strategic balance and point toward a restructuring of the Middle East order. The Mecca Agreement builds on security ties that had already deepened before its signing, including Pakistan’s 2025 defense agreement with Saudi Arabia and the ratification of its defense pact with Kuwait in July 2026.

The First Steps toward a Common Defense Framework: The Mecca Agreement

It is against this background that Chinese experts have largely interpreted the Mecca Agreement as consistent with the regional scenario that they long anticipated, and in some cases, hoped for.

For instance, Yan Xuetong, Honorary Dean of the Institute of International Relations at Tsinghua University, argued that the Iran war has made Middle Eastern countries that rely on the U.S. for defense and security question its willingness and ability to provide a protective umbrella: “If the U.S. military can’t even protect its own bases, how can it protect these countries?,” he asked.⁶

According to Li Zixin, an assistant researcher at the China Institute of International Studies, the Mecca Agreement differs from the “defense solution” proposed by the U.S. in two ways. On the one hand, in contrast to the hierarchical relationship between Washington and its regional allies, it offers a more equal and cooperative relationship. On the other, the agreement may facilitate resource pooling and mutual support among its members in a geopolitically fragmented region.⁷

While the Mecca Agreement has been described by many as a Middle East version of NATO, Chinese experts do not expect this pact to truly work as NATO. The Mecca Agreement stipulates that “an armed attack against any one of the three countries should be considered an attack against all three,” echoing Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. Yet, Li observed that the three parties remain cautious about how this provision would be implemented in practice, arguing that, in the context of “hot war,” it would be unrealistic for the agreement to include specific clauses or triggering conditions.⁸

Kong Dejun, a researcher at the Institute of Mediterranean Studies at Zhejiang University of Foreign Languages, also concurred that it is too early to speak about a full-fledged “Islamic NATO,” noting that “the main security directions faced by the three countries are not completely consistent” and that military obligations have yet to be transformed into permanent implementation mechanisms.

“The significance of this agreement is here: the principle of common defense has been established, the ministerial committee and the permanent secretariat have begun to be set up, and cooperation has remained open to other countries […]

The extent to which joint command, air defense and anti-missile defense, intelligence sharing, military reinforcements and military-industrial coordination can be developed remains to be tested by reality.”⁹

In this context, Türkiye, which is also a NATO member, makes an interesting case. Guo Bingyun, associate professor at the School of International Relations of Sichuan International Studies University, outlined the economic incentives that contributed to Ankara’s joining the agreement, arguing that extending Turkish defense commitments to the Gulf and South Asia can significantly expand its strategic depth and arms market:

“Türkiye’s defense industry has advantages in areas such as drones, ships and munitions. The agreement explicitly mentions joint defense industry projects and counter-terrorism cooperation, opening the doors to Saudi funding and Pakistani technology […]
By allying with Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, Türkiye strengthens its collective deterrence against potential threats and enhances its voice in the Islamic world and global affairs. Meanwhile, its NATO membership and the obligations of the new agreement are officially defined as non-conflicting and complementary.”¹⁰

According to Guo, the Mecca Agreement is also likely to complicate Israel’s regional strategy, with Turkish military power and Pakistani nuclear deterrence objectively increasing the potential costs of any unilateral Israeli military action.¹¹ Moreover, given the deterioration of Turkish-Israeli relations since 2023 and the absence of formal diplomatic ties between Israel and Saudi Arabia or Pakistan, the Mecca Agreement may also undermine Israeli efforts to integrate into the region’s security framework and advance normalization through the Abraham Accords.¹²

More broadly, Sun Degang argues that ultimately, the Mecca Agreement’s symbolic value is much more important than its tactical effectiveness: it is all about signaling to Washington and Tehran.¹³

On the Iranian side, soon after the announcement of the defense pact, former commander-in-chief of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Mohsen Rezai was appointed Secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council on August 9.

Qiushi, the official journal of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, described Iran’s reaction to the Mecca Agreement as “most nuanced.” While the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs welcomed the pact by underscoring the importance of “security autonomy” and downplaying concerns that the agreement could be directed against Iran, Rezai also warned Saudi Arabia that, “just as years of unilateral dependence on the U.S. had not brought it security, neither would the Mecca Agreement.”¹⁴ This ambivalence, according to Qiushi, “reflects Tehran’s complex mentality of both welcoming the weakening of U.S. influence and fearing that the new alliance might encircle Iran.”¹⁵

Despite the timing of Rezai’s appointment, however, it should not necessarily be read as a direct response to the Mecca Agreement. Jin Liangxiang, a researcher at the Shanghai Institute of International Studies, noted that Rezai’s broad influence could allow him to better coordinate major issues in Iranian foreign diplomacy, while the appointment resulted from internal power dynamics within the political establishment.¹⁶

As for the United States, Li Zixin noted that Washington will probably tolerate the Mecca Agreement for the time being, given its longstanding security cooperation with all three members. However, should cooperation among the three begin to develop in ways that challenge or seek to replace U.S. influence, Washington may intervene to contain it.¹⁷

Prospects for Broadening the Agreement

One of the most debated issues among Chinese experts was whether other countries in the region would join the Mecca Agreement.

During the last few months, Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, Pakistan and Egypt have built a coordination mechanism known as the “R4” to discuss regional security, particularly the impact of the U.S.-Iran war. Egypt’s participation in this framework made its inclusion in the Mecca Agreement a natural expectation.¹⁸

According to Guo Bingyun, while Egypt’s future accession is a concrete possibility, Cairo’s current caution is due to two key aspects. First, the Mecca Agreement’s collective defense obligations are difficult to reconcile with Egypt’s policies prioritizing domestic stability and economic recovery. Second, as a signatory of the Camp David Accords, Egypt maintains a high degree of military and security dependence on the U.S. and a complex relationship with Israel.¹⁹

Clearly, the Mecca Agreement is not limited to trilateral cooperation, but is envisioned by its founders to become a broader model for regional security cooperation. Other countries, including Qatar, Kuwait, Jordan, Syria and Azerbaijan, have also been mentioned as potential future participants. As Li Zixin noted, one of the main purposes of the agreement is to “set an example” for other countries in the region:

“Right now it’s more about emphasizing a concept, a future direction for development. If this form of cooperation gains widespread recognition among countries in the region, it’s worth paying close attention to whether the relevant clauses will be further solidified or supplemented with new content after the end of the U.S.-Iran war.”²⁰

Pakistan’s institutionalized entry into the Middle East security architecture also raised the possibility that the Mecca Agreement could extend to countries outside the region.

Qiushi observed that with the Mecca Agreement, “the geographical boundaries of Middle East security issues are extending from the Middle East itself to a trans-regional security network covering the Persian Gulf, the Red Sea, the Arabian Sea and even South-Asia.”²¹

Against this backdrop, some Indian media have even speculated that China might join the agreement, if invited. In response, Liu Zongyi, a researcher at the Shanghai Institute for International Studies, argued that the three signatories are unlikely to extend such an invitation and that, in any case, China would probably refuse. According to Liu, the assumption that Beijing would accept a hypothetical invitation reflects Indian media’s “anxiety” and tendency to “view China as its biggest threat and adversary”:

“China’s position is clear: it will not participate in military agreements or alliances. Pakistan fully understands China’s relevant positions and therefore will not push for China’s participation in such defense agreements.”²²

Liu nevertheless highlighted that China could pursue normal defense equipment cooperation with the signatories, particularly Pakistan. He argued that the agreement not only strengthened Pakistan’s role in the regional security architecture and enhanced its diplomatic influence, but could also allow Islamabad to play a key role in China’s arms system exports.

“[Pakistan] could play a bridging role between China and the Middle East and the Islamic world, while also receiving support from China in its industrialization, Saudi Arabia’s funding and Türkiye’s military industry’s assistance.”²³

Conclusion

Chinese experts broadly interpreted the Mecca Agreement as both a consequence of the collapse of the old regional order and an early attempt by Middle Eastern states to develop greater strategic autonomy. Although they recognized the agreement’s current limitations – including different security priorities among its members and uncertainty over the implementation of its collective-defense provisions – they see it as a potentially important framework for more flexible, multidirectional regional cooperation.

It is also notable that some Chinese analyses highlighted how Pakistan’s participation in the Mecca Agreement strengthens an indirect channel for Chinese influence: Islamabad can connect China to the emerging Middle Eastern security architecture, while potentially facilitating Chinese defense-equipment exports and broader cooperation with Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, and other future participants. In this sense, the agreement is interpreted not only as a regional response to declining confidence in the United States, but also as a development that could expand China’s influence through existing partnerships.

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Eva Ragozzino is a Research Fellow at the ChinaMed Project. She holds a Master’s Degree in International Relations and Institutions of Asia and Africa from the University of Naples “L’Orientale,” specializing in East Asia and Chinese studies. Her research interests include China’s foreign policy and Sino-Middle Eastern relations.